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ABSTRACT
ENERGY POLICIES, LIBERALIZATION AND THE FRAMING OF CLIMATE
CHANGE POLICIES IN INDIA
SEPTEMBER 1997
ANILLA CHERIAN, B.A., CORNELL UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Peter M. Haas
Global climate change has emerged a new environmental issue affecting developing
countries particularly after the signing of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change in June 1992. This dissertation focuses on the factors which motivate
Indian responses to global climate change at the international level.
The study evaluates the relative impacts ot two policy frames in the formulation of
India’s national climate change policy stance . The concept of “ policy frames” refers to
the idea that the definition of , and responses to a particular problem are constructed in
terms of another more pressing and salient policy concern. A “policy frame” is an
analytically constructed policy filter comprised of key, identifiable, policy features and
existing resource constraints in a sector. The study traces the evolution of national energy
(coal, power and renewable energy) and environment sector policies under centralized
planning based on a survey of a series of Five Year Plans (1970-1997). Characteristic
v
secora, policies are ideniified as constituting an
‘•energy-related developmen, poUcyW and an
“envtronment-rela.ed developmen, poltcy frame” under tw0 distinc
, phases
of national economic development- a managed economy and a liberalized economy.
The study demonstrates tha, the 1991 shift towards phased eeonomtc Itberalizatton
resulted not only in a new se, of energy (coal, power and renewable energy, poUetes and
consequently an altered energy policy frame, but also in a largely unchanged set of
environmental sector policies and consequently only a margtnally altered environmental
policy frame. The study demonstrates that the post-,991 energy policy changes together
with existing energy resource constraints, constitute the dominant poUcy frame driving
both the formulation of Indian policy stances at international climate change negotiations
and also Indian responsiveness to coal, power, renewable energy, and climate change
projects funded by the World Bank and GEF
The study also demonstrates that key features of the energy policy frame functions
as a shared cognitive reference for a select group of national poUcy actors (comprising
both poUcy makers and policy experts), responsible for formulating climate change poUcy
responses. The study highhghts the influential role played by very smaU set of national
poUcy experts who construct national climate change options on the basis of features of
the energy policy frame.
vi
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CHAPTER I
THE FRAMING OF INDIAN CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY STANCES
1*1 Introduction
The economic and political exigencies confronting many developing countries’
aders at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) 1972.
initially encouraged perceptions that policy perspectives on global environmental problems
would be difficult to resolve with economic growth objectives. Bu, the active participation
of developing countries in international negotiations on the loss of biodiversity and the
threat of global climate change leading up to and after the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) 1992, is evidence of a new trend towards the
internationalization of environmental problems. ' This internationalization or globalization
of environmental problems has resulted not only in greater policy priority being accorded
to the environment in both developed and developing countries, but also in growing
North-South tensions on allocating responsibilities and assessing responses for these
problems.
Global environmental problems have attracted increasing press coverage in leading
English language newspapers in India and a review of key national newspapers’ coverage
of the UNCED indicates that over 280 articles on the UNCED proceedings were
published from March-July 1992. 2 But for the vast majority of Indians struggling to eke
1 See Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury eds.. The International Politics of the
Environment
.
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), page 2.
2 The complete list of articles covering the UNCED from March-July 1992 is printed in
(continued...)
1
out a daily Uving a^dst endunng poverty, communal nots
,^ comiptjon„
topical issues such as economic Uberalizatron. burgeoning national energy needs, and
endemic power shortages are no, associated with the global chmate change problem. » The
central issue under mvestrgation in this study
,s to explain why and how the Indran state
responds to the global elunate change problem, given the plethora of pressmg socio-
economic development concerns confronting national policy actors.
Although environmental issues occupy an increasingly important place tn the
political agenda of both developed and developing countnes. envrronmenta, policy making
m developing countries ren^ins poorly understood primartly because social scientists have
not focused adequate attention on this matter. Studies in environmental politics and policy
makrng have tended to focus on understanding the development-environment linkage from
political and institutional perspectives existing in, or specific to, industrialized countries.
The three models of environmental policy-making developed so far are based largely on
the environmental experiences of developed countries. The electoral pressure or pohtics
model argues that public concern for the environment creates electoral pressure which
’(...continued)
Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI) publication. TERI, “TERI Information Service on
Global Warming (TISGLOW)”, (Vol 3: No.2, October 1992), page 60-69.
Global climate change refers to the impacts of increasing anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gases in enhancing the natural greenhouse effects and resulting on average in
an additional warming of the Earth's surface and atmosphere. The four major greenhouse
gases (GHGs) are carbon dioxide, methane, Chlorofluorocarbons, and nitrous oxide. Of
these carbon dioxide is considered the most important in terms of magnitude of emissions,
radiative forcing, and its direct linkage with energy consumption and production patterns.
2
leads to environmental legation. « The bureauerattc or organtza.tonal change model
posits that environmental issues are stressed within the state bureaucracy and structural
changes in the bureaucracy lead to changes in environmental policy. » The exogenous
change model posits that external pressures generated by international mshtuhons and
regimes contribute to changes in nattonal pohey stances on global environmental issues. ‘
This study focuses on providing a pohey framework for understanding the process
by which a large developmg counhy Uke India formulates nattonal pohey stances on global
climate change. An examinatton of the impacts of global climate change on the Indian
energy-environmental policy apparatus appears to be both timely and necessary, given the
costs of rapidly increasing national energy needs and the growing international concern
over environmental degradation. An explanatton of why and how Indian climate change
policy making occurs does not he in the three previously described models of
environmental policy-making for the following reasons. One, given the absence of
widespread Indian pubhc concern with climate change, the electoral pressure model is
Antony Downs discussed the process by which the environmental issue first appears
on the social agenda in "Up and Down with Ecology," Public Interest (No.28. 1972)
page 28-50.
5
L. Lundqvist compared the electoral pressure model in the US to the Swedish case of
organizational change to 'hare and the tortoise’ in The Hare and the Tortoise: Clean Air
Policies in the United States and Sweden (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
1980).
6 Karen Litfin, “Ecoregimes: Playing Tug of War with the Nation-State”, in Ronnie
Lipschutz and Ken Conca eds.. The State and Social Power in Global Environmental
Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), page 94-117 Marc Levy, Oran
Young and Michael Zum, The Study of International Regimes
.
(Laxenburg: IIASA
1994).
3
clearly no, relevant. ’ Two, whfle there have been sotne signtficant increment,,! changes in
the bureaucracy since 1972, .here have been no deep structural changes in the state
machinery responsible for dealing with global environmental problems. Three, the
exogenous change model appears to have little sahence in explaining the formulation of
na,tonal climate change pohcy stances primarily because there is no climate change related
international regime that has had any clearly detectable influence on the formulation of
national climate change policy stance.
In studying the effects of the globalization of environmental problems,
considerable attention has been paid to the role played by non-state actors and the role of
negotiating structures and rules in the international environmental negotiating process. 8
The extent to which national development priorities drive national responses to global
A 1 992 international opinion survey of 24 nations asked representative national
samples of citizens to rate as “very serious” each issue from among the following list of
environmental problems: air pollution, water pollution, contaminated soil, loss of species,
loss of rain forest, global warming and loss of ozone. According to the survey’s findings,
36 % of Indian citizens (urban based) as compared to 71% of Brazilian citizens and 47%
of American citizens said that they personally believed that global warming was a “very
serious environmental problem. The survey notes that Indian citizens appear more
concerned with air pollution (65%)
,
loss of rain forest (54%) and water pollution (50%).
Riley E. Dunlap, George Gallup and Alec Gallup, Health ofThe Planet (New Jersey:
George Gallop International Institute, 1992), page 27 and Table 6. The authors note that
with the sole exception of India (non-rural adult population sample), findings are based on
representative national samples of the total adult population.
8
Robert Keohane and Marc Levy, Institutions for Environmental Aid
.
(Cambridge,
MIT Press, 1996); Marc Levy, Robert Keohane, Peter Haas eds.. Institutions for the
Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection
.
(Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1993); Thomas Bemauer, “The Effect of International Environmental Institutions:
How we might learn more,” International Organization. (No.49: Vol.2, Spring 1995),
page 351-77; and Richard Benedick, Ozone Diplomacy
.
(Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1991).
4
environmental
.sues and the objective matenal cond.Uons that affect md,vidua, nations’
pohcy stances on these issues have not been adequately examined by political scientists.
While studies on the role of international organizations and on the dynamics of the
international negotiatmg process facilitate an understanding ofhow nations participate in
resolving the global environmental problems; it is equally unportant to examine the
factors which explain national participation in global environmental negotiations and to
reflect on the process by which national pohcy stances on global environmental issues are
formulated.
Due to the paucity of social science work on the formulation of national climate
change policy stances, there are unfortunately no adequate theoretical explanations as to
why and how individual nations formulate particular policy stances. For instance, Richard
van der Wurff s unpublished manuscript comparing the climate change positions of the
US, Germany and Britain attempts to explain cross-national policy variations on the basis
of the environmental views of national elites but does not provide adequate theoretical or
empirical evidence of how the views of national elites actually influences specific national
climate change policy stances. In fact, van der Wurff extrapolates that cross national
policy variations may be explained because “the prominence of cross-national difference in
climate change views suggest that these views indeed will have a significant effect on
climate change policy positions,” but goes on to admit that climate change positions in the
UK and the US “are less explicable in terms of underlying climate change views than the
5
position. In addition, very little attention has been paid to studying developing
countries’ responses to the international elimate change negotiations, and to the domestic
factors motivating developing countries’ participation in such negotiations. '» As this study
argues, domestic factors are no, limited to material conditions which affect a nation’s
response to global climate change bu, also encompass the domestic policy-making arena in
which climate change policy is made and the role of policy experts and relevant
.merest
groups.
The active role played by Indian negotiators in the international climate change
negotiations indicates that the problem of global climate change is neither insignffican, or
esoteric for large developing countries like India. This study argues that international
negotiations on a possible protocol for limiting GHG emissions and discussions on
technology transfer and resource flows related to the energy-environment nexus are topics
of interest for both Indian climate change policy experts and policy makers, particularly as
these issues coincide with India being confronted with growing energy needs and
shortages and moving towards energy sector liberalization.
4
Richard van der Wurff. International Climate Change Politics: Interests and
Perceptions, (Unpublished Manuscript, March 31, 1997), page 286.
10
In a study done by Gupta, Junne and van der Wurff “foreign policy” was cited as the
major influence in putting climate change policies on the domestic agendas of India,
Indonesia, Kenya and Brazil. However, the study does not discuss specific Indian climate
change policy stances taken at international climate change negotiations nor does it explain
how foreign policy concerns result in specific climate change policy stances. Joyeeta
Gupta, Gerd Junne and Richard van der Wurff, International Policies to address the
Greenhouse Effect
.
(Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1995), page 45-59.
6
Despite the Inchan state's imtitutionalization of environmental concerns from
1 972 onwards, only a select group of national pohcy actors within the huge machtnery of
state bureaucracy have been active in responding to the global climate change. A detailed
examination of the Indian climate change related policy apparatus reveals that Indian
environmental pohcy makers and pohcy experts who are principally responsible for
formulating national climate change pohcy stances understand and respond to the global
climate change issue in energy related and not environment related terms. Using the
concept of pohcy framing, the study argues that for developing countries like India, it is
not concern over the global environment or national environment related concerns which
drive national policy making on global climate change. Instead, Indian pohcy making on
global climate change is “framed” by other more pressing national pohcy concerns such as
energy related development needs. Here the concept of pohcy framing refers to the idea
that national energy-related development pohcies taken during the post- 1991 shift towards
economic liberalization set the parameters for the formulation of national climate change
policy stances.
Through an examination of the role of a select group of national policy actors and
national energy and environment policy frameworks, the study uses the concept of policy
framing to argue that national energy related development policies “frame” national
climate change pohcy stances and that these national energy related development policies
have a direct impact on Indian responsiveness to two of the most important climate
change-related international financing institutions- the World Bank and the Global
Environment Facility (GEF). The study argues that Indian pohcy stances at international
7
climate change negotiations are “framed” by its enemv a iy n ergy related development needs and
polices and not by national environmental policies or needs.
In order to understand how national energy related development needs and
patterns of energy consumption and production govern India’s response to the climate
change tssue, the following questions are raised: who are the key national and intemat.onal
actors-individuals, groups or institutions - involved in formulation of Indtan climate
change policy stances?, how do national policy actors understand or make sense of the
global climate change problem?, what are the relevant national energy sector policies and
needs that channel or create certain opportunities and constraints for the formulation of
national climate change policy stances? have there been any environmental policies which
address the issue of global climate change, and what roles do international environmental
financing institutions and policy experts play in the formulation of Indian climate change
related policy stances?
It was critical to identify very early on in the study the group of national policy
actors active in the formulation of national climate change related policies. After attending
all the major intergovernmental climate change negotiations from 1994 to 1995 11 and
conducting a series of preliminary interviews with key international climate change actors
such as Michael Zammit-Cutajar, the Executive Secretary of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Dr. R. Sundararaman, the
1
1
Attendance at the major intergovernmental climate change negotiations in 1994-1 995
was facilitated as a consequence of work done for Earth Negotiations Bulletin, a reporting
facility for conferences on environment and development administered by the International
Institute for Sustainable Development, Canada.
8
Secretary of the Intergovernmental Pane, on Chmate Change (IPCC), Mohammed El-
Ashry, the Chairman of the GEF, Dr. A. Rehman. a South Asian environmental expert. Dr.
Irving Minzter of the S.oekholm Envrronmen, Institute, and various developing and
developed country negotiators, it became clear that only a small group of Indian policy
actors (policy makers and pohcy experts were tnvolved in interna.,onal chmate change
negottattons. Preliminary mterviews were conducted in 1994 to determine the group of
national actors responsible for the formulation of climate change policy stances.
Given the recent international political emergence of global climate clurnge
problem, there is no clear institutionalized process by which national climate change pohcy
making in developing countries like !nd,a occurs. Instead, national climate change policy
stances are formulated on an ongoing basis by a small group of national pohcy actors. In
the Indian context there has been httle by way of active non-governmental or interest
group pressures exerted on the select group of national policy actors responding to the
global climate change problem in contrast to more sustained popular or interest group
pressures exerted on the state machinery responsible for the construction of mega-hydro
and for forest management practices. The principal policy actors responsible for
formulating national climate change policy stances include key officials in the Ministry of
Environment and Forestry (MOEF), Indian diplomats from the Ministry of External
Affairs, and officials from the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources (MNES). In
addition to the above, the group of national policy actors who respond to the global
climate change issues also includes policy experts from the Tata Energy Research Institute
(TERI)- a private not-for-profit research organization, the Centre for Science and
9
Environment (CSE)- a envu-onmental non-govemmental orgamzat.on, and the
government sponsored Indira Gandh, Institute of Development Research (IGIDR). Table
I 1 provides a list of relevant national pohcy makers interviewed. Indian policy makers
have commissioned pohcy advtce and papers from both TERI and IGIDR. and all the
pohcy experts identified in the Table 1 .2 below have provided pohcy advtce to Indian
negottators in workshops held both pnor to and dunng the major international climate
change meetings from 1991-1996.
Table 1.1 List of relevant national policy makers interviewed
Name Institutional Affiliation & Interview Date 12
Kamal Nath Minister, MOEF, (September 11, 1995)
Dr. N. Krishnan Secretary- MOEF, MOEF, (April 28, 1995)
Antony De Sa Personal Secretary to Minister, MOEF, (August 23, 1995)
K.K. Bakshi Additional Secretary, MOEF, (September 1 1, 1995)
Mukul Sanwal Joint Secretary, MOEF. Currently working as senior advisor with
the UNFCCC Secretariat. (August 23, 1995)
Dr S. Sharma Director-Climate Change, MOEF, (September 12, 1995)
Amb. T.P. Sreenivasan Ministry of External Affairs, (October 21, 1994)
S.Krishna Kumar Minister, MNES, (November 21, 1994)
B.R Prabhakara Secretary-MNES, MNES, (September 14, 1995)
K.R. Achary Technical Assistant to Minister, MNES, (September 12, 1995)
Dr. S.K. Chopra Senior Advisor, MNES, (September 14, 1995)
R. Vasudevan Secretary-Power, Ministry of Power, (September 14, 1995)
Under the parliamentary system in India, the highest ranking bureaucrat within each
Ministry is given the title of Secretary. These central government bureaucrats retain their
position unlike Ministers who may lose their portfolios at any time during their tenure.
10
Table 1.2 List Of reievant nation*, c,imate change experts interviewed
Name
Dr R.K. Pachauri
Institutional Affiliation
Director, TERl/Special Advisor to UNDP Administrator,
Dr. C.S. Sinha
(October 27, 1994 & September 13, 1995 )
Climate Change Focal Point, TERI,
Dr. Ajay Mathur
Ravi Sharma
Dr. Jyoti Parikh
(October 26, 1994 & September 13, 1995)
Policy Expert, TERI/World Bank, (November 14, 1994)
Climate Change Expert, CSE, (September 13, 1995)
Senior Professor, IGIDR/Lead convening IPCC author.
(September 29, 1995).
12 Significance of the Study; Whv inHi^
India is the second most populous country in the world and may be the most
populous one by 2025. A case study of Indian policy responses to climate change is of
particular interest for the following three reasons: 1) India’s current and future
contributions to global carbon dioxide emissions given national reliance on using domestic
coal reserves
; 2) India’s role in international climate change negotiations as indicative of
developing countries participation in international negotiations on global environmental
problems, and 3) the need to understand the energy-environment relationship from a
developing country perspective. 13 The segment below provides information pertinent to
the first reason while the other two reasons are discussed in detail in the remaining
chapters of the study.
13 Corazon Siddayo, "Energy investments and environmental implications,” Energy
Policy, (Vol.20: No.3, March 1992), page 223-232. Siddayo, head of the Energy
Program in the World Bank, discusses the need to focus on key policy issues for
developing countries in the energy-environment linkage
11
Indu, and Chrna are major players in .he resolution of global climate change
because of them Ukcly leases of carl™ dioxtde (C02) emtssions due to tncreases
income and level of population, and thetr dependence on coal. » Coa, has the highest CO
;
emtssion coefficient per primary Gigajoule (GJ) of the various fossU fuels available. Coal,
largely of sub-bttununous grade, is India's larges, energy resource, and it is the source of
about 60% of its commercial energy. » Another chrna,e change related concern is the
generally poor quality of Indian coals which is characterized by htgh-nearly 35%-ash
content “ A World Bank dtscussion paper on energy demand in five major Asian
developing countries notes that India has substituted tndigenous energy sources for oil,
and that the most important indigenous source is coal which supplies over one half of
primary energy sources. 17 Rapidly growing demands for commercial energy, combined
with the need to cut back on oil imports to reduce the likelihood of a severe foreign
exchange crisis (such as the one triggered by rising oil prices during the Persian Gulf
Jyoti Parikh and Subir Gokam, "Climate Change and India's energy policy options ”
Global Environmental Change
,
September 1993, page 277.
15 TERI, Energy Data, Directory and Yearbook. 1990-91
. tNew Delhi- tfri 1992 )
page 37.
16 M. Grubb, P. Brackley, M. Ledic, A. Mathur, S. Rayner, J. Russell, and A. Tanabe,
Energy Policies and the Greenhouse Effect
.
(Dartmouth: Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1991), page 408.
17 Masayasu Ishiguro and Takamasa Akiyama, Energy Demand in Five Major Asian
Developing Countries, (Washington D.C.: World Bank Discussion Papers, 1995),
page 14.
12
War), makes coal a critical energy source. From 1980 to 1992, coal product,on more than
doubled to 229 miUion tons and it is expected to reach 400 million tons by 2000
ISENDS 90 reveals thal GHG emissions in India continue to be largely from
coal burning which contributed to 72% of emtssions in 1988 though per cap,.a emissions
in 1988 were less than 4% of the US value. '• Ajay Mathur ofTER!, writes that the most
probable scenario is that Indian energy consumption will continue with rapid growth based
on commercial fossil fuels, dominated by coal for power production, in which case carbon
enussions can be expected to increase sixfold by 2025. 20 Nandita Mongia and others note
that India will account for 18% of the increase in carbon emissions from energy use in
developing countries between 1985 and 2025. 21
Repetto notes that the greenhouse issue has emerged as a completely new potential
environmental factor affecting India's energy sector and, potentially, the overall economy.
He points out that in discussing the need to develop coal resources, the Second India
ls
Asian Development Bank
,
Environmental Considerations in Energy Development
(Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1991), page 24.
Thomas Boden, Paul ICanciruk, Michael Farrell, TRENDS 90: A Compendium of
Data on Global Change, (Oak Ridge: Oak Ridge National Laboratory-Carbon Dioxide
Information Center) 1990: p.104. Emissions have grown 5.6% per year as India climbed
from 13th to 6th place as a national contributor from 1950-1988.
20 Ajay Mathur, 1991, page 398.
1 Nandita Mongia, Ramesh Bhatia, Jayant Sathaye and Puran Mongia, “Cost of
reducing C0 2 emissions from India." Energy Policy . (Vol.19: No. 10, December 1991),
page 978.
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Studies, 22 an eight-volume report sponsored by the Ford Foundation in the mid 1970s.
made no mention of potential climate change as a possible constraint, primarily because
the issue only received widespread international attention in the 1980s. 22 But with the
entry into force of the UNFCCC in June 1994. India, as the world's fifth or sixth larges,
emitter ofGHGs with a heavy reliance on coal-a carbon rich fuel- faces the task of
deciding how best to respond with some urgency.
Though India's responses to the climate change issue are significant because of its
role as a net emitter of GHGs, contentious debate has ensued at the international level as
to whether India’s present and fbture contributions to the global GHG emissions should be
represented on an aggregate or on a per capita basis
,
and whether national contributions
to GHG emissions should be differentiated on the basis of GHGs. 24 India is one of the
largest consumers of energy in the developing world and is among the top 20 consumers
of commercial energy m the world. On a per capita basis, however, its use of commercial
The series included an overview report and individual studies on demography,
urbanization, the economy, agriculture, water, energy, industry and services. The authors
considered events through 1970 and constructed several plausible scenarios up through
the year 2000. F.A. Mehta, Second India Studies: Economy
.
(New Delhi: MacMillan,
1976); and K. Parikh, Second India Studies: Energy
.
(New Delhi: MacMillan, 1976).
23 Robert Repetto ed.. The "Second India" Revisited
.
(Washington D.C.: World
Resources Institute, 1994) page 75.
24 World Resources Institute (WRI), World Resources: 1990-91
.
(New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990) ranked India as the fifth largest contributor to annual increases in
greenhouse gas emissions, chiefly due to methane emissions from agricultural practices.
The Centre for Science and Environment (CSE- an Indian NGO) criticized the WRI
assessments for attaching equal weight to all emissions without paying attention to their
source and for sidestepping issues of equity and per capita emissions. Anil Agarwal and
Sunita Narain, Global Warming in an Unequal World (New Delhi: Centre for Science and
Environment, 1991).
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energy is only one-e.ghth the world average. » Pankh and Gokan, argue ,ha« from
.ndia's
perspective, its fossil-based carbon emtsstons were only 115 million tons in 1985
compared to 5.4 bilbon tonnes for the world and 1 .3 billion tons for the US; and even in
2025, its total emtssions are likely to be only 0.6 billion tonnes. * Recent WRI estimates
indicate that total CO
; emissions from industrial processes in India are 769,440 metric
tons in 1992 while per capita CO, emtssions are 0.88 metric tons in ,992 as compared to
total CO, emissions from industrial processes of 2,667,982 and 4,88 1 , 349 metric tons
from China and US respectively and per capita CO, emissions of 2.27 and 19. 13 metric
tons from China and US respectively. The issue of stressing per capita GHGs emissions
rather than aggregate GHG emissions has been a consistent policy concern of Indian
negotiators at a various international climate change related fora because it has allowed
Indian negotiators to argue that the real responsibility for addressing the global climate
change problem rests with advanced industrialized countries who should therefore bear the
costs of adjusting to the problem.
With regard to the debate over which GHGs should be considered in estimating
national GHG contributions, an official MOEF publication notes that national GHG
inventories must be based on national statistical data where available and must be prepared
by groups within the country itself primarily because measurements made elsewhere and
25 WRI> World Resources 1994-95
.
(New York: Oxford University Press) 1994- page
100 .
26
Parikh and Gokam, 1993, page 278.
27 World Resources Institute, World Resources: 1996-1997
.
(New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), page 327.
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extrapolated to vastly different nattonal condttions can be mtsleadtng. - Moreover. Indian
sc,enlists such as Dr. A.P Mitra. have questioned non-lnd,an est,mates of other GHGs.
particularly methane emissions from rice-paddy cult,vat,on and animal wastes. WRI
estumtes mdicate that total methane emiss,ons from anthropogenic sources for India and
Chma amount to 33,000 and 47,000 metric tons respectively, with we, rice agriculture
(rice paddy fields) accounting for the bulk of Ind,an methane emissions- 16,000 metric
tons, and Chinese methane emissions-24,000 tons. These figures indicate that both
countnes are significant contributors ofmethane emtssions when compared to total
methane emissions from US. Europe and Africa estunated at 47,000, 53,000 and 21,000
metnc tons respectively. » Although methane emtssions cannot be equated with carbon
dioxide emissions, because carbon dioxide remains the “prime greenhouse gas” and the
burrnng of fossil fuels is “responsible for roughly 80 percent of yearly carbon dioxide
emissions worldwide”, » the issue of accounting for methane emissions has been a thorny
issue for both China and India. For India, the question of methane emissions from
agriculture and cattle rearing is simply absent from national policy actors's discussions of
the global climate change problem both at the international level and in personal
interviews.
8
A.P. Mitra, Greenhouse Gas Emissions in India: Scientific Report No.4
.
(New Delhi:
Council of Scientific and Industrial Research and the Ministry of Environment and Forests,
August 1992), page 1.
39 World Resources Institute, 1996, page 329.
30 World Resources Institute, 1996, page 317.
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n large part due to the controversy over estimating national GHG emissions
,
Indta, unhke Chtna, Braztl and Malays,a, has no, accepted funding from e.ther the US
Country Stud.es Program or the GEF for conducting a national GHG inventory, bu, has
tnstead used national fitnds and experts under the ausp.ces of the national Conned of
Scientific and Industrial Research and the MOEF. According to GHG emissions est,mates
prepared by the two inst.tutions above, the total contribution ofCO, from all sources in
India is estimated at approximately 2.2% of global emissions. » While stressing the
“advantages of conducting India’s own national GHG inventory”, Indian scientists have
focused on the issue ofmethane emissions from paddy fields. Arguing that “Indian
estimates had lowered by as much as a factor of 10“ earlier “estimates made outside India
from the extrapolation of measurements made in Western countries under very different
conditions,” official Indian estimates indicate that methane emissions from paddy fields are
4 Tetra grams (Tg)/yr as against the US EPA estimates of 37.8 Tg/yr for 1991. 32
Even though India is considered the fifth largest emitter ofGHGs on a aggregate
basis, the UNFCCC states that “the share of global emissions originating in developing
countries will grow to meet their social and development needs”. 33 But consider for the
moment, the following not-so unlikely hypothetical. Given the increasing pressure from
31
A.P. Mitra, Greenhouse Gas Emission in India . 1992, page 1
32
A.P. Mitra, 1992, page 1. Tetra is 10 12 grams.
Information Unit on Clim.ite Change (IUCC), “United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change”, (Geneva: United Nations Environment
Programme/World Meteorological Organization, 1992), preamble. See Chapter 4 for a
discussion on Indian policy stances regarding per capita emissions.
17
developed counlnes, ,he Conference of .he Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC has agreed to
™Pose new consents on ceriam large developntg countries „ke India, Chnta and
Braztl. Recent developntents in the international clunate negottat.ons partteularly in light
of the discussion of a future protocol to be considered in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997,
discussed in Chapter 4, in which a broadening of commitments from “certain developing
countries” have been sought, have raised a red flag for negotiators from India, China,
Brazil and Malaysia, fearfitl of having any GHG emissions reductions imposed on them.
The need to respond to the threat of global climate change adds a new dimension to the
energy-environment policy nexus particularly for large developing countries like China and
India, as they move towards increased economic liberalization and rely heavily on
domestic coal supplies to fuel their economic growth.
International policy debate on the linkage between patterns of energy production
and consumption and global climate change did not emerge until the early 1990s. Energy
became a major international issue in the 1970s following the oil crisis and more recently,
global climate change induced by excessive greenhouse gas accumulation in the
atmosphere has emerged as a problem that further complicates energy issues. From the
perspective of the current study, Mohan Munasinghe makes an useful point in noting that
developing countries,
“...would be expected to cooperate in global environmental programs only to the
extent that such cooperation is consistent with their national growth objectives. 34
Mohan Munasinghe, "Policy for Energy and Sustainable Development" in John
Byrne and Daniel Rich eds.. Energy and Environment
.
(New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1 992), page 250. Until very recently, Munasinghe was the head of the Energy
(continued...)
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Th,s study argues that a.,hough the chntate change problem has ,ow issue identification
with the Indian public, a group of naltonal policy actors have responded to the issue
primarily to ensure that no res,notions be unposed on Indtan energy related development
policies, including the national policy preference for using coal reserves to fuel mdustrial
development, and also to secure appropriate energy related fbnding and technolog.es on a
grant or concessional basis. Munasinghe’s point that the developing countnes’
cooperation in global environmental programs depends on the extent to which such
programs reflect national growth objectives is directly linked to the central claim advanced
m this study that developing countries’ participation in international climate change
negotiations is “framed” by, or contingent upon their energy related economic
development objectives.
13 “Eohcy Frames” and the Formulation of Indian Climate Change Policy
Stances
Social scientists have sought practicable ways to make sense of the process by
which issues and problems are identified and constructed in the minds of policy actors.
This study argues that the identification of an issue, like the identification of a problem, is
an analytic construct in the mind 35 which is responsive to, and embedded in, a specific
socio-political or institutional context. Consequently it does not exist as an entity separate
34
(...continued)
and Environment Division in the World Bank.
35 Aaron Wildavsky, Speaking Truth to Power: The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis ,
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), and Carol Weiss ed., Using Social Research in Public
Policy Making
.
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977).
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from the means of maktng or no, makmg sense of the ,ssue. The s,„dy will no, attempt ,o
provide a defimttve explana.ion for how policy actors flunk the way ,hey do, hu, will
provide evidence ,o support ,he claun ,ha, pohcy actors link or associate global issues like
global climate change, with more pressing national ones, such as energy-related
development needs. Thus, for example, access to safe water may be seen as par, of the
health issue. Such an associative construction between issues means that one particular
tssue, in this case, health concerns may drive or influence pohcy debate on another- access
to clean water. In other words health policy concerns may function as the policy filter or
frame by which policy actors devise responses to the problem of providing clean water.
When pohcy discourse in issue (y) is either conceptualized and/or bounded in terms of the
policy discourse in issue (x), tssue (x) can be said to function as a pohcy filter or “frame”
for pohcy debate on issue (y). Here, it is not just that issue (x) is associated with issue (y),
but that issue (x) provides both the contextual reference and the pohcy impetus for
issue (y).
Clearly, Indian policy actors, like their counterparts in other countries, are
confronted with a daunting array of multi-dimensional criteria, tasks and pohcy goals. This
study argues that although the global climate change issue is low on the Indian public
pohcy agenda, its real and potential impacts on national energy related development needs
have elicited pohcy reactions from a select group of national pohcy actors. The direct
linkage between patterns of energy consumption and production, C(X emissions, and
anthropogenic interference with the climate system provides therefore the contextual
20
impetus for the Indian state’s response at international
institutions such as the GEF.
climate change related fora and
1-31 ~*he ApP'ic3lion “Policy Frames" in this
Thts study uses the analytical concept of “policy frame” to refer to the idea that the
definition of a part.eular policy problem and responses to that problem are constructed in
terms of a more presstng and salient policy concern. The study focuses on factors which
drive pohcy actors to construct responses to the clnnate change problem and in so doing,
finds David Dery’s distinction between problem solving and decision making particularly
relevant. Dery compares decision making behavior to running through a maze, whereas
problem definition is more like maze building or "constructing certain constraining
mechanisms in which only certain specific action or movement are possible or acceptable.”
This study argues that in India, the global climate change problem is defined in terms of
national energy-related development policies, and that national policy stances on climate
change are constructed in response to more pressing national energy related policy
concerns, rather than as a response to national environment-related policy concerns.
In countries like India which engage in planned development, national development
strategies and objectives directly influence both energy and environmental policy and the
relative priority accorded to each. In India, the attainment of national development goals
such as rapid economic industrialization has meant that energy policy has priority over
environmental policy. Although this priority for energy over environment has been a
6 David Dery, Problem Definition in Policy Analysis
.
(Lawrence: University of Kansas
Press, 1984), p. 25-26.
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constant of Indian policy, both in the era of state-led devcloptncn, and after econotntc
liberalization in 1991, energy policy has no, only been accorded even greater prion,y over
environmental policy after ,99, bu, has also been fttndamentally altered since ,991. These
altered energy sector policies have specific implications for national climate change policy
makmg. Understanding the shift from state-led development to liberalization would
require a study of the determinants of national development policy bu, here it must be
noted that this study will no, provide conclusive explanations as to what drives shifts in
national development strategy, how nafional economic development goals are formulated,
who were the principal actors responsible for a shift in national development strategy, and
what factors and beliefs motivated them to do so. To answer all of these questions would
require a separate study altogether-one on the framing of national development strategies.
The current investigation has a more limited focus which is to explain the formulation of
national climate change policy stances and the shift in national development policy will be
treated as a given.
In this study, national energy related development policies and needs frame or
drive the formulation of national climate change policy stances through two distinct but
interrelated mechanisms. Using the analytic concept of a policy frame, the study argues
that certain energy (coal, power and renewable energy) sector policies, and existing
material conditions such as patterns of national energy production and consumption, and
profiles of national fuel usage, constitute a dominant development policy frame- an
energy-related development policy frame” - which set the policy parameters for the
formulation of climate change related policy responses. In other words, the study
22
hypothesizes that national energy related development polices rather than environment
related ones exert an indelible influence both on Indian elunate ehange policy
pronouncements a, mtemat.onal climate change negotiations and on the types of climate
change related projects, India seeks under the aegis of the World Bank and the GEF. But
since it is only actors who make policy, the study argues that key policy features of the
national
“energy-related development policy frame” function as a shared cognitive
reference for national policy actors seeking to formulate climate change policy stances.
That is, these policy actors construct the global climate change problem and formulate
responses to it on the basis of the attendant features of the energy related development
policy frame rather than an environment related development policy frame.
In this study, a “policy frame” is defined as an analytically constructed policy filter
comprised of key, identifiable, policy characteristics or features, and existing material
resource constraints, in a particular policy sector. This definition of a policy frame
corresponds to the concept of “ ideal-types of frames” used by Marcus Jachtenfiichs in his
analysis of the European Union’s responses to the greenhouse effect from the early 1980s
to 1991. Although a theoretical discussion on frames is undertaken later, at this juncture it
is important to note that ‘‘policy frames” like “ideal types of frames”, are as Jachtenfiichs
points out, analytical constructions based on program or policy documents produced by
particular policy actors in question, and “never exist in reality but are the tools of the
researcher to direct his attention in specific directions.” 37 In this study, a policy frame
37 Markus Jachtenfiichs, International Policy-Making as a Teaming Process?: European
Union and the Greenhouse Effect
.
(London: Ashgate Publishing, 1 996), page 46-48.
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therefore be constructed on the basis of a detaUed historical examination of sectoral
policies. But clearly frames do not make policy, actors do. and here the argument is that a
particular pohcy frame or alternatively, a combtnation of policy frames
.unctions as a
cognitive reference for pohcy actors seeking to formulate policy responses to pohcy
problems. It is however unportant to point out that a constructed pohcy frame never
appears in its entirety as a cognitive reference for pohcy actors but elements of a
constructed pohcy frame are present in and may be traced to the pohcy pronouncements
and positions of individual policy actors.
For the purpose of this study, it was important at the very outset to understand
how national pohcy actors comprising of both pohcy experts and pohcy makers made
sense of the climate change issue from 1991-1996. Consequently, a series of intewiews
with relevant pohcy actors was conducted from 1 994- 1 996. The results of these
interviews provide evidence for the study’s claim that national pohcy actors
-pohcy
experts and pohcy makers- link the problem of global climate change with a national
energy related pohcy frame rather than a national environment pohcy frame. The pohcy
makers and pohcy experts interviewed were ah asked the same set of questions: 1. How
do you characterize the climate change issue?; 2. What are the key concepts that you
associate with the issue?; 3. Is this issue linked to any other relevant issues; and, 4. What
are your perceptions of the concept ofjoint implementation or activities implemented
jointly, if there has been any changes in your perception what are the causes for this
change? Pohcy experts were also asked what key pohcy perspectives they had proffered
and whether these had been reflected in official pohcy documents or pohcy stances.
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In response to the question of how they characterized the climate change issue, all
nationa, policy actors stated that global clunate change by itselfwas jus, no, a sign,Scant
pohcy issue from an envaonmental perspective for India. Pohcy makers such as Mimster
Kamal Nath, Ambassador Sreemvasan and Antony De Sa, argued tha, (he primary reason
for India's involvement in mtemational climate negohations was to ensure tha, no
international agreements be undertaken which might impose any burden on national energy
related development objectives. Policy experts such as Dr. Jyoti Parikh of IGIDR, Dr.
Pachaun ofTER! and Ravi Sharma ofCSE, on the other hand, argued that a, the hear, of
the climate change problem lay the issue of energy, not only in terms of consumption
patterns but also in terms of current and firture production patterns, energy sources and
the transfer of environmentally sound energy technologies.
The key concepts most commonly associated with climate change by the policy
actors were: equity, “common but differentiated responsibilities of states”, developing
countries’ right to development, linkage of global environmental issues with national
development ones, patterns of consumption, and the transfer of economically viable and
environmentally friendly technologies. With regard to the question of whether the global
climate change issue was linked with any other issue, all policy actors referred to the
linkage between global climate change and energy related economic development, citing
issues such as national energy consumption and production patterns. Some policy actors
referred to the connection between accelerated economic growth under liberalization and
the need to increase energy su\ plies to meet economic growth objectives, while others
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referred to the linkage between global chmate change and transfer of envtronmentally
sound energy technologies.
The study focuses on constructmg envtronment and energy related development
poltcy frames for period from 1972 to 1996 for two mam reasons. One, the UNCHE
( 1 972), was the watershed mark for the creation of an institutional framework for
environmental protect,on in India. Two, the tmpact of sectoral poUey changes in energy
and environment can be evaluated by contrasting the earlier import-substitution
industrialization (1970s-80s) with the more recent export-promotion industrialization
phase favored by the Indian government since liberalization in 1991. Time-line narratives
based on a survey of a series of Five Year Plans and other relevant offictal documents are
used to provide a historical framework oflndian development strategies, and to construct
the environmental and energy policy frames. These time lines are necessary in order to
locate any changes in energy and environment sector policies as well as any overlap of
policies in these policy arenas.
The study examines Indian development planning under centralized planning from
1972 until 1996 and provides a detailed framework of the institutional and policy
evolution in the energy and environment sectors to establish whether priority has been
accorded energy policies over environmental policies. In tracing the sectoral evolution of
energy and environment in India, specific features of the energy and environmental sector
policy will respectively be identified as constituting an “energy-related development policy
frame” and “an environment-related development policy frame” under two distinct phases
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Of national economic development- cen.rahzed plannmg under a managed economy and
centralized planning under a liberalized economy.
The study demonstrates that the 1991 shift in nor 1 a iIVV shltt m national development strategy
towards economic UberaUzation, resulted in not only in a new set of energy sector poUeies
and consequently an altered energy policy frame, but also in a largely unchanged set of
environmental sector policies and consequently only a margmally altered environmental
poltcy frame. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, liberalization has had a significant unpact on
certarn energy policies and priorities in the coal, power and renewable energy sectors, all
of which have direct climate change related policy implications. From 1991 onwards, the
environmental policy frame remained largely unchanged, includes only a passing reference
to global environmental issue, and its influence on the implementation of coal and power
projects has been more constrained. On the other hand, the energy pohey frame has been
significantly altered under liberalization. Thus the energy pohey changes under
liberalization together with existing energy resource constraints, constitute the dominant
policy frame driving not only the formulation of Indian climate change pohey stances but
also Indian responsiveness to coal, renewable energy, and climate change related projects
funded by the World Bank and GEF.
In examining the linkage between particular sectoral policies and the global climate
change problem, it is important to note that although the global climate change problem
began to attract international scientific attention in the late 1980s, it was only from 1990
onwards that the growing scientific consensus on the adverse effects of global climate
change translated into increased international political action. The study argues that the
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coincidence of ,he intemationaUzafon of the global climate change problem. and the onset
of energy sector liberation in .ndia in ,99, had a dtrec, impact on the
.ndtan state's
responses to g,obal chntate change. The study dentonstra.es that under a Uberahzed pohey
regime, nationa, energy-re,ated development poheies rather than the nattona, environment-
re,ated deve,opment object,ves have framed or driven the chmate change pohey stances
taken by India at international climate negotiations.
The key characteristics of the energy-related development pohey frame under the
overall liberalized national policy regime tnclude: 1) the need to build additional electricity
production capacity to meet increased demand, 2) an mcreased commitment to reduce oil
imports, 3 ) an increased reliance on domestic coal reserves, 4) a severe shortage in
electricity power generation due to endemic gaps between antic,paled and actual
electncity generation, 5) institutional reforms in the power, coal and renewable energy
sectors, 6) a policy shift towards privatization in both the power and renewable energy
sectors, 7) acceptance of the need for rapid clearance of independent power projects
fimded by foreign investors, 8) an increased pohey commitment to secure additional
energy supphes through alternative energy sources, 9) a policy shift towards emphasizing
marketable appheation of renewable energy technologies rather than decentralized, rural
applications ol pilot projects based on national research and development efforts, 10) a
need to reduce energy losses and ensure energy efficiency in the coal-fired electricity
plants, through measures such as coal-washing and reducing the fly-ash content of Indian
coal, and 1 1 ) the need to establish clearer and more transparent procedures for
negotiating bids for private sector power projects. The study argues that it is these key
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features of the energy policy frame that influence the construction of Indian policy stances
on climate change both in terms of establishmg certam real, materia, pohcy parameters for
the subsequent foimulation of national climate change pohcy stances, and in terms of
providing a cognitive reference for key pohcy actors responding to the global chnuue
change issue.
India’s responses to the climate change issue may be traced in two ways. One, by
its stances in international negotiations on climate change second which are discussed in
detail in Chapter 4. Two, by its uses of energy-and climate change related projects of the
World Bank and the GEF which are discussed in Chapter 5. As stated previously, carbon
dioxide is considered one of the principal GHGs responsible for global climate change, and
carbon dioxide emissions are principally associated with fossil fuel (coal, oil and biomass)
burning. The study examines the impact of the World Bank’s coal and power projects and
GEF s projects on national energy and environment sector policies. In so doing, the study
does not use the concept of pohcy framing to characterize the influence of these two
institutions on Indian climate change policy making.
Examining the impacts of these projects on the formulation of Indian climate
change policy stances, the study presents a two-fold argument, One, although the Bank
has had a greater impact on the coal and power sectors after liberalization, these two
institutions are not the source of policy frame for India’s climate change policy stances,
but are funding sources of projects which have climate change related policy implications.
Two, India s responsiveness to these institutions is driven more by Indian national energy
related development needs and objectives and neither of these organizations have any
29
overt or dominant influence on the Indian environmental policy making apparatus. The
World Bank and GEFs impact on national energy and environment seetor may be
characterized in three distinct ways. One, under a Uberaltzed policy regnne, the Bank has
had a greater impact on Indtan coal and power sector reforms. Two, an examtnation of
Indian participation in the GEF and the GEFs chmate change portfolio reveals that Indian
policy actors have sought GEF binding for climate change projects with a renewable
energy and energy effictency and conservation focus rather than a strictly environmental
focus. Three, based on an analysis of these institutions’ energy and climate change related
funding, neither institution has had any impact on national environment sector policies.
In addition to examining the influence of the World Bank and GEF, the study also
evaluates the extent to which national climate change policy experts (knowledge-based
experts) have been effective in capturing the policy domain, and in influencing the minds
of policy makers. To this end, the role played by Indian policy experts from CSE, TERI
and IGIDR, in the formulation of Indian climate change stances is discussed throughout
the study. The climate change issue appears tailor-made for testing the influence of
knowledge-based experts, as it is characterized by uncertainty in both scientific knowledge
and policy response assessment, which are areas where expert intervention is often both
solicited and offered. In one sense, there is nothing new about the concept of technocratic
elite and its effects on policy making and as Frank Fischer points out, political references
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«o technocracy in winch trained experts rule by vutuc of then speeded knowledge dates
back to at least the seventeenth century. 38
While the role of experts in the overall policy making process of developing
countnes is clearly an area winch needs further investigation; the more limited focus of
y will be on the role played by a small group of policy experts from CSE, TERI
and IGIDR, in setting the policy parameters by which Indian climate change stances and
projects are formulated. In this regard. Haas's definition of an epistemic community as a
transnational network of professionals with recognized expertise in a particular domain,
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain, and shared
common views about the causes and solutions of a policy problem, is useful. 59
According to Haas,
“The pacing of national response can be explained largely in terms of the extent of
the epistemic community’s influence on various governments and its ability to help
them interpret the emerging scientific consensus and articulate appropriate
policies.” 40
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Frank Fischer, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise (Newbury Park: Sage
Publications, 1990), page 1 7.In The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as Policymakers .
Sheila Jasanofif focuses on the place of scientific experts in policy making and argues that
the notion that scientific advisers can, or do limit themselves, to addressing strictly
scientific issues is misconceived. Sheila Jasanoff, The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers as
Policymakers, (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1990), page 249-250.
Peter Haas, Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental
Cooperation
,
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1990) and Peter Haas,
“Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,”
International Organization
.
(Vol.46: No.l. Winter 1992), page 2-3.
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Peter Haas, “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect
Stratospheric Ozone,” International Organization. (Vol 46: No 1, Winter 1992), page 215.
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Haas’s focus on the impacts of sets offractional knowledge expens on international
environmental policy making can, with some imponant caveats, be translated to a study on
the impacts of national knowledge based experts on national environmental policy making.
Fast, the focus of this study is on national rather than transnational policy experts.
Second, Adler and Haas, outline a four step process by which epis.emic communtties
engage in policy evolut.on which includes policy innovation, diffusion, selection and
persistence. Given the recent emergence of the climate change issue, and the limited
number of policy participants active in formulating national responses, focus must be
limited to the policy innovat.on stage. However, future investigations on the role of policy
experts might choose to focus on extent of policy diffusion amongst other national actors
such as private and public sector mdustries and the extent to which representatives of key
industries participate in the formulation of climate change policy responses. Accordingly
the current focus is on the policy innovation stage where epistemic communities,
“...bound the range of collective discourse on policy, as well as guide decision
makers in the choice ol appropriate norms and appropriate institutions within
which to resolve or manage the problem.” 41
Third, epistemic communities are seen to exist when a group of “professionals”
share normative beliefs, causal beliefs, a common policy enterprise and common tools by
which they validate this enterprise. The idea is that the shared normative and causal
41 Emmanuel Adler and Peter Haas, “Conclusion: Epistemic Communities, World
Order and the Creation of a Reflective Research Program,” International Orflani7fltion
(Vol 46. No.l. Winter 1992), page 375.
Peter Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination,” 1992, page 3.
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beliefs of an epistemtc community may be exammed by looking at the poUcy traces left
behmd by those actors who constitute the eptstemic community under investigation, and
by interviewing relevant members of the epistemic community. But in the case of India,
such poltcy traces are not just difficult to find, they are virtually non-existen. because even
if policy makers solicit the optnions of poliey experts, there is little public record of such
expert intervention. Also experts rarely publish their policy preferences to the extent
common in developed countries which when combined with the fact that the climate
change problem is a very new, makes it very hard to find a public, published record of
expert intervention in the formulation of policy stances. It is clear from interviews with
Indian policy makers that from the very start of the intergovernmental climate
negotiations, they have solicited policy advice and position papers from policy experts
from CSE, TERI and IGIDR, and have held strategy meetings with these experts prior to
an international climate change meeting. 43 Policy experts from CSE, TERI and IGIDR in
separate interviews corroborated the above, and have highlighted particular meetings with
officials, such as the one held before the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1), where
Indian climate change policy stances did undergo some change. 44 Policy experts from the
CSE, TERI, and IGIDR have also provided technical assistance to Indian negotiators at
43
Personal Interviews with Minister Kamal Nath, Antony De Sa and Dr. Subodh
Sharma of the Ministry of Environment and Forests conducted in New Delhi, September
11-12, 1995. Personal Interview with Mukul Sanwal, Senior Advisor, UNFCCC
Secretariat, Geneva, August 23, 1995.
44
Personal Interviews with Dr. Jyoti Parikh (IGIDR), Bombay, September 29, 1995,
Dr. R. Pachauri (TERI), New Delhi, September 13, 1995, and Dr. Ravi Sharma (CSE),
September 13, 1995.
33
various international climate change fora and their
Chapters 4 and 5.
role in these fora will be highlighted in
Fourth, the difficulty in establishing whether pohcy experts share normative beliefs
s complicated by the fact that interview responses by which normative beliefs may be
evaluated are no, necessanly venfiable or falsifiable. and consequently pose a tremendous
hurdle for social scientists. For al, of the reasons listed above, the study chooses no, to
apply strictly, the concept of epistemic communities as defined by Haas, but chooses
instead to employ a broader and more loose concept- knowledge-based or policy experts.
Accordingly, it will not attempt to investigate how these policy experts came to
prominence or whether they share normative beliefs.
Despite the application of the concept of a knowledge elite in political science 4\
the study of the effects of knowledge elites on pohcy making is complicated by the fact
that even if these technocratic groups can be assumed to share techniques and evaluative
criteria, they cannot be easily assumed to share identifiable political agendas or programs.
It is consequently left up to the researcher studying the effects of knowledge elites to
determine the extent to which experts share specific political and policy agendas. Ross
Gelbspan’s effort in this area is particularly noteworthy. He provides evidence to support
the claim that the oil and coal industry together with conservative US politicians support
the efforts of a very small but vocal group of “greenhouse skeptics”. These skeptics use
45
John Ikenberry, “Creating Yesterday’s New World Order ”in Judith Goldstein and
Robert Keohane ed.. Ideas, Beliefs and Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1993),
p.57-86. He argues that in the post-war uncertainty over how to proceed with policy,
Keynesian ideas were embraced and transmitted by an epistemic community.
34
he issue of scientific uncertainty associated with global clunate change to cast doubt on
the international scientific consensus developed by the IPCC (comprtsing the leading 2,500
relevant scientists in the world), on the sensittvi.y of the earth’s temperature to changes in
atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations. « Gelbspan identifies the members of the
small group of “greenhouse skeptics - Pat Michaels. Robert Balling, Sherwood Idso, Fred
Singer, Richard Lindzen - and highlights the oil and coal industries’ funding of almost all
of their climate change related research. He also documents their influence on the
formulation of US climate change policy stances.
If the climate skeptics have succeeded in confusing the general public, theirinfluence on decision makers has been, if anything, even more elfective...Their
testimony contributed to the defeat of proposals in California and Colorado to
mcrease electricity rates to reduce the amount of greenhouse gases produced by
oil-and coal-burning power plants...Congressional conservatives have used the
testimony ol the skeptics to justify cutting the climate research budgets and to
discredit the scientific findings of the IPCC.” 47
The role of national knowledge-based experts on influencing the direction and
tenor of national and international climate change policies should not however be
restricted to the role of US climate skeptics. The role played by relevant national climate
change experts in setting the parameters for the formulation of developed and developing
countries national climate change policy stances needs to examined.
46 Ross Gelbspan, The Heat is On
.
(New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
1997).
47
Gelbspan, 1997, page 35.
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, *3 *2 ^Schematic Overview of thp St..H y
As described in Figure 1 . 1 be.ow, the study focuses on energy and environment
sector policies in two distinct periods of economic development and constructs four
specific policy frames. These policy frames are constructed on the basis of a detailed
review of relevant environment and energy sector policies and allocations reflected in the
Fourth through Eighth Five Year Plans. The specific contents of the various policy frames
are not included in the figure below but are discussed in Chapters 2 and 3 respectively.
It is important to note that policy frames do not make policy. In this study, policy
frames are analytical construct which are externally constructed by the researcher. This
study argues that the energy policy frame under phased economic liberalization (1991-
1996) functions as a shared, representative, cognitive tool for national policy actors who
formulate relevant climate change policy stances. As discussed previously, based on the
information provided in their interviews, national climate change policy actors, that is both
policy makers and policy experts can be seen as constructing policy responses to global
climate change in terms ol the energy related development policy frame under phased
liberalization and not in terms of the environment policy frame for the same time period.
Finally, it may be noted that although the World Bank and the GEF are
international institutions, they are represented as institutional actors operating within the
context of a liberalized national economy because the policy impacts of fossil fuel,
renewable energy and climate change projects funded by these institutions are felt at the
national sectoral level.
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Role of Policy Experts.
Policy Actors & Policy Experts
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y
Climate Change Policy Stances
Note
A)
B)
C)
D)
E)
F)
H)
Energy policy trame has altered as a consequence of sectoral changes under liberalization but
environmental poltcy trame is only slightly altered due to minor sectoral changes.
Dotted Arrow Line from energy policy frame to climate change policy frame represents the
study’s central claim
WB stands for the World Bank
The arrow numbered 1 represents the interaction betweenWorld Bank ‘s (WB) fossil fuel and
renewable energy projects and the enegy frame
The arrow numbered 2 represents energy frame’s influence on Indian participation in the GEF
No arrow from WB & GEF to environment sector represents lack of projects;m pact son sectoral
policies
Dashed line under liberalized economy between energy and environmen sectors represent
limited policy interactions.(Absence of line under managed economy indicates absence of policy
interactions between sectors)
Figure 1.1 A Schematic Overview
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Frames have been defined by Markus Jachfenfuchs as “basic patterns ofperceiving
and interpreting the world”, « by Klaus Eder as “stable patterns of experiencing and
perceiving events in the world which structure social reahty”, • and by Dan.e, Sehon and
Martm Rein as “underlying structures of belief, perception and appreciation”, » Although
all these authors use the word ‘perception’ in their definition of ‘frames’, only
Jachtenfuchs and Schon and Rein employ the concept of frames to explain the emergence
of policy outcomes. Since frames are not free-floating but are grounded in either
institutional or societal actors, identifying frames first requires elucidating the cognitive
perceptions of institutional or societal actors and then explaining policy outcomes on the
basis of actors’ cognitive perceptions. But, as discussed below, elucidating and evaluating
the cognitive perceptions of others poses a tremendous methodological challenge for
researchers mterested in studying the framing of policy responses at the national, regional
or international level. Policy research on frames, as defined above, requires the
appropriate methodological tools for making actors’ cognitive perceptions transparent,
and linking them to specific policy outcomes. This is indeed a difficult task made all the
more difficult for those social scientists such as Eder, Jachtenfuchs and Schon and Rein,
who do not employ the tools of cognitive psychology in their study of frames. Despite the
48
Jachtenfuchs, 1 996, page 1
.
Klaus Eder, The Social Construction of Nature: A Sociology of Ecological
Enlightenment
.
(Eondon: Sage Publications, 1996), page 166.
50
Daniel Schon and Martin Rein, Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of
Intractable Policy Controversies
.
(New York: Basic Books, 1994) page 23.
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role of cognitive perception in all of the. definitions of frames, none of these authors
address the tssue of how cognitive perceptions may be elucidated much less linked to
specific policy outcomes.
Although spectfic policy applications of frames remain rare, as early as 1974,
proponents of frame analysis such as Erving Goffinan focused on identifying structures
that shape social interact,on and communication. 51 Drawing on work done by Goffimm
and more recently by W.A Gamson and A. Mod.gliani, » Eder argues that “frames are the
micro-units of a discourse analys.s” of ecological communication. » The methodological
steps outlined by Eder in his work on frames are "identifying the cognitive devices for
constructing frames”, “analyzing this construction of frames as a process of symbolic
packaging”, and “identifying the masterframe which emerges from competing framing
strategies in public discourse.” 54
One difficulty with Eder’s application of frames in discourse analysis is that it all
hinges on his identification of three cognitive framing devices in modem
environmentalism. Eder never makes it clear how collective cognitive devices are
explicated and distilled into the three cognitive devices he has identified-moral
51
Erving Goffinan, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Orpanfration nf Experience .
(Cambridge: Flarvard University Press, 1974).
52 W.A. Gamson, Talking PQlitics
,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992) and
W.A. Gamson and A. Modigliani, “Media discourse and public opinion on nuclear power:
a constructionist approach,” American Journal of Sociology (Vol. 95, 1989), page 1-38.
53
Eder, 1996, page 166.
54
Eder, 1996, page 167.
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responsibUity, empirical objectivity and aesthetic judgement, or indeed why these are only
relevant cognitive framing devices in modem environmentalism.. According to Eder, these
three cogmtive dev.ces are used in ecolog,cal communication by environmentalists to
create a specdic anage of themselves through a process called ‘-symbolic packag,ng”which
comprises of three packages-consemationist, ecological and fundamentalist (deep
ecology). Here, Eder is clearly extending a generalization which may be applicable only to
Western environmentalists, and even so he chooses no, to provide specific examples of
environmental groups that might be usutg these so-called packages. In the end, the
identification of cognitive devices, packages and the masterframe bear little relation to the
process by which specific environmental problems are understood and responded to by
societal actors in either developing or developed countries.
In contrast, Jachtenfiichs’ argument that frames are “the basis of problem
definitions and thus of actors’ preferences” is pertinent to the current investigation on the
role of frames in climate change policy making. 55 Although Jachtenfiichs does not mention
this, the idea of frames as the basis of problem definitions is clearly related to the much
broader policy analysis literature on problem definitions. 56 Jachtenfiichs studies the role of
55
Jachtenfiichs, 1996, page 2.
56 David Dery, Problem Definition in Policy Analysis
.
(Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1984); Judith de Neufville and Stephen E. Barton, “Myths and the definition of
policy problems,” Policy Sciences, (Vol. 20, 1987), page 181-206; Janet Weiss, “The
Powers of Problem Definition: The case of Government Paperwork,” Policy Sciences
(Vol.22, 1989), page 97-121; Judith Innes, Knowledge and Public Policy: The Search for
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(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990); and, Donald
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.
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frames in the European Unton’s responses to the greenhouse effect from the early 1980s
to 1991, 51 but there is no overall consistency in his definition of frames.
In his chapter on frames and learning, Jachtenfiichs states that,
and "=8“““ in actors’ construction of the world, there
Ll r y of drawu'8 systematic conclusions about the behavior of actors
called
Patt<
T'
11 IS clalnled that such regularities indeed exist. They will beframes in the ensuing text.” 58 y
A few sentences later, he states that frames “constitute the cognitive filter used by the
system to reduce environmental complexity”. 59 Here frames are viewed alternatively as
cognitive regularities in actors’ perceptions of the world and as cognitive filters of a
system. An empirical application of the first definition requires discerning the cognitive
regularities held by actors, while the second, requires anthropomorphizing a system and
discerning its so-called cognitive filter. It is never made clear what methodology will be
used to evaluate these alternative definitions of frames and to determine cognitive
structures, regularities or filters. In addition, Jachtenfiichs’ conceptual definition of frames
as cognitive filters or regularities, bears no methodological relationship to his empirical
56
(...continued)
Little & Brown, 1984).
57
Jachtenfiichs refers to the European Union in his title but throughout his study he
refers to documents from the European Community and the Economic Commission for
Europe. Although., he claims that his study extends from the early 1980s up to Rio in
1992, does not include any references to the Community’s policy responses on
greenhouse effect at UNCED during which differing European states’ stances on the
greenhouse effect became apparent.
58
Jachtenfiichs, 1996, page 24.
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appUcation of ideal-type frames which he says will be “looked for basically in the
programmatic documents of respective actors ” 60
In his empirical application of frames, Jachtenfuchs chooses two ideal-type
environmental policy frames
-“classical envtronmental policy and sustainability, three
.deal-type energy pohcy frames - “supply, conservatton and energetics (sic)” and two
types of integration frames-“supranational integration and member state dominance". «
But even here, the distinguishing features of the ideal-type frames are not identified on the
basis ofprogram documents or the cognitive perceptions of actors, but are “constructed
on the basis of the existing literature on the subject”. “ Here, the literature upon which his
environmental and energy policy frames are constructed includes environmental economics
where he cites over 14 sources, and energy pohcy where only 2 sources are cited (one of
which predates the period under investigation).
Using the ideal-type frames identified, Jachtenfuchs evaluates relevant European
Community and Economic Commission for Europe documents dealing with the
greenhouse effect and concludes that,
“Within the Commission, environmental policy is now conceived on the basis of
sustainability instead of classic environmental policy. In parallel the basic frame of
energy policy making has changed, though less radically, from supply to
energetics ”. 63
60
Jachtenfuchs, 1996, page 48.
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Jachtenfuchs, 1996, page 49-59.
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Although there extensive references to European Community and Commiss.on documents
based upon which policy changes with regard to the greenhouse effect are traced, his
study does not include policy interviews with specific actors against wh,ch the
.deal-type
frames may be evaluated. In the crucial chapter on the definition of a greenhouse strategy,
m which “evolutton of the issue in terms of frames” is discussed. Jachtenfuchs notes that
the chapter “strongly relies on interviews with Commission officials and on interna]
documents which cannot be quoted.” He goes on to discount the value of such data by
arguing,
“Still the interviews and internal documents do not constitute the essential parts of
argumentation but only serve only to deepen and to illustrate the analysis of two
publicly available Commission documents from this phase.” 64
Here
,
the trouble is that policy interviews and internal documents in which policy
actors may reveal concepts and views which they associate with the policy problem under
investigation are crucial to any discussion on the role of frames
,
particularly to one like
Jachtenfuchs’ which claims that frame change occurs in policy making. Understandably,
policy makers are unwilling to reveal the factors that drive or influence their construction
of policy problems, and as discussed previously, such policy interviews cannot alone
provide conclusive evidence of the effects of framing on policy making.
Jachtenfuchs draws heavily on the work of Daniel Schon and Martin Rein in his
conceptualization of frames. No discussion on the role of policy frames would therefore be
complete without a reference to their book, Frame Reflection , in which substantial
M
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theoretical and empirical ursights are provrded. « Schon and Rea, distinguish between
“pohcy disagreements” where contendtng parties are able to resolve disputes by exanrinrng
the facts of the situation, and “policy controversies” which are immune to resoluhon by
recourse to facts, listing issues such as crime, abortion, “the Third World” and the
conservation of energy as examples of policy controversies. « In then view, policy
controversies are “intractable” disputes in which contending parties hold conflicting
frames which are resistant to appeals to facts or reasoned arguments since it is the parties'
conflicting frames that determine what counts as fact or relevant argumentation. The only
solution for transforming such policy controversies into “policy conversations” he in wha,
they call “design rationality” which involves a communicative approach where policy
actors engage in a process of reflecting on the frame conflicts themselves (frame
reflection ) which may then lead contending parties to resolve or “reframe” the problem. 67
Schon and Rem discuss three cases which provide material for their analysis of design
rationality- early retirement policies in Germany, Project Athena in MIT, and homelessness
in Massachusetts.
Before discussing the validity of frame reflection and reframing, it is important to
focus on Schon and Rein’s theoretical construction of frames. According to Schon and
Recently, an entire issue of Knowledge and Policy focused on evaluating and
responding to the concept of ‘design rationality’ proposed by Schon and Rein in their
book. For additional information on discussions and policy applications see Knowledge
and Policy
.
(Vol. 8, No.4. Winter 1995-96), page 5-82.
66 Schon and Rein, 1994, page 3-4
67 Schon and Rein, 1994, page 38-40.
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very
Rein, i, is the frames held by actors that de.etmtne wha, actors see as being in their
interests and therefore wha, interests they view as conflicting. According to them, the
ac, of making sense of social reahty occurs through a frame, stnce the task of responding
to any completed, information-rich situation requires the operatton of select,v„y and
organization whtch is wha, frarnmg entails. « Exfrapolattng from this, different frames
could lead to different problem constructions which i n turn could lead to the formulation
of different policy responses. The idea that the policy actors’ frames determine their
perceptioas of policy problems, is germane ,0 the argument advanced in this study that the
shared frame of a select group of policy actors leads ,0 a certain set of policy stances. The
role of shared frames corresponds to the role of shared ideas as discussed by Goldstein
and Keohane who argue that ideas influence policy when the casual beliefs they embody
provide road maps that clarity actor's goals and ends-means
.
» Moreover, Goldstein and
Keohane's point that they do not seek to explain the sources of ideas but focus instead on
the effects of ideas is worth reiterating for the purpose of the current study, which will not
evaluate the cognitive process by which policy actors come to hold a particular frame but
wUl focus instead on the policy effects of a set of policy actors sharing cognitive
references to a certain policy frame.
In their theoretical definition of framing, Schon and Rein distinguish between two
kinds of frames
-rhetorical and action- and specify three levels of action frames
- policy,
68 Schon and Rein, 1994, page 30.
69
Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, ed„ Ideas. Beliefs and Foreign Policy
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), page 13-17.
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institutional action and metacultural frames. » Rhetoncal frames are seen as those
underlying the use of story and argument in policy debate and action frames are seen as
those informing policy practice. Although, they issue the caveat
.ha, often the same frame
can serve both functions, they do not offer a clear example of a case in which the two
kmds of frames differ. The only example cited is that the rhetoric of the “safety net-
prominent in the Reagan and Bush administrations speeches on welfare was accompanied
by changes in regulations (action frames) intended to punish those who milk the welfare
system. It is however, their differentiation of policy and institutional action frames that is
most informative for the purpose of this study. Here, Schon and Rein differentiate between
a policy action frame which is,
actor uses t0 construct the problem of a specific policy
and an institutional action frame which is,
the more generic action frame from which institutional actors derive the policy
frames they use to structure a wide range of problematic policy situations.” 72
They pomt out that institutional action frames tend to be complex, hybrid and consist of
families of related frames rather than a single coherent frame. The third level of frames-
metacultural frames- are the broad culturally shared systems of belief which are seen as
the root of shaping both rhetorical and action frames such as, the nature versus nurture
cultural metaframe regarding criminality in American society.
70 Schon and Rein, 1994, page 32-34.
71 Schon and Rein, 1994, page 33.
2 Schon and Rein, 1994, page 33.
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Schon and Rein’s demotion between an institutional frame and a policy frame is
relevant for the current study’s use of policy frames. The current study argues that
national development strategy provtdes the broad institutional locus (planntng framework)
for sectoral policies on energy and envtronment based upon which sectoral policy frames
may be constructed. Here, national development strategy may be seen as corresponding to
Schon and Rein’s mstitutional frame, but as discussed previously, the study does not
examine the process of national development strategy framing but instead examines the
extent to which more specific sectoral poltcy frames drive national climate change policy
actors responses to global climate change. Although Schon and Rein choose to focus only
on policy controversies which are characterized by conflicting frames, their point that
"frames are not free floating’’ but are embedded in institutions that sponsor them, and are
held by mstitutional actors ties in well with the argument that Indian climate change policy
stances are framed or driven by national energy related needs and policies. 73
The more difficult question plaguing the study of design rationality is what
prompts policy actors to engage in frame reflection and in reframing policy controversies.
Schon and Rein note that in order “ to make reframing work, the policy makers must
reflect on old and new frames” but they themselves also note that relationship between
frame reflection and reframing is “anything but straightforward”. 74 They go on to concede
that frame reflection may occur without reframing and vice versa, and that frame reflection
73 Schon and Rein, 1994, page 29.
74 Schon and Rein, 1994, page 40.
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may ne 'ther be 3 ”“"“y n°r “ SUffiC 'e" t ror reframing. » They themselves
have Ii««le actual success in applymg ,he concept of frame reflection to three case studtes.
They conclude that the case of early rettrement in Germany,
With regard to the case of Project Athena (large scale experiment in edueatton computmg)
at MIT, they find that.
The fundamental frame conflict persists at MIT. Protagonists and defenders
^d rlttl s
OCate
^
dff SkCPtiCS and resis,ers have "gained skepticaland esis ant ome of the chaUengers may have tried to promote a frame-reflectivedialogue, if they did, it is clear that they did not succeed." 77
It is only in their tlnrd case on the development of homelessness policy in Massachusetts in
the 1 980s that they find a policy conversation that is reflective. 78
Sehon and Rein acknowledge the difficulty of finding a policy situation in which
frame reflection can be demonstrated conclusively. In their discussion on the relativist trap
of frame reflection, Sehon and Rein ask whether it is possible to actually resolve frame
conflicts when the frame themselves determine what counts as relevant evidence. They
raise the very real possibility that the criteria for choosing among conflicting frames cannot
really be applied in a manner free of association with the frames themselves. In spite of
75 Sehon and Rein, 1994, page 40.
7h Sehon and Rein, 1994, page 90.
77 Sehon and Rein, 1994, page 127-128.
78 Sehon and Rein, 1994, page 159-160.
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acknowledging the practicable difficulties ofmcuit.e analyzing frame reflection and reframing.
C“'ng A'bert H^Ch,mn
-
th6y ^d ^ «as for hope- ,ha« policy makers can
sometimes change then mmds and that poltcy pos.t.ons can be reframed ,o transform
policy controversies into opportunities for policy dialogue
.
79
In almost all the examples of pohcy controversies cited, certain frames win out or
at least appear to wtn out despite the claim that they are intractable to “facts”. The
question is whether this happens because of reframing or for some other reason for
example, the political or economic dominance of the adherents of one frame. This study
argues that a large part of the answer lies in the political, economic and institutional
context m which the conflicting frames clash. For example, a woman's access to a legal
abortion, despite the policy controversy over abortion may be explained by the choice
made by a specific political administration and/or a group of influential policy actors
within that administration, that favor a woman’s right to reproductive services over the
competing right to life claim, and accordingly provide state landing for family planning
clinics. And the so-called policy controversy over the conservation of energy may not
even be a policy controversy as demonstrated by the Indian state’s decision to upgrade the
Department of Non-Conventional Energy Sources into an fully fledged independent
Ministry and rely more heavily on emphasizing energy conservation and marketable
applications of renewable energy. Moreover, it is not made clear why the issues cited as
controversial, such as the Third World, conservation of energy, environmental destmction
and resource depletion are indeed controversial. For instance, conservation of energy
79 Schon and Rein, 1994, page 56-57.
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under the newly hberafeed Indian policy regune does no, demonstrate any of the
hallmarks of betng a policy controversy as diverse national actors such as the Indian
Government, private industry groups and NGOs all appear amenable to pushing the cause
of renewable energy, energy conservatton and clean coal technologies. And the idea of
Tlurd World as political controversy appears dated, as even the “Thud World” is willing
to concede that it is no longer a monolith nor should be considered as one given its
plurality of representation.
The trouble with defintng “frames” as underlying structures of belief and
perception is that social scientists who seek to explain how particular frames operate in
shaping policy disagreements or controversies must first figure out how to get into the
heads or hearts of those who “frame” the particular polices under investigation. In fact.
Schon and Rein do acknowledge the methodological difficulty associated with frame
construction and note that,
...it may be difficult to tell, in an actual policy situation, what frame really
underlies an institutional actor’s position”. 80
They list several factors which complicate the construction of frames. First, that the
rhetorical frames that shape policy makers public statements may be “incongruent” with
the frames implicit in their actions. Second, that the same course of action may be
consistent with different policy frames. Third, there may be discrepancies between frames
held by the same set of institutional actors. Fourth, it may be difficult to distinguish
s0 Schon and Rein, 1994, page 35.
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between after and tn.ra-frame conaict. Fifth, i, may be difficult to d,s„nguish between real
and potential shifts of frame. 81
In addition to the practical difficulties associated with frame construct,on whtch
mtght according to the authors be circumvented by “carefully nuanced observations and
analyzes of the processes by whtch policy utterances and actions evolve over « therc
is also a genenc, theoretical difficulty that cannot be easily resolved. The theoretical
difficulty is that social scientists have not only to devise a schema for studying the
underlying beliefs tha, confute “frames” in policy actors bu, have also to guard agatns,
second-guessing and selective hearing. More specifically, the frame or frames used by the
social scientist for the study itself, (and since we all make sense of social reality there is no
reason to suppose that the social scientist lacks these) do have the very real potential to
impact on or even prompt the policy actors under investigation to attempt to alter their
opinions. There is unfortunately no verifiable way to guard against this likelihood other
than giving all relevant policy actors an opportunity to respond to the same set of
questions, which is a procedure undertaken in the present study.
In the end, it is these methodological and theoretical difficulties associated with
frame construction, and most specifically the difficulty in distinguishing frame shifts, that
complicates any claim that a shift in policy frames corresponds to learning. Proponents of
—
81 Schon and Rein, 1994, page 36.
82 Schon and Rein, 1 994, page 36.
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learning have distinguished between “simple and complex leanung", •> and “adaptation or
learning”. « E. Haas defines learning as, “ the process by which consensual knowledge is
used to speedy causal relationshtps in new ways so that the result affects the content of
public policy. 8S Based on this definition of learning, it can be argued that although a shift
tn policy frames could result in new policy perspectives or outcomes, a shift in policy
frames, unlike learning, does not need to be based on consensual knowledge spec,lying
new casual relationships. For instance, what may be understood as a shift in policy frames
could be an unmediate result of dramatic changes in certain material factors affecting the
overall policy situation, or a shift in policy frames may be gradual as a result of
incremental policy adaptations or tinkering, both of which are distinct from learning. This
contradicts the view offered by scholars like Jachtenfiichs who have theorized that a
change in frames corresponds to complex learning. 86 For Jachtenfiichs,
Frame selection and frame change do not take place in a vacuum but in a specific
institutional context which considerably influences the way frames are taken up by
actors and used by them.”
The current study supports the idea that frames are located in specific socio-political and
institutional contexts, and that these contexts influence the way frames (problem
definitions) are constructed by actors. But if frames are grounded in specific institutional
Joseph Nye, Nuclear Learning and U.S-Soviet Security Regimes.” ! ntemationfll
Organization
.
(Vol. 41, 1987), page 371-402.
84
Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International
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85
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86
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contexts and these institutional contexts influence no, only the chotce of frame bu, also
changes in frames, then is it really that easy to dtstinguish a frame change from a
institutional context change. And clearly learning cannot be satd to occur if a frame
changes occurs as result of an mstitutional context change which has nothing whatsoever
to do with the provision of consensual knowledge.
For learning to occur, the process of changing frames has not only to be facilitated
by the provision of consensual knowledge but also has to be demonstrated as such. Now
although Schon and Rein do not equate the concept of learning with their concept of
frame reflection and reframing, frame reflection and reframing corresponds more closely
to learning than a shift in frames does. According to Schon and Rein, for frame reflection
and reframing to occur policy makers have to first reflect on old and new frames (which
requires the provision of consensual knowledge) and then reframe the existing policy
controversy (which results in new policy outcomes). In this context, to demonstrate that
learning has occurred requires both frame reflection and reframing. But as discussed
before, Schon and Rein acknowledge that frame reflection could occur without reframing
and vice versa, and that the relationship between frame reflection and framing is not
straightforward nor easily researchable.
Rather than discounting the role of framing altogether because of the
methodological difficulties associated with frame construction, it can be argued that
framing is a necessary precondition for learning in that, framing provides an opportunity to
identify the parameters shaping particular policies, and to identify any subsequent changes
in these parameters which might sponsor policy changes. Consequently, it may be of use
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in terms of
to those interested in evaluating the effects of part.cular policy changes ,
tnstitutional outcomes and goal attamment. While the literature on learn,ng neecssanly
informs the analytical application of policy framing, policy frarnmg as i, is applied in this
study is conceptually different from learning in that, it does no, provide normative
assessments as to whether policy actors or inst.tutions have unproved or declined in then
ability to deal with particular policy problems. » The idea that national policy actors
respond to global climate change from an energy perspective rather than an environmental
perspective indicates only that global environmental benefits and concerns are jettisoned in
favor of more pressing national growth objectives. Conclusive evidence about the
relationship between policy frame shifts and learning in this case, would require revisiting
the Indian case five or even ten years from now to see if Indian climate change policy
stances are still being dnven by energy related development policies or some entirely
different policy composite.
15 An Overview of the Study; A Brief Chapter Outline
The study comprises five chapters in addition to this one. The study’s first
objective is to present the overall national policy framework in the energy and
environment sectors from 1972 to mid 1996, in order to provide an understanding of
national energy related development needs and policies and to account for any changes in
these development needs and policies. Accordingly, Chapter II focuses on the national
policy framework as it related to the energy and environment sectors from 1972 until
87
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Problems,” in Sheila Jasanoff ed„ Learning From Disaster
.
(Philadelphia: University of
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1991. It provides detailed time line narratives of relevant Indian growth objectives and
energy and environmental policies through an exammation of the Fourth through Seventh
Ftve Year Plans (1969-1990) and official government documents. addition, data and
stat,sties on fossil fuel and renewable energy usage, patterns of energy use, and
informal,on on Indran contributions to GHG enusstons will also be given. Based on the
above, environmental and energy policy frames under a managed economy will be
constructed. Chapter III deals with the national policy framework after India embraced
economic liberation in 1991 and discusses the policy implrcations ofthis shift on the
energy and environment sectors. The chapter hrghlights relevant aspects of the Eighth Five
Year Plan, paying particular attention to the policy changes induced by liberalization in the
energy sector and their implications for the formulation of Indian climate change policy
stances. Environmental and energy policy frames will be constructed based on the sectoral
policy changes outlined in the Eighth Five Year Plan, as well as any subsequent policy
changes induced under an overall liberalized policy regime. Taken together. Chapters II
and III provide a comprehensive look at Indian sectoral policies in energy and
environment and provide an opportunity for the construction of environmental and energy
policy frames under two different phases of Indian planned development.
The study then shifts focus from the national to the international level to study
India’s role in international climate change negotiations until mid 1996. Chapter IV
examines Indian positions at international climate change negotiations and includes
interviews with diplomats and a literature review of India's role in international
negotiations. The chapter focuses on demonstrating the effect of energy policy frame on
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national energy-related development priorities.
Chapter V eontinues to foeus on the tntemationa, level, by examrnrng Indian
partieipation in the fossil fuel, renewable energy and climate change related projects of
>wo relevant mtemattona, envtronmen, financing ins,buttons - the World Bank and the
OEF. The central issues under investigation in this chapter are the nature of Indian climate
change related involvement in these mstitutions and the extent to whtch the chmate change
related portfolios of these institutions infiuence the formulation of Indian climate change
policy stances. Here, the role of Bank's energy policy advice and projects under
liberalization, and Indian positions at GEF negotiations and its climate-related GEF
projects will be considered. Finally, Chapter VI briefly summarizes the overall findings of
the study, and discusses the implications of framing, as revealed by the Indian ease, for the
study of international climate change negotiations. Finally, some recommendations for
future work on the role of frame in policy making are also discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
THE IMPACTS OF CENTRALIZED PLANNING ON THE ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENT SECTORS
2.1. Introduction
Indian policy makers rarely choose environment over development; such a bintuy
opposition assumes a parity between the two issues that simply does not exist in the
national poliey makrng arena. Development remams the top pnonty of the Indian
government. The conflation of development with economic development and economic
development with economic growth has long been a convenient tool for national policy
makers. As Dudley Seers points out, by equating development with economic
development, policy makers can resort to the supposition that if national income increases
faster than population, socio-political problems (including in this case, environmental
degradation) will be solved. 88
In India, environmental issues are either adapted to developmental needs or piggy
backed on development issues. 84 In the crowded national policy agenda of developing
countries like India, environmental issues do not compete with development concerns but
are subsumed by national development objectives. Developing countries leaders have often
seen environmental issues as part and parcel of overall developmental problems and issues.
88 Dudley Seers, “The Meaning of Development,” in Pradip Ghosh, ed., Economic
Policy and Planning in Third World Development
.
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press,
1984), page 7.
89 Renu Khator, Environment. Development and Politics in India
. (University Press of
America: Lanham, 1991), page 12.
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A good example of this was Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’
of the 1972 UNCHE in Sweden, when she noted.
s speech at the opening session
Xeop”"*'
" Can"0t f°r 3 m°mem f°rget thC **"^
Incta Gandhi did not reject envboumental protection in favor of development, as much as
she invoked development as the only route to overcomtng the environmental problems
caused by massive impovenshment. Thts senttment has persisted unabated in the policy
pronouncements of Indian delegates at various international environmental fora for over
two decades.
In his 1992 UNCED address, India’s Minister of State for Environment and
Forests, Kamal Nath, noted that complex public choices had to be made in the need for
trade offs between economic and human resource development and environmental
protection and that it:
“...would be futile to pit environment and development against each other as
adversaries, ifwe do not reconcile the needs of both in a higher symbiosis, the
resulting conflict of interest will damage the one and retard the other.” 91
90
Indira Gandhi, “Man and his Environment”. “Address at the plenary session of the
United Nations Conference on Human Environment at Stockholm,” Sweden, 14 June
1972. Text provided to author by Ministry of Environment and Forestry, New Delhi,
India.
91 Kamal Nath, “Environment: Top of National & International Agenda: An address to
UNCED, Brazil: 1992,” in Kamal Nath, India’s National & Global Environmental
Concerns
.
(New Delhi: Environment Information System, 1995), page 83. The book is a
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A. a press conference held during UNCED, Kamal Nath also stated that India did no.
believe it was responsible for causing global warmtng and that it would no. agree to any
global treaty that restricted or burdened its right to development.' « Taken together.
Nath’s statements mdtca.e the contours of the recent balancing act performed by the
lnd,an government in lurking environment and development concerns while ensuring that
the global climate change tssue does not unpose any new burdens on India’s economtc
development.
Pohcy makers also have a relatively free hand because climate change is not an
issue which has gripped the public imagination in India. Unlike local and regional struggles
over natural resources or over decisions to build mega-hydro dams, the global climate
change issue has not inspired any pitched political debates between national groups.
Natural resources have been diverted to produce energy and commodities for consumption
by the State and more powerful social groups, and the poor have borne a
disproportionately large share of the cost of environmental destruction while being
apportioned a meager share of energy and commodities. But there has been little attempt
in India to characterize the climate change issue as one polarizing the national haves’
from the much numerous national have-nots’. There are no media driven public debates
on global climate change in India pitting the “greens” against the “browns” (fossil fuel
industry groups), as there have been in most Western European countries and in the US. 93
Cited in Anil Agarwal, “Western rhetoric swamps cold facts of global warming.
Economic Times. January 26, 1992.
93
Ross Gelspan, The Heat is On. 1997, page 33-60.
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Ind,an responses to global climate change issues have emerged from a core group of
policy actors who respond to the problem of global warmtng because of its direct
connections to burgeoning energy-related national development needs.
Thts chapter focuses on impacts of cenlralized, national planned development on
energy and environment sector policies from 1972 through the Seventh Plan (1985-1990).
Based on key energy and environment sector policies undertaken during this period,
representative national energy related and environment-related development policy frames
will be constructed. These sectoral policy frames serve as a contrast to sectoral pohey
frames constructed on the basis of a review of the energy and environment sectors under
the Eighth Plan period (1992-1997). Chapter 3 examines the extent to which the 1991
shift in national development strategy towards liberalization under the Eighth Plan period
( 1 992- 1 997) has affected the Indian energy and environment sectors. As discussed in the
introduction, the study advances the claim that the energy related development policy
frame was altered under liberalization and drives the formulation of Indian global climate
change policies, while the environment related development policy frame remained largely
unaltered during the two distinct phases of national development strategy. Before
embarking on a discussion of key energy and environment sector policies undertaken
during centralized planned development, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the
Indian polity.
2.2 Background and Government: A Brief Overview
The subcontinent of India stretches from the Himalayas in the North, to the Indian
Ocean in the South, and is sandwiched between the Arabian Sea to the West, and the Bay
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Of Bengal to the East. India is the second most populous country in the world, but
occupies only 2.4% of the world's land area. With a GNP per capita of $300, India
remains one of the poorest countries in the world. « India comprises a melange of
linguistic, religious and ethnic groups with 16 official languages. Although about 83
percent of the people profess Hinduism. Muslims comprise 1
1 percent of the national
population, giving India the world's third largest Muslim population after Indonesta and
Bangladesh, with the remainder of the population comprising of Sikhs, Buddhtsts, Jains
and Christians. Despite Hindu predominance, independent India has to date adhered to the
concept of a secular state in which the constitution guarantees equal status to all religtons.
India gained independence on August 15, 1947 after a prolonged struggle against
British colonial rule. The Indian Independence Act, put into effect by Britain divided the
sub-continent into the sovereign nation-states of India and Pakistan, and set the stage for
confrontation between the two new nations over accession of various princely states,
which still persists over Jammu and Kashmir. The Indian constitution of January 26. 1950
provides for India to be both a republic and a parliamentary democracy. India currently
comprises of 25 states and 7 union territories and capitals (centrally administered
territories). The national government is headed by a President who is elected for a five-
year term, under a weighted voting system, by an electoral college composed of elected
members of both houses of the bicameral Parliament and the state legislatures. The
Parliament consists of the Rajya Sabha (Council of States) and the Lok Sabha (House of
"4 World Resources Institute, World Resources: 1996-97
.
(New York: Oxford
University Press, 1996), page 169.
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«he People). The Vice-President
,s chosen by an electoral college conning ofmembers of
the full Parliament and serves as ex-officio chatrman of the Rajya Sabha. The Prime
Mtnster is elected by the pari,amentary members of the majority party in the Lok Sabha
and heads a government that is collectively response to the legtslature. The Lok Sabha
is presided over by a speaker eleeted by its members who must be a member of Parliament
but by convention is divested of party affiliation while serving office.
The Rajya Sabha is a body of not more than 250 members, not more than 1 2 of
whom may be appointed for six-year terms by the president. The remaming members of
the Rajya Sabha are indirectly eleeted for staggered six-year terms, with approximately
one-third retiring every two years. They are chosen by the elected members of the state
and territorial assemblies, according to their allocated quotas. The Lok Sabha currently
has 545 seats of which 543 are allocated to directly elected members from states and
urnon temtones, with two seats for representatives of the Anglo-Indian community filled
by presidential nominations. Under a constitutional amendment adopted in November
1976, the Lok Sabha has a six-year term, unless dissolved earlier. There is also a
constitutional provision (exercised in March 1976) allowing for the delay of a scheduled
election by one year during a state of emergency to be declared by the President.
India is officially both a democracy and a republic. Its size, population base,
religious, linguistic and regional diversity thwart even the most herculean efforts for a neat
encapsulation of Indian politics. In 1997, India will have been a functioning democracy -
the largest in the world- for half a century. But with a 1 993 per capita income of $300,
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India is also one of the world’s poorest countries 95 TKic . •
• This combination would severely
challenge any government. More worrytng is the long-tenn erosion of the Indian state’s
capacity to govern and its abtlity to simultaneously promote development and to
accommodate diverse mterests. Atul Kohl, argues that an important cause oflndia’s
“crisis of govemabdity” is the disintegration oflndia’s major political institutions,
especially the decline of its premier political entity, the Congress party. * For over two
decades, India’s problems ofgovemabdity have become increasingly evident in erosion of
political order produced by the spiraling ethnic and religious violence in Punjab, Assam
and Jammu and Kashmir.
In 1992, 16 months after Prime Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao proposed shifting
India towards economic liberalization, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party(BJP)
-the
Hmdu nationalist party- endorsed the destruction of a 430 year-old mosque at Ayodhya.
The ethnic stnfe and rioting which followed served as a grim warning of the dangers of
ethnic chauvinism in India. In the most recent elections in April-May 1996, the BJP
formed for the first, albeit brief, time a national government. The BJP’s hopes of securing
additional political strength do not bode well for guaranteeing a secular Indian state as
their party manifesto specifically rejects this, and also calls for revoking the separate code
of civil laws for the country’s 120 million Muslims. The question of exactly how
increasing ethnic differences and communal conflict will challenge the course oflndia’s
1)5
World Bank, Trends in Developing Countries: Vol.2 - Emerging Capital Markets
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1995), page 31.
Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent
.
(New Delhi: Cambridge University Press,
1992), page 5.
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economic reform remains a very mrportani one, and one ,o which there are no easy
answers. Wha, is important to note is that there is mcreastng evidence of erodtng pohttcal
order and a growth of regional factionahsm in India a, the national, regional and local
level.
ince independence, the Congress Party has ruled India almost continuously, first
under Jawaharlal Nehru until his death in 1964, then under his daughter Indira Gandhi
( 1 966 - 1 977 and 1 980- 1 984), until she was assassinated in 1 984, and more recently under
his grandson, Rajiv Gandhi who led the Congress (I- “Indira”) Party from 1984 until he
was assassinated while campaigning in 1991. The more recent routing of the Congress
Party at the polls in 1996 was only the third time that the Party was unable to exert its
dominance over Indian politics. In 1975, Indira Gandhi declared a state ofemergency and
suspended many civil liberties, but the electorate did not give her the mandate she sought
and she was defeated in the 1977 elections by Moraji Desai, who headed the Janata Party-
a grouping of give opposition parties. In 1989, Rajiv Gandhi’s government was brought
down by allegations of corruption and he was replaced first by V.P. Singh and then by
Chandra Shekhar. But the loose coalition between the Janata Dal and the Hindu nationalist
BJP on the right and the communists on the left collapsed in November 1990 and elections
were called for in June 1991.
From independence until 1991, India pursued a planned approach to development
with an extensively regulated economy predominated by an active state role in banking,
basic industries, and infrastructure. A 1995 World Bank study concluded that this strategy
has produced mixed results. The study notes that on the positive side it succeeded in
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transforming a stagnant economy into one where on average GDP per capita grew at
'
-4% per year, reduced the incidence of poverty from over 50% in the ,960s to less than
30% in the late ,980s. and eradicated famines; on the negative side i, resuhcd in much
lower growth rates than could be expected in a country saving and mvesting over one-filth
of its GDP. 97 By the late 1980s, the administration of Rajiv Gandhi instituted policy
changes whtch began to gradually liberahze trade, industry and the financial sector, but the
investment licensing regime remained pervasive as did the inefficiency of public
enterprises.
sector
By the late 1980s, India faced increasingly serious political uncertainties as the
Gandh, administration lost a critical series of mid-year state elections. Prime Minister
Gandhi called an early Lok Sabha election for November 1989, at which the National
Front (under V.P. Singh) and its allies gained a clear majority, forcing the Congress into
the opposition for the second time since independence. The BJP emerged as a dominant
national political party endorsing support for the National Front. From 1989 to 1991,
there were two general elections and four changes of government. In September 1990, the
BJP leader, L.K. Advani was arrested under orders of Prime Minister V.P. Singh while
attempting a religious pilgrimage to the site of mosque which the BJP claimed should be
replaced by a Hindu temple. The National Front was now weakened by the lack of BJP
support and V.P. Singh became the first Indian P.M. to be defeated on the floor of the
Lok Sabha in a no-confidence vote. On November 10, 1990, Chandra Shekhar was
47
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appointed Prime Minister but his Janata , , ,m (S) group had only 54 members and he resigned
on March 6, 1991. On March
,3, 1991, President R. Venkataraman dtssolved the
parbament and scheduled an election for late May ,99.
. The firs, stage of balloting
occurred on May 20 ,1991 but on May 21, 1991, Ra,v Gandh, was assasstnated by Tanul
separatists from Sr, Lanka. The remauung par. of the polling was postponed until June,
and P.V. Narasimha Rao, an old-time party stalwart was named as the new head of the
Congress (I) Party. With only about 50% participation by eligible voters, the Congress did
no. have enough for a clear legislature majority, but Rao succeeded in forming a coahtion
government and was sworn in on June 21, 1991
One of the firs, acts of the new Rao government was to launch a liberalization
programme that transformed India’s strategy of planned development. In late July 1991.
Rao announced a new industrial policy along with a revised budget which liberalized one
of the most extensively controlled investment regime in the world - ubiquitously named
the “License Raj”. The state had been expanding since independence and had borrowed
and taxed as much as it could. In 1991, India’s foreign-exchange reserves were virtually
non-existent, the budget deficit had soared and the country was on the brink of defaulting
on its loans. Prune Minister Rao and his Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh, embarked on
a series of policy reforms which included devaluing the rupee and overturning the
decades-old industrial licensing system in which government licenses were needed to set
up businesses, promote exports and secure imports. These reforms ended the state
monopoly in energy, ports, aviation and telecommunications by inviting new private ar J
foreign investment and liberalizing foreign investment rules to attract foreign direct
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investment and had serious policy ramifications for not- iP tor national energy policies which in turn
had policy implications for Indian climate change stances.
The move towards liberalization has been accompanted by numerous corruption
scandals symboliztng India's difficulties at governance. The larges, of the scandals
occurred in January ,996 and involved seven serving Cabme, Ministers of the ruling
Congress Party, and top level opposition leaders, including the leader of the BJP (by now
the largest oppos.tion party), and members of the Janata Dal. (the nation's third largest
opposition party). * It implicated Kamal Nath who had until September, 1995 been the
Minister of Environment and Forests and Rajesh Pilot, who had been shifted from his
influential position as Minster of State for Internal Security in September 1995, to tha, of
Minster of State for Environment and Forests. The tainting of the top echelon of the
political establishment, just months before the general election in April
-May 1996, led to
speculation about the election results. 99
In the end, the voters’ overall discontent with the lack of leadership and the
involvement of several serving Cabinet Ministers in the scandal led to a dismal
performance by the Congress (I) Party at the polls. The Congress Party lost more heavily
than the BJP, and the only real winners were the regional parties in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil
9X The roots of the scandal can be traced to two diaries seized from a raid of the home
of Surendra Jain (an industrialist) in 1991, that contain records of 1 15 payments to New
Delhi politicians and bureaucrats over three years. Jain’s home was raided after detained
Kashmiri students implicated him in an illegal money-laundering scheme that channeled
funds to Muslim guerrillas in t! e divided Indian state ofJammu and Kashmir.
Special Correspondent, “Rao Unveils Audacious Strategy,” Indian Txpress . January
25, 1996.
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Nadu, and Havana, and ,he left popuUs, Bahujan Samajwad, Party. » For the flrst „me
m 'nd,an thC BJP^ 8 'Wn
.o fortn the nattona, g„vetnmen,
and A.B. Vajpayee becante India’s 1 , th Prune Mtnister. Bu, he rentained in office for on.y
13 days, because of the BJP's inabUtty to secure a parhantentary majority. The BJP
Government resigned on May 29, 1996 to save
..self the embarrassment of betng voted
out of power. - An anti-BJP coahtion- Utnted Front - was forged among the left and
regional parties with the support of Congress (I) party with Deve Gowda
,
chief minister
of Karanataka, being sworn in as the 12th Prime Minister. In October 1996. Rao became
the first Indian Prime Minister to be charged with comtption. « In April 1997, Deve
Gowda found himself in increasing disfavor with the United Front’s principal allies
-the
Congress Party - and was replaced as Prime Minister by I.K Gujral, a former Foreign
Affairs Minister.
2
-3 - Development Planning jn India
All governments engage in conscious intervention in national economies, but some
plan more overtly than others and commit themselves to producing central plans at
regularly chosen intervals. According to Ian Little, non-Leninist central planning derives
from the theory of indicative planning invented by the French. In this process, the central
100 Arun Nehru, "The Politics of Uncertainty,” The Hindu. May 13, 1996.
101 SPecial Correspondent, “Vajpayee resigns before vote on trust motion in Lok
Sabha,”The Hindu. May 29, 1996.
102
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Minister.
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plan becomes a direct mstrumen, of government tntetvemion;
"i, is itself an mfluence
actmg on decentralized decisions". '« While Governments may differ in the degree of
central planning and the time horizons they chose for their plans, structural or central
Planning is often assoc,ated with longer term horizons rangtng from three to five years.
The genenc term Five Year Plan”, has had a long assoc,ation with socialist
development planmng. But trouble achreving the targets and goals set for particular time
horizons has been a problem endenuc to centralized planning. Despite the intent,ons and
attempts of planning commissions to generate consistency and comprehensiveness in then-
plans, five years has proved to be too long a time horizon to target and predict for
consistency. As Little, long familiar with Indian planning efforts and methods notes,
“Few if any Five Year Plans have both avoided serious crisis and mapped the
ure course ot the economy without very large errors. A conflict between short-
and medium-term plans ts usually unavoidable and results in difficult relationsbetween planning ministries and finance ministries”. 104
Despite these gaps between what was planned and what was actually achieved,
these Five-Year Plans are the most authoritative indication of the stated objectives and
targets of Indian development planning over a 24 year period. While the story of Indian
development might be described in terms of pressure-group politics for particular sectors
at particular times, it is still not possible to tell such a story without contrasting it to the
stated record espoused in the Plans. An analysis of the stated objectives of the Plans for
the environment and energy sectors permits tracing sectoral policies and budgetary
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allocations over time and identifying any noliev rhinal • .uy h y P° ,,cy changes in these sectors. Sectoral policy
frames will be constructed on the basis of kev sectoral n^i; • ,K y policies undertaken in the Fourth
through Seventh Plan and the Eighth Plan.
India began the process of planned development more than forty years ago, with
the start of the First Five Year Plan in April 1 95 1 . India was the first and largest non-
communist country to begtn its post-tndependenee development within the framework of
centralized national development plans and consequentially the Indian planning process
has been written about some length. '« The Planning Commission was first established on
1 5 March, 1 950 with Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru as its first Chairman, and Mr. G. L.
Nanda, a member of the Nehru Cabinet as its deputy Chairman. The Planning Commission
is the key institutional structure credited with formulating and explicating to date, a series
of Etght Five-Year and four Annual Plans. The Planning Commission functions within a
political framework of the National Development Council comprised of the Prime
Minister, state chief ministers and members of the Planning Commission. In addition, a
National Planning Council was set up in February 1965, "comprising of specialists to work
in close and continuous association with the Planning Commission” l06
. The Planning
Commission ot each Five Year Plan has had to decide on the size and allocation of
See A.H. Hanson. Ih<? Process of Planning
.
(London: Oxford University Press,
1956); Jagdish Bhagwati and S. Chakravarty, “Contributions to Indian Economic
Analysis: A Survey “American Economic Review Supplement
. September 1 969; Jagdish
Bhagwati and Padma Dcsai, India-Planning for Industrialization^ .ondon- Oxford
University Press, 1970), and B.R. Nayar, The Modernization Imperative and Indian
Planning
.
(Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1972).
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investment amongst a host of sectors including agriculture, rural development, irrigation,
industries, energy, educate, health, socta, welfare, labor, transport, houstng, and science
and technology. The Planmng Commtssions have had to make two key decisions: the
appropriate size of overall investment in each Plan, which in turn depended on the
expected level of foreign aid and the political and economical feasible marginal rate of
savings, and the allocation of investment amongst different sectors.
Planning in India was intended, in the words of the Government Resolutton of
March 1950, to promote a rapid rise in the standard of living of the people by the
‘•efficient exploitation of the resources” of the country and by increasing industrial
production. The proclivity towards centralized planning did not in any way diminish
the Indian Government’s preference for economic growth often at the cost of social
reform. Responding to criticisms that the early Plans’ focused on growth and not on social
issues, Bhagwati writes that the growth strategy was conceived by the early planners at
the start of their ’’planned assault on poverty as an activist, interventionist strategy” guided
by a “pull-up” rather than the “trickle-down theory”. Noting the absence of a strong
consensus on the debate between merits of direct anti-poverty and indirect (growth-based)
poverty programmes, Bhagwati argues that Indian planners underestimated and
107 The Government Resolution of March 1950 was cited in the "Approach and Policy"
chapter of the Fourth Five Year Plan. See Planning Commission, Fourth Five Year Plan.
1969-74 , (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1969), page 2.
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consequently underspent on issues like health, food and education. » The troubling truth
is that there has been very little tnoventen, on social refonu, and India still lags behind
most other poor coun.nes in prov.dtng its citizens adequate health care and access to
primary education. 110
2 3
- 1 Ihe Indian Approach to Planning
India embarked on the road to central planning with the First Five Year Plan
(1951-1956, which sough, to rehabilitate the national economy and the Second Five Year
Plan (1956-61) which explicitly accepted "a socialist pattern of society" as the goal of
national social and economic development programmes. The early influences for India's
predilection for five year plans are varied, and include sources as diverse as Sir M.
Visvesarayya’s, publication ofIhe Planned Fcononry mm. in 1934 the
ideology of the Congress National Party, and the British Imperial Government.
For Bhagwati and Desai, the most persuasive influence on the direction and pattern
of Indian planning was the socialist political ideology of the Congress Party, and more
directly Jawaharlal Nehru who influenced the scope and pattern of India’s early
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development plans. » Chakravarty who setved as a member of the Indian P,a„ntng
Commission m the 1970, argues that the fas, three r,ve-year plans should be treated
separately from all other, because they were success,ve and no, punctuated by any annua,
Plans, and aU formulated under and bore Nehru's seal of approval. Roy and Tisdell note
•hat the intellectual impetus of plannutg the Fast and Second Year Plan, was provtded by
.he Daector of the Indian Statistical Institute, Prof. P. C. Mahalanobi, They point out
.hat in the Fas, and Second Plan, the push by the "big planners" led by Mahalanobts and
Pi,amber Pan, (the head of the Perspective Planning Division), received support from both
Nehru and the Plannatg Commtssion. Consequently,
"a smaller and politically more
feastble plan put forward by the Ftnance Ministry did no, receive any serious consideration
at all."
113
Chakravarty states that it was well known that Nehru persuaded Mahalanobis to
work out the blue print for the Second Five-Year Plan. 114
The Second Plan reflected a major watershed in Indian economic thinking and
gave credence to the Nehru-Mahalanobis strategy of development through large-scale
industrialization. The influence of the Mahalanobis model continued beyond the Second
See Jagdish Bhagwati and Padma Desai, India: Planning for
Indpstrializatipn,(Oxford: Oxford University Press) 1970. Bhagwati joined the Indian
Statistical Institute in 1961 which was affiliated with the Planning Commission.
113 K C. Roy and C. A. Tisdell, “Planned Development: Strategies and the Place of
Environment in Indian Planning,” in K.C. Roy, C.A Tisdell and R.K Sen, eds.. Economic
Development and Environment- A Case Study of India
. (Calcutta: Oxford University
Press, 1992), page 22-23.
114
Chakravarty, 1987, page 3.
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Plan. The Thtrd Five Year Plan (.96,
-,966) set the achtevetnen, ofa "good life" for
every citizen as the ultimate goal of soctahs, society. The early plans’ objectives of
ensuring a minimum standard of living was worthy one.
achieving self-reliant growth while
but at best, it necessitated an over-extension of the state and at worst, it remained
unachievable. A basic prenuse of the early plans was the visuafcation of vast
adnuntstrative requirements, but by the Thud Plan, doubts about the state’s admans,rattve
capabilities had already begun to surface. 116
Key Features of the Plann ing Exercise: 197Qs- 199(k.
The foreword to the Fifth Year Plan notes tha, Indian needs were so vast that a
Plan, however big, would always fall short of expectattons. This reference to the
shortcomings of centralized planning was an expire,, recognition of the rigors associated
with planning development in a polity confronted with endenhc large scale poverty and a
multitude of development problems. One of the distinguishing features of centralized
planning in India was that for the majority of her poor from the 1970s onwards, planning
remained largely an exercise in futility. In the early 1970s, Indira Gandhi campaigned on a
platform of “garibi hatao” (abolish poverty) and the government began spending more on
employment and food programmes intended to benefit the poor. But the public sector
115 Roy and Tisdell, 1992, page 22.
!
16 banning Commission, Third Five Year Plan. 1961-66
.
(New Delhi: Government of
India Press, 1961), page 277.
Planning Commission, Fifth Five Year Plan: 1974-1979
.
(New Delhi: Government
of India Press, 1976), page iv.
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push for heavy industrialization meant that planners shifts r*P c lled resourees away from the rural
agricultural sector where the majority of poor people lived.
The Minimum Needs Programme m,reduced in the Fifth Year Plan was devised as
an investment in human resource development where the provision of free or subsidized
services, such as elementary education, rural health, rural water supplies, rural
electrification, rural roads, environmental improvement of urban slums and nutrition, was
expected to improve the fives of the poor. Bu, the total provision for the Minimum Needs
Programme in the Fifth Plan, was Rupees (Rs.) 2607 crores " 8 which amounted to a mere
4.1% of the total outlay for the Plan period. By the Sixth Plan, the provision of Rs. 5807
crores lor the Minimum Needs Programme amounted to only 3.4% of the total outlay, and
by the Seventh Plan the provision of Rs. 1 0,08 1 .72 crores for the Programme amounted to
an even lower 2.9% of the total outlay. The abysmally low amounts allocated to anti-
poverty programmes intended for the poor indicated that the extension of social sendees
through centralized planning in the 1 970s and 1 980s remained largely a sham, and a
projection of pious governmental intention useful only for populist electioneering.
Several other features distinguished the Indian experiment in planned development
during this phase. A curious fact about India’s experiment in planned development was
that India’s gross national product grew at a faster pace (average of 4.3%) during the
period 1974-1979 than in the preceding decade (average of 3.4%), in sharp contrast to the
1 lx A crore is a unit used in India. Rs one crore is equal to Rs.10 million.
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experiences of most other
countries which borrowed
non-oil developing countries. Unlike most developing
heavily in response to the 1973-74 oil crisis, India did not
borrow commercially, kept inflation low and bulk up reserves of food and foreign
exchange. A World Bank study on the macroeconomic experience of 1 8 develop,ng
countries noted that India unhke many other countries, expenenced no deb. crisis or
recession in the early ,980s. » The authors, Josh! and Little, state that the Larin American
tendency to view tnflation and development as inseparable was absent in India. One
possible explanation for this was the unpopularity of inflatton in a democracy in which
elections have to be won, but democracies can be inflation-prone if governments give out
too much money to competing groups. Joshi and Little, attribute India’s low inflation to
the guard,anship of the state by bureaucrats who chose not to index their salaries until the
1 980s, and hence imposed on themselves an incentive to keep inflation low. 121 But by the
nud 1 980s, inflation had increased and was accompanied by a growing current account
deficit financed by heavy foreign and domestic borrowing. By the late 1980s, India's
economic conservatism had dissipated and India experienced its debt crisis in 1991, a
decade later than most other developing countries. The policy implications of the macro-
1 14
Mrinal Datta Chaudhuri, “The background to the current debate on economic
reform,” in Ashok Guha, ed.. Economic Liberalization. Industrial Structure and Growth in
India, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), page 13.
10
Vijay Joshi and Ian Little, India: Macroeconomics and Political Economy. 1964-
1.991, (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1994), foreword.
121
Joshi and Little, 1994, page 12.
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economic crisis of 1991, which Iriggercd the move Cowards economic reform and
liberalization, is discussed al greater length in the chapter 3.
The inward looking character of industrialize was one of the more persistent
traits of Indtan planntng. provided the policy tmpe.us for the employment of pervasive
controls and protectionist trade policies and was reinforced by a genera, dtstrus, of the
price mechanism which led to strict control over the exchange rate and interest rates.
Distrust of the pnee mechanism, private sector investments and foreign trade were key
distinguishing features of the Fourth-Seventh Five Year Plans. In the world according to
planned development, the state emerged as both the mobilizer of savings, and the investor
and owner of capital. The state was also viewed as the primary agent ofeconomic activity
and change. Public acceptance of this overextended state facilitated its regulation of
private sector activities. Bimal Jalan points out that national policy makers assigned
foreign trade a small role partly because of their belief that international trade was biased
against developing countries, and partly because of the national intellectual tendency
toward export pessimism. 122
Another eommon feature of the planning exercise through the 1 980s was the
public sector s inability to function efficiently and to generate its expected contributions to
the overall economy. 1 ' Though public sector enterprises in manufacturing, mining.
122 Ja,an served as a former Finance Secretary and Executive Director of the World
Bank and is currently the Member-Secretary of the Planning Commission for the Ninth
Plan. See Bimal Jalan, Indian Economic Crisis
.
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
1 992), page 22 and also Joshi and Little, 1 994, page 1 2.
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Public sector inefficiency has been documented in B.R. Nayyar, “The Public Sector
(continued...)
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construction, transport, commutations, banktng and insurance prov.ded nearly 70% of
the 26 million jobs in the large scale organized sector in 1989. the average rate of
financial return on employed capital in the public sector was a dtsmal 2.5%. » Tins mean,
.ha, the public sector was unable to generate the necessary resources for domestic
investment and capital formafion. Public sector inefficiency was particularly charactensfic
of the energy sector. Jalan states that the primacy accorded to the pubhc see,or was based
on the mistaken assumption that the public sector could increase savings at a higher rate
than the private sector. 125 Moreover, the governmental policy of takrng over "sick units”
-private firms making losses- devised as a response to political demands for avoiding firm-
level bankruptcy, only worsened the problem. In 1988, “sick frnns” numbered nearly
250,000 and owed the Indian banks over Rs. 77 billion. I2‘ Increased foreign and
domestic borrowing and mcreased defense expenditures together with the pubhc sector's
low returns on capital investment and its economic inefficiency through the mid-1980s,
were largely responsible for the foreign exchange crisis that developed in mid- 1991. Table
2. 1 and Table 2.2 provide an overview of the distinguishing features of each Plan and the
planned and actual outlays for each Plan.
i:3
(...continued)
in India: The Dialectics of Legitimation and Rent Seeking,” in L. Gordon and P.
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Table 2.1: Key Features of the Plans. 127
Plan Key Distinguishing Feature
Second Plan Mahalanobis Model-inward looking development & m 4 , ,
Third Plan
uc ct industrialization
Jvioditied Mahalanobis model-recognition of role of agricultu^
Fourth Plan New strategy of agricultural development
Fifth Plan Self-reliance through elimination of net aid and poverty eradication
Sixth Plan Emphasis on minimum needs for the poor and the national rural
employment programmes
Seventh Plan Emphasis on technological modernization of the economy with
increased outlays for human resource development
Eighth Plan Transition from centrally planned to market-led economy, performance
oriented based on the optimal utilization of resources
Table 2.2. Planned Outlays and Growth Rates: Fourth-Eighth Plans 128
PLANS TOTAL
OUTLAY
(in Rs.crores)
PUBLIC SECTOR GROWTH RATE
(% per annum)
Planned
outlay
Actual
Expendi-
ture
FOURTH 24,882 15,902 15,779 3.3
FIFTH 63,751 39,322 39,426 4.37
SIXTH 172,210 97,500 109,646 5.2
SEVENTH 348,148 180,000 178,377 5.8 GDP ( Unit used)
EIGHTH 798,000 434,100 Ninth Plan
estimate
5.6 GDP (Unit used)
Key features of each plan based on author’s analysis of the respective Plans.
128 Data gathered by author from the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Five
Year Plans.
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2 4
Fourth-Spvp.th
WWle the literature on Indtan economtc plannmg is quite voluminous, hardly any
attention has been paid to a detailed exanrtnahon of energy and envtronnren, sector
outlays and pohcies. The two sections which foUow examtne sectoral spending and
poltces in environment and energy from the 1970- 1980s (Fourth-Seventh Plans). The data
g,ven below in the form of time line narratives provides information on the overall policy
framework and the allocated outlays for the two sectors. In tracing the sectoral evolut.on
of energy and environment in India, spec,fie features and recurrent, identifiable pohcy
pnorities which have climate change implications in energy and environmental sectors are
identified as constituting an energy policy frame and an environment policy frame under
two distinct phases of national economic development, centralized planning under a
managed economy, and centralized planning under a liberalized economy. The idea is to
first examine the policy pnorities of both sectors as described in the Five Year Plans from
1 970 through 1 990 and next, to construct representative environmental and energy policy
frames based on the key sectoral policies identified.
2.4.1 National Environment Policies: 1970-1990
India has a relatively long history of environment-relevant legislation. Specific acts
with environmental relevance in effect even before Indian independence in 1947, included
the Indian Fisheries Act of 1897, and the Indian Forest Act of 1927. Several other
legislative measures came into force after 1947, including the Factories Act of 1948 and
the Atomic Energy Act of 1972. Yet the bulk of Indian environmental legislation was put
into place after 1972. Environmental concerns were entrenched in the Indian Constitution
80
by 1976, when Parliament passed the Constitution (42nd Amendmen«, Act. Section ,0
stipulates that.
••.The State shall endeavor to nrntfw Qn4 •
safeguard the forests and the wildlife ofther^;-'
1
™0"™6'’1 ““ ‘°
New environment-related
,egis,a„on tneluded the Water (Prevention and Control of
Pollution) AC of 1674, the Wildhfe (Protection) Act of 1072, the Pores, Conserve™ Ac
of 1980, the An (Prevention and Control of Pollution, Ac of 1981, and the Envtronmen,
(Protection) Act of 1986.
The institutional framework for environmental management in India can be traced
back to the creation of the National Committee on Envtronmen,al Planntng and
Coordination (NCEPC) in 1972, in the context of the UNCHE. The issue of
environmental protection was firs, mentioned in Chapter 2 of the Fourth Plan ( 1 969-74),
entitled The Long-Term Perspective”:
“Plamnng for harmonious development recognizes the unity of nature and manSuch planning is possible only on the basis of a comprehensive appraisal of
envtronmen,a issues. There are instances in which timely, speciafced advice on
environmental aspects could have helped in project design and in averting
subsequent adverse effects on the environment leading to loss of invested
resources. It is necessary, therefore, to introduce the environmental aspect into ourplanntng and development...It is particularly important that long-term basic
considerations should prevail over short-term commercial considerations, and
social costs and benefits should be used as the yardstick rather than private gains
and losses. 130
I ata Energy Research Institute, Environmental Considerations and Option? in
Managing Indians Long-term Energy Strategy , (New Delhi: Tata Energy Research
Institute, 1995), page 13.4
130
Planning Commission, The Fourth Five Year Plan. 1 969-74 (New Delhi:
Government of India Press, 1969), page 49.
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Incorporation of environmental considerations info th„ ia into the planning process remained difficult
to implement in subsequent five-year plans. Despite its well-meaning espousal of
environmental protection, the Indian state lacked the resources and the political will to pu,
these sentiments into practice in the policy enforcement and monitoring arenas. Evidence
of the gap between intention and action was obvious as early as the Fifth Plan (, 974-79)
which did not even discuss the environment and ecology. The foreword to the Fifth Plan
merely noted that,
"...concentration on development should focus more pointed attention on its lone
iTh! "!
0?T‘ n°‘ reCk 'eSSly Cul down ‘ nor air a"<i water pollutedTechnology should work in resonance with natural forces.” 131
In the Sixth Five Year Plan (1980-1985), the environment merited its own chapter
for the first time. Chapter 20 classified environmental problems in India into two broad
categones, those arising from the conditions of poverty and under-development and those
arising as negative effects of the very process of development. 132 The first category
covered the impacts of poverty and the inability to fulfil basic human needs on natural
resources; while the second category, covered the “unintended side effects of efforts to
achieve rapid economic growth and development”. 133 Noting that a concern for the
environment was essentially a desire to see that national development proceeds along
131
Planning Commission, Fifth Five Year Plan. 1974-1979
.
(New Delhi: Government
of India Press, 1976), page vii.
132
Planning Commission, Sixth Five Year Plan. 1980-85 (New Delhi: Government
-»f
India Press, 1981), page 343.
133
Planning Commission, Sixth Five Year Plan . 1981, page 343
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rational sustainable lines”, the Sixth Plan proclaimed that,
in fact, the very basis of all development." 134
environmental conservation is.
The Sixth Plan's short chapter on environment focused on five issues, natural
resources and the environment, environmental pollution, environmental impacts from
development projects, administrative and legislative arrangements for environmental
protection, and programmes. The bulk of the chapter deal, with land, water and fores,
management. Environmental pollution was farther subdivided into water, air. land and
noise pollution, and human settlements, with poUution being defined as “a process by
which a resource (natural or man made) is rendered unfit for some beneficial use due to
physical, chemical, or biological factors.” Although water poUution was deemed to have
the most serious health implications, the Plan's reference to air poUution is worth
highlighting for its future climate change impUcations. WhUe linking air poUution to
industrial growth and urbanization, the Plan noted.
...in many towns and cities in India domestic sources which bum coal, cowdung,
firewood, or trash can be a significant source of pollution particularly under
conditions of stagnant air in winter months. Fortunately, Indian coal is low in
sulphur content, the number of automobiles is relatively small and the rainy season
is an effective scrubber for mitigating air pollution.” 135
Here, industries, the primary users of coal are not identified as a “significant source”of air
pollution underlining the Indian state’s tendency of viewing environmental concerns as
distmct from industrial development concerns, and industrial development as not being a
significant cause of environmental degradation. Moreover, the environmental impacts of
134
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Indian coal was seen in relation «o smog and acid rain, bu, not in relation to carbon
d,oxide emissions. Interesttngly, the cursoty discussion on the environmental impacts of
development projects does no, dtscuss specific environmental tmpacts. and argues that the
“unintended” impacts of development projects can in fact be minimized or avoided if
environmental considerations are made “an integral part of all planning for
development.” 136
The Sixth Plan did however highlight the need for a fresh, comprehensive look at
administrative and legislative aspects of environmental protection which prompted the
Government to constitute a Htgh Power Committee chaired by the Deputy Chatrman of
the Planning Commission, Mr. N.D. Tiwari. The Tiwar, Comnuttee's Report, submitted to
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in September 1980, recommended creating a Department of
Environment (DOE) to provide explicit recognition of the pivotal role that environmental
conservation must play for sustainable national development. According to the Plan, the
functions of the DOE were to serve as a ‘nodal’ agency for environmental protection and
eco-development in the country; carry out of environmental appraisal of development
projects directly and through other ministries/agencies; and, have administrative
responsibility for pollution monitoring and conservation of critical eco-systems. 137
By 1985, the issues of forestry and wildlife were linked and the DOE was
transformed and upgraded to become the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MOEF)
136
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137
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wuh overall admmlstrative responsibility in e„v,r„„mc„ta, plannlng
, protection^
pohcy making. Established towards the end of the Sixth Plan period, the MOEF is
supported by a senes of organs,ions, ineludtng the Centra! Pollution Boards, the
Botanical Survey of ,„d,a, the Zoological Survey of India and the Fores, Research
Institutes, which assist the MOEF in the implementation of the Environmental Protection
Act of ,986. In addition. State Environment Boards and Departments are responsible for
state-level pollution control and monitoring of environmental protection programmes. The
implementation and enforcement functions of environmental protection are performed by
Ihe Central and State boards, the Chieflnspeetors of Factories and the Insecticides
Inspectors of Agricultural Departments. The total outlay of Rs 40 crores for the
environment was allocated for environment planning and coordination (Rs. 1 5 crores), eco
development programmes (Rs. 1 0 crores, and environment training programmes (Rs. 5
crores) and the botanical and zoological sutvey of India (Rs. 1 0 crores). The sectoral
outlay amounted to 0.023% of the aggregate outlay of Rs. 1 72,2 1 0 crores envisaged in
the Sixth Plan. 138
Before highlighting key environmental policy features of the Seventh Plan, it is
important to discuss briefly the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 (EPA) which was
passed at the start of the Seventh Plan period (1985-1990). The aftermath of the Bhopal
tragedy spurred political support for the issue of environmental protection, and the bill,
prepared by the MOEF took just six months to move from drafting stage to the final
Presidential signature. The EPA was designed as umbrella legislation and it provides a
138
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smgle focus for environmental issues in the country. The EPA provtdes the MOEF with
•he legal and institutional basts for rule-maktng. no , lfica,ion of standard, delegation of
powers, identtfication of agencies for hazardous chemicals management and setttng up
environmental protection councils in the States. The EPA was a supplemental and
overarehing law, and consequently did no, sanetton the creation of new bureaucrac.es bu,
sought instead to use existing ones. According to Renu Khator, the EPA offered no new
solutions and did not indicate any significant policy shift, although it did extend
environmental jurisdiction to the entire nation. 139
The Seventh Plan's chapter on environment and ecology began with the claim that
all development programmes ought to take environmental considerations hilly into
account and that the basic approach to the Plan was “sustainable development in harmony
with the environment
. The use of the concept “sustainable development” indicates that
at the very least the Indian government was quick to sponsor the use of an environmental
term before it became widely accepted international buzz word. In chapter 18 of the
Seventh Plan, environmental problems in India were once again bifurcated into the
consequences of poverty and underdevelopment and the negative effects of badly planned
development programmes. At the same time, rapid economic development was officially
enshrined as the primary antidote to national environmental problems. 141 The Seventh
139
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Plan also noted for the first tune India’s role in highlighting the relevance of environmental
concerns within the context of economic development at international fora. « This role
would be particularly relevant during the international el,mate negotiates, gtven India’s
need to ensure that global climate change concerns do no, constrain national energy
related development objectives.
The Seventh Plan focused on articulating basic policies related to the
implementation of environmental management, defined as encompass,ng environmental
planning, protection, monitoring, assessment, research, education, conservation and
sustainable use of resources. '« The key program areas identified in the Plan included
pollution monitoring and control, environmental impact assessment, natural living
resources conservation, eco-development, environmental research promotion and
environmental training and information. The Seventh Plan’s development of a new policy
mechanism- Environmental Impact Assessments (EIAs) merits attention. According to the
Plan, EIAs were designed as evaluatory tools for assessing a project, a programme or even
a piece of legislation, which may cause damage to the environment. The Plan sought to
induce all socio-economic ministries, departments and agencies, whose projects impinge
on environmental quality to establish cells for Environmental
Assessment. 144 These cells were responsible for ensuring that project authorities carry out
EIAs at the feasibility report stage of each project. The DOE was assigned an overseer
142
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role with authority to approve projects, monitor compliance and systematically document
EIA related expenence and mformation. While the mstitutionalization of ElAs was
noteworthy, based on information provided during interviews with MOEF officials.
indicates that the implementation reeord of EIAs has remained rather dismal.
Unltke previous Plans, the Seventh Five Year Plan also tncluded a specific
reference to the benefits of international cooperation through bilateral and multilateral
programmes. The cooperation between the DOE (as nodal agency) and international
organizations such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the
International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, the South Asia
Cooperative Environment Programme, the International Centre for Integrated Mountain
Development was noted, as well as, the DOE’s participation in the environment
programmes of a host of other international bodies. In addition, there was a rather brief
and cursory reference to some bilateral agreements with countries of the North and South
which have as major components, cooperation in environmental management activities. 145
No references were made to international debates on climate change and biodiversity
which were still in the stages of political infancy.
The total Seventh Plan outlay of Rs. 427.91 crores for the environment amounted
to 0.24% of the total planned outlay of Rs. 180, 000 crores and represents a significant
increase in sectoral allocation. Yet a footnote to the Plan indicated that the bulk of the
Seventh Plan outlay - Rs 240 crores - was targeted towards the Ganga Action Plan. This
left only Rs. 187 crores or 0. 1% of the total planned outlay to be used for environment
145
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and ecology, prevcnlion and control of air and water pollution, an effective reminder of
the level of the Indian state’s commitment to environmental protection.
2 -4 '2 En-Vi-'o-nent-Related Development Policy Fr-n- Hmm.mw,
Based on mformation included in the Fourth through Seventh Plans, key policy
features deemed relevant to the subsequent formulation of climate change responses have
been idcnt.fied as constituting an environment related development policy frame. The
representative environmental policy frame for this period includes the following features.
One, an early institutionalization of environmental concerns following the UNCHE in
1972, including the creation of a DOE and a MOEF, comparable to a similar
institutionalization in other more developed countries. Two, an early history of
environment relevant legislation. Three, a recurrent bifurcated classification of
environmental problems; those arising from conditions of poverty and those arising as
“unintended” consequences of the process of economic development. Four, recurrent
policy espousals of the need to ensure that planning efforts acknowledge environmental
concerns, but in contrast to these espousals, no actual linkage between planning and
environment considerations during this period. Five, consistently small sectoral outlays
allocated to addressing environmental degradation and environmental monitoring
programmes. Six, identification of India’s role in highlighting environmental concerns
within the context of economic development at international fora. Seven, the identification
of the benefits of international environmental cooperation through bilateral and multilateral
sources.
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2 5
-nCreY and f>"<rali/ed Plann ing: Fourth-s-yenth piat,«
Although significant international political attention on global climate change
emerged only after 1990- the end of the Seventh Plan period, the
,dent,fica,ion of key coal
,
power and renewable energy policies from 1970-1990 is important because these sectors
are linked with emitting the buUt of India’s carbon dioxide emissions. First, a tune line
narrative of relevant policy priorities in power and renewable energy in the Fourth through
Seventh Plans will be discussed and second, an energy policy frame will be constructed on
the basis of key policy features identified in the time line narratives.
It must be noted at the outset that obtaining data on financial outlays for the power
sector from the various plans is complicated by the fact that in the Fourth and Fifth Plans,
plan outlays on petroleum and coal were included under “Industry and Minerals”, and the
planned installed capacity of these sectors, along with hydropower were included under
the chapter heading of “Power”. But this categorization was changed from the Sixth Plan
onwards, and plan outlays for the coal, lignite, petroleum, new renewable sources of
energy and power transmission, distribution and rural electrification were all included
under the chapter heading of Energy5
. Although the Plans do refer to targets and
anticipated outlays, and in theory subsequent Plans ought to reveal the actual installed
capacity, the data on targeted versus actual installed capacity is neither consistent in terms
of units nor in terms of placement within the text of the Plans.
2.5.1 National Energy Policies : 1970-1990
In the Indian context, “energy” is the term used to describe the composite of
energy sources including thermal, nuclear and new and renewable, while “power” relates
90
to supply, demand and use of electricity from pnmarily thermal and hydro energy sources.
Although fttelwood, animal wastes and agricultural residues eonttnue to meet the bulk of
rural energy needs, coal remams the primary source of commeretal energy. Coal is the only
fossil fuel with which India is relatively well endowed and as discussed in Chapter 1, coal
used in thermal (coal-fired) power plants will be the main source of commercial energy in
the next few decades. Coal became a public sector industry with the establishment of the
National Coal Development Corporation in 1956 and the nationalization of coking and
non-coking mmes in 1972-73 around the same tune that concern over envuonmental
degradation received international political attention at the UNCHE. Power development
in India began with the commissioning of the Shivasamudram power station in Karnataka
in 1900, but installed capacity remained very low until 1947. At the start of the plans.
installed capacity was as low as 1362 Mega Watts (MW) and activity was mainly
concentrated around urban areas whereas today, the total installed capacity in India is
81,164 MW. 146
Power is an issue which appears in the Concurrent List of the Constitution and is
therefore is the responsibility of both the Central and State Governments. The Third Five
Year Plan envisaged that all power stations should be interconnected to form state and
regional grids. Accordingly, the country was divided into five regions- Northern, Western,
Southern, Eastern and North-Eastern- each with a Regional Electricity Board. State
Electricity Boards (SEBs) which form a part of the Regional Boards are responsible for
146 Government of India Press Information Bureau, “Power Highlights,” Press
Information Bureau Archives
. August 14, 1996. Available at <http://www.nic.in/India-
Irnage/ PIB/power. html>
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ne generation, transmission and distribute of electricity in a given State. The Central
Electncity Authority, const,tuted under the Electricity (Supply) Ac, of 1 948, is
responsible for advising the Ministry of Power on all related techmcal and economic
matters. The Minrstry of Power and Non-conventional Energy sources was g.ven overall
responsibility for power bu, div.ded into separate Ministries for Power and for Non-
conventional Energy Sources in July 1992.
W,thm the Power Ministry, the construction and operation of generation and
transmission projects a, the Centre level is entrusted to several Central Sector Powfer
Corporations including the National Thermal Power Corporation, the National
Hydroelectric Power Corporation
,
the North Eastern Electric Power Corporation, and the
Power Grid Corporation of India. The Power Grid Corporation, established in 1989, is
responsrble for all existing and firture transmission projects in the Central sector. In
addrtron, there are two joint venture Power Corporations under the admmistrative control
of the Ministry of Power, namely, the Nathpa Jhalcrt Power Corporation and the Tehri
Hydro Development Corporation. Rural electrification projects fall within the purview of
the Rural Electrification Corporation. The Energy Management Centre was created in
April 1989 as a focal point for the national exchange of technical experience among
energy institutes and as an information and research center based on cooperation between
India and the European Union.
An examination of energy sector policies in power and renewable energy outlined
in the Fourth through Seventh Plans reveals several main features or characteristics: 1) a
constant effort to reduce the use of imported oil primarily due to foreign exchange
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concerns, 2) a commitment to rely on domestic coal reserves, 3) a recognition of the
financial mtsmanagemen. of SEBs includtng a recognt.ton of the problems assoc,a,ed with
some SEE's providing electricity below the cos, of generation, 4) a widening gap
between antidpated capacity and actual additions in the power sector, 4) consistent
sectoral overspendutg in power and coal 5, a stated policy interest in domes, ,c research
and development efforts a, appl^ng decentralrzed renewable energy technologies pnmanly
through pilot projects aimed at rural areas.
The provision of additional and cheaper power fueled primarily through coal
reserves was a central concern of the Indian State as noted in the Fourth Plan. 147 The
Fourth Plan also provided an early indication of financial mismanagement of most of the
SEBs and noted that although the Electricity Supply Act required SEBs to become self-
supporting, the financial working of most of the SEBs was not satisfactory. Here, the Plan
referred specifically to the problems associated with the SEBs selling “ a large part of
electricity generated to bulk consumers below the cost of generation”. 148 Reiterating what
was to become a central policy concern of the energy sector, the Fifth Plan noted the
national energy strategy’s main emphasis was to focus on coal along with its substitution
for imported sources of energy whenever possible. 149 The Fifth Plan also went on to
outline a long-term perspective for non-renewable energy resources including the need to
prepare a detailed inventory of natural resources, to achieve self-reliance in terms of
147
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technology, product,on and conservation. » Highlighting the dual focus on the use of
conventional and non-conventional energy sources, the Filth Plan stated that, in the area
of energy, “ a multi-pronged approach” to develop b.ogas technology, as well as new
sources such as solar energy, tidal and wind power has been initiated. It also notes that
programmes for improve minmg techniques, mrne safety, transportation and gasification of
coal have been given priority. 151
In the Sixth Plan (1980-85), energy was seen as the essential input to all
productive economic activities and to the process of econom.c development. 152 The
Energy Strategy” pointed out that the per capita commercial energy consumption in India
was only one-tenth of the global average, the costs of oil dependency were high, and that
India’s plans for unhampered economic growth necessitated a reduced dependence on
imported oil. 153 In reaction to the serious balance of payments crisis during the oil crisis
of 1979, the key elements of the Indian energy strategy included a reduced dependence on
oil imports, accelerated exploitation of domestic conventional energy resources,
exploitation of renewable sources of energy, and intensification of research and
development in emerging energy technologies. According to the Sixth Plan, coal, the only
fossil fuel with which India is relatively well endowed, would have to be the main source
150
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of commercial energy in the nex, few decades. * Bu, the Plan cautioned that the problems
faced by the coal tndustry were tdentical to the problems faced by the power sector
namely, mability to meet demand, deteriorate in financial performance and ristng capital
costs. Accordingly, the Plan caUed for structural changes to strengthen and streamline
management practices in coal companies. Iss
Noting that the country's growing energy demands would have to be met by new
and renewable sources of energy, the Sixth Plan also called for more attention to be paid
to efficiency of energy generation, utilization and conservation, particularly in the
industrial sector which was the largest commercial energy consumer. 156 Under the Sixth
Plan, new and renewable energy technologies were seen as particularly suitable for
decentralized and small scale systems appropriate for meeting rural energy needs. The Plan
envisaged that remote rural communities which could not be cost-effectively reached by an
electricity grid or which did not have easy access to convention commercial fuels would be
provided with renewable energy sources for household and agricultural use.
Accordmg to the Plan, these technologies had the additional merit of having “less
adverse impact on the environment” than the conventional fossil fuels systems, and even
though these technologies were not economically competitive, they were seen as playing a
154
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predominan. role in the future. '» The Plan also discussed vanous ava.lable new and
renewable sourees of energy includurg biogas. solar energy, biomass conversion
technologies, and wind energy. In the solar energy sector, the goals were to bring down
the cost per peak watt of electricity and to initiate a national demonstration program for
field appl,cation. In addition, demonstration projects for wind energy applications and two
R & D centers on wind energy utilization were to be set up. 158 Outlining the broad
development perspective from 1985 to 2000, the Seventh Five Year Plan (1985-90), noted
that dependence on imported oil would have to be contained. Emphasizing the importance
of coal in the overall energy scenario, the Plan notes that,
"Coal should remain the king-pin of India's energy pohey, and it should replace oil
wherever possible. 159 F
The Seventh Plan highlighted the need to modify existing energy strategy to include
accelerated exploitation of coal, hydro and nuclear power, intensification of exploration
for oil, management of oil demand, exploitation of renewable sources of energy like bio-
gas, especially to meet the needs of rural communities; and, intensification of R & D in all
energy sources. 160 Out of the total Seventh Plan outlay of Rs. 1 80,000 crores, the energy
sector was allocated by far the largest tranche, Rs. 54,821.26 crores (30%), while the
agriculture and industry sectors were allocated Rs. 10,573.62 crores (5.9%) and Rs.
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22,460.83 crores (12.5%) respectively. By comparison , 1,y y n, the entire social service sector
including education, health, family welfarey welfare
- housm
«- women's welfare, nutrition
and labor was allocated Rs. 29, 350.46 crores (16.3%).
Passages in the Seventh Plan’s chapter on energy had implications for the
formulation of global climate change policy responses. This was the first Plan to devote a
separate section ,0 the tmportance of “new and renewable sources of energy." The major
programmes for new and renewable sources of energy developed under the Seventh Plan
included the National Project on Btogas Development and the National Programmes on
solar thermal energy utilization, solar photovoltaic, wind energy and biomass conversion.
In addition, a new financmg agency, the Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency
(IREDA) was set up under the Seventh Plan for providtng financial support to tndigenous
technology development and dissemination of non-conventionai energy technologies.
IREDA would under a liberalized power sector regime be credited with leveraging funds
for commercially viable application of marketable renewable energy technologies and
would be an essential institutional partner in renewable energy projects for the World
Bank and GEF. It also proposed specific new steps for environmental management in the
coal sector including the laying down of environmental guidelines for coal mining, creation
of organizational capacity for preparing environmental impact assessments of new
projects, and monitoring the implementation of environmental protective measures. The
Sectoral outlays in the Seventh Plan are included in the relevant chapters of the
Plan.
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Plan pointed out that in all new nroiecK « •
nvironmental management plan would be an
integral part of the Mining Feasibility Report. 162
WWie the proven of adequa,e supply of low cos, power was enshnned as an
essential ingredient ofaU the P,ans in the 1970s and 1980s, in reahly, gaps between
proposed and actual instaUed capacity and target and actual production figures ,oomed
large and were a recumng theme in all Plans. Table 2.3 gives an ovewtew of the financial
outlays, anticipated targets and actual additions to installed power generating capacity.
Table 2.3: Power Sector - Plan outlays and installed capacity. '«
PLAN OUTLAYS
(Rs. crores)
TOTAL
CAPACITY
AT START OF
PLAN (MW)
ADDITIONS TO
INSTALLED CAPACITY
(MW)
Target Actual
FOURTH 2,447.57 14,300 9,300 4,280
FIFTH 6,190 18,456 16,968 12,124
SIXTH 19,265.44 31,024 20,168 14,226
SEVENTH 34,273.46 42,585 22,245 21,401
EIGHTH 79,589.32 69,082 a 30,538 Ninth Plan
estimate
l6
~ Planning Commission, Seventh Five Year Plan- Vnl I 1985
,
page 10.
The data has been compiled from the discussions on power in the Fourth-Eighth
Plans Adding the total installed capacity at the start of a plan with the actual additions to
installed capacity does not give the figure represented at the start of the following plans
but this may be explained by transmission and distribution losses which have been
significant problem in the Indian power sector. Note: a Two Annual Plans after the Seventh
Plan added a total installed capacity of 5,803 MW.
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Table 2.7 below provides an overv.ew of the financial outlays and target esttnrates
versus actual production figures for the coal sector.
Table 2.4: Coal Sector - Plan Outlays and production figures. '«
PLAN OUTLAYS PRODUCTION (million tons)
(Rs. crores) Target Actual
FOURTH 110 93.5 78.2
FIFTH 1,025 135 104
SIXTH 2,870 155.70 147.44
SEVENTH 7,400 226 200.89
EIGHTH 10,507 308 Ninth Plan estimate
2 *^*2 Energy-Related Development Policy Frame: 1 970-1 QQft
The Indian state’s allocation of resources for the energy sector is an effective
reminder of the Indian state’s commitment to energy and stands in marked contrast to its
much more limited sectoral spending on the environment. As discussed earlier, the
essential features of the energy policy frame for this period of planned development
include :1 ) a constant policy concern to reduce the use of imported oil primarily due to
foreign exchange concerns, 2) a commitment to increase reliance on domestic coal
reserves, 3) a recognition of the financial mismanagement of SEBs including a recognition
of the problems associated with some SEB’s providing electricity below the cost of
generation, 4) a widening gap between anticipated capacity actual additions in the power
164
Data compiled from Industry and Minerals chapter in Fourth and Fifth Plans and
from Energy Chapter in Sixth and Seventh Plans.
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sector, 4) consistent sectoral overspendtng in power and coa, 5) a stated pohcy interest in
domestic research and development efforts a, applying decentralized renewable energy
technologies primarily through pilot projects aimed at rural areas.
Spec,lie energy sector polrcies continuously dtscussed and equally constantly not
acted upon during the period of the Fourth-Seventh Plans, such as the ftnanctal
mismanagement of the SEBs, and cons,stem overspendurg in the power and coal sector in
the ,970s and 1980s would be h,ghl,gh«ed as evidence for the need for reform under the
E,ghth Plan. As Chapter 3 demonstrates, two distinguishing policy characteristics of the
power and renewable energy sectors associated with the period of planned development
under a centrally managed economy were accorded much greater policy emphasis under
liberalization. These are the reduction of dependence on oU unports through the use of
domestic coal, and the augmentation of fossil fuel resources with renewable energy
sources. Both policy features have direct implications for the formulation of climate
change policy responses from the 1990s onwards The emphasis on production and
consumption of domestic coal has of course the most direct impact on global climate
change because of the potential of added GHG emissions. The desire to use domestic coal
together with the need to supplement fossil fuel resources with renewable energy was an
early indication of the Indian state’s interest in addressing the question of its power needs
by all means available. However with regard to the application of renewable energy
technologies, the focus from 1970-1990 was on decentralized, rural pilot projects based
on national research and development efforts, whereas under the liberalized policy regime.
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the focus shifted to market-oriented applications of commercially viable
technologies in both rural and urban applications.
2.6 Conclusion
renewable energy
The mstitutional and legislative framework for environmental issues in India was
very clearly m,reduced within the context of centrahzed plannmg and no, in response to
ctizens- movements or pressure groups polittcs. Tins meant that there was no organized
outside political pressure on the state to engage in envtronmental protection. Although
subsequent plans built incrementally upon the exrsting institutional framework, much was
left undone at the various state government levels in the areas of monitoring and
implementation. An analysis of the impacts of centralized planning on the energy and
environment sectors reveals a preponderance towards the institutionalization of
environmental and energy issues. Indian centralized planning called for an over extension
of the state. Given the accepted managerial and regulatory role of the state in areas of
production, distribution, consumption and investment of economic and natural resources,
it is hardly surprising to find that the state’s control over environmental problems was
exercised through legislation rather than actual monitoring.
Khator finds that the environmental implementation in India depends to a large
degree on “the political profitability” of the environmental issue. With regard to legislative
support for the environment, she argues that.
‘...personalities and international pressures are significant inputs to the process of
issue-creation and policy formation. Nevertheless, the implementation history of
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Khator is right in potnring out the role of personahties in the process of environmental
issue and pohey creation. But the
.ndian state and its poktieitms are hardiy unusual in only
responding to envtronmental issues which are politically expedten, for preserving the
status quo, and are useful tools in future electioneering. A notable example is the US,
whtch five years after signrng the Untted Nattons Convent,on on Biological Dtversity, has
still no, become a Party to the Conventton because key members of its Senate are
sensitive to the concerns of pharmaceutical companies, the bio-genetics industry and the
agro-business lobby and remain reluctant to ratify the Convention.
In its push towards inward looking industrial development, the Indian state created
an institutional labyrinth of pohcy controls in the industrial sector which simultaneously
suffocated private sector initiatives and bloated the public sector. Despite large
investments in the power and coal sectors, the consistent inability to meet anticipated
targets and inefficient management of coal and power sectors led to endemic power
shortages. As the analysis of the Plans demonstrates, India’s advocacy of coal as integral
energy source predates the emergence of international concern over global warming in the
late 1980s and 1990s. India’s preference for fueling its economic development by using
domestic reserves of low-grade coal through the 1980s exerts a definite influence on the
formulation of Indian responses to the climate change debate. The Indian policy of
165
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avoiding dependence on foreign oil tmports timbered
.he desme ,o rely on eoa, and
.he
need ,o rely on alternative energy sources for rural development needs.
The examination of the Fourth through Seventh Plans reveals a national policy
Priority on coal as an energy source, a need for substi.u.mg oil imports with domestic
energy sources, a push towards harnessing renewable energy sources, endemic power
shortages, widening gaps between planned and actual ms.alled capacity, and the
unsatisfactory financial working of the most of the SEBs. The need for the SEBs to review
their operations with a view to become self-supporting and the high costs associated with
them practice of selling a large part of electricity to agricultural sector consumers below
the cost of generation in some Indian states was hrghhghted as early as the Fourth Plan
.
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Unfortunately very little action was taken during the Fourth-Seventh Plans to reform
the power sector, reduce the gaps between actual and targeted installed capacity, improve
the efficiency of the SEBs and make energy pricing a priority. The coincidence of India’s
attempt to ameliorate its worsening energy situation, and the international emergence of
the global climate change issue with its linkage to fossil fuel consumption patterns made
for some interesting tightrope acts by Indian policy makers in the 1990s.
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CHAPTER 3
liberalization and its impacts on energy and
environment
3.1 Introduction
International discussion of posstble action on the global climate change problem
coincided with the Indian government's move towards liberalization from 199. onwards
Accordingly, the quest,ons addressed in this chapter are whether the shift in the
orientation of national development objectives to a more liberated economy resulted in
new sets of sectoral policy parameters in energy and environment and what are the climate
change policy implications of these sectoral policy changes. This chapter will elucidate the
environmental and an energy policy frame guiding sectoral priorities and policy changes
under liberalization and will examine the climate change related policy implications of the
two policy frames.
The chapter begins by outlining some of the key features of the Indian move
towards liberalization. This is followed by an examination of the Eighth Five Year Plan
and its sectoral outlays and policies in energy and environment and the climate change
related implications of the same. The significant policy changes which have climate change
implications undertaken from 1991-1996 are in the energy and not in the environmental
sector. Accordingly, the chapter examines the impacts of liberalization on climate change
related issues by looking at specific policy changes and projects in the areas of coal, power
and renewable energy. The chapter argues that the shift towards liberalization has had a
more profound and direct impact on the Indian energy sector, and that Indian
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environmental policies have given much lf»ce policy attention in favor of energy related
growth objectives. Next, an environment and an energy pohcy frame representing hey
sec,ora. pohcy characteristics under libera,hzation whl be constructed, on the basts of the
sectora, policy infomtation and policy changes undertaken front ,99,-1996. The chapter
wil, dentonstrate that the energy policy franre has been altered under liberalization and that
,hts new energy policy frame has more dtrec, imphcations for the global climate change
ssue than the envtronmental pohcy frame whtch has rematned largely unaltered from the
1980s onwards. Ftnally, the chapter concludes by discussing the imphcations for Indian
pohcy responses to global climate change due to policy preferences and choices made in
the energy sector during the 1990s.
India's move towards fiscal and trade reforms was induced by a macro-economic
crisis m 1991, manifested by a current account deficit of around $10 billion, and a
reduction of foreign exchanges reserves to a point where they could cover only two
weeks’ imports despite an IMF loan of $1 .8 billion in January 1991. Additional
commercial borrowing became impossible because of the sharp downgrading of India's
credit rating and a cut-off short-term credit. The Rao administration justified its 1 99
1
commitment to the IMF to pursue a restrictive monetary pohcy and slash fiscal deficit on
the basis of the existing precarious balance of payments situation. But economists like
Bharat Dogra have argued that although the Gulf War certainly posed a serious threat to
India s foreign exchange position, the available data show that the downslide towards the
debt trap had started in the 1980s and “only an additional push was needed for the fatal
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faU into the debt trap
. In Ind ia’s Economir Reforms: 1991.7001 joshi and Little
argue tha, the principal reasons for the 199, macro-economic crisis was the rise in the rate
of mflatton well above 10 percent, a w.demng of the current account deficit, and a heavy
and growing burden of domestic and foreign debt. They argue that the exogenous shock
of short-term oil price tncreases due to the August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait could
have been weathered, had the Indian economy not been rendered vulnerable due to the
unsustainable macro-economic policies of the 1980s 168
Arguing that a massive default in its loans was inevitable and that the country-
external viability cannot be restored in the medium term without assistance from the IMF,
the Finance Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh committed the Indian government to
macroeconomic reform. '« In 1 99 1 , India arguably one of the most-controlled of
,
non-
communist economies voluntarily undertook a significant devaluation and other
deflationary fiscal measures to secure the confidence of foreign lenders and non-resident
Indians (who were among the first to drain foreign exchange out of the country in 1990).
In July 1991, the 71
-year old Prime Minister Rao, an old-school politician, and his Finance
Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, pledged to liberalize the Indian economy thorough a
broad set of reforms of the investment regime, trade policies, the financial sector, and
167
Bharat Dogra, “India: Despair and Hope”, in Third World Network. The Social and
Ecological Impact of the World Bank/IMF Structural Adjustment Policies in India (New
Delhi: Third World Network, 1992), page 19
168
Vijay Joshi and Ian Little, Indians Economic Reforms: 1991-2001 (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1996), page 14.
169 Economic Bureau, “India to pursue a restrictive monetary policy: Manmohan”,
Indian Express . December 17, 1991.
106
pubhc enterprises.
,ndia vet, simply had gone bust and needed ano|her^^
foreign exchange from the IMF. Realizing
,ha, the ,MF w„n,d not extend any more credit
f economic reforms were no, undertaken, the Rao administration attempted to convince
•he IMF of its sertous intent for fiscal and trade reform. Accord,ngly, the Indtan
Government devalued the rupee twice, announced a new trade policy and promised an
austertty budget on July 24. 199, which would cu, the budget deficit from 9% to 6,5-/. of
•he GNP. In addition, in the firs, week of July, India atrlifted 25 tonnes of gold to vaults of
the Bank of England in a desperate attempt to convince foreign lenders that i, would
rather sell or mortgage its reserves than default on foreign loans. ™ The austerity program
was soon accompanied by economic reforms and the liberalization of selective sectors.
3
-2
’ E£ai‘omic Reform and Libera l ization in India: Son,. k-,
r
a
Before discussing the implications of liberalization on the energy and environment
sectors, it is useful to briefly summarize some of the main elements of the move towards
liberalization, which began as a need to restore maeroeconomtc stability but expanded in
scope and coverage with time. A discussion of the impacts of liberalization in the specific
areas of industrial policy and foreign investment follows this segment and where relevant,
the impacts on public sector policy particularly with regard to the power sector are also
considered.
an
The current Financial Secretary, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, argues that
important feature distinguishing India’s reform program from reforms underway in other
countries has been its emphasis on gradualism and evolutionary transition, rather than
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rapid restructuring or shock therapy. He
approach was that the market reforms
points out that one reason for the gradualist
were not introduced within a context of prolonged
economic crists or systemic collapse, but were adduced in the wa.ee of a severe, short-
term balance of payments crisis in ,99,. » Arguing along the same lines. ,sher J.
Ahluwalia notes that the ,ndtan economy was no, in as frag.le a state as the Latin
American economies were when they initiated their
unhke certain large Latin American countries in a comparable time frame, ,he Indian
economy was not affheted w„h hyper-mflation or a huge externa, deb, crisis, although key
Indian economic indicators appeared grim. 172
economic reforms. He writes that.
M. Ahluwalia does however, highlight the fact that these gradualist reforms are
very different from wha, he calls Indian government's incremental approach to reforms in
the 1980s. He notes that the current reforms are based on a clearer understanding of the
need to integrate with the global economy and that “there is a clear recognition that the
reforms cannot be limited to piecemeal adjustments in one or another aspect of policy, but
must bring about system changes affecting several sectors of the economy.” 173
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Singh Ahluwalia
’ “India’s Economic Reforms,”in Robert Cassen and Vijay
Joshi eds., India: The Future of Economic Reform
,
(Delhi: Oxford University Press
1995), page 13.
Isher J. Ahluwalia, “New Economic Policies, Enterprises and Privatization in India,”
m Robert Cassen and Vijay Joshi eds., India: The Future of Economic Rffformc (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995), page 256. Given the burgeoning current' account
deficit and double digit inflation in a country with historically low inflation, Ahluwalia’s
point that the crisis erupted suddenly at the end of a period of apparently healthy growth
in the 1 980s has been contested by Joshi and Little.
173 Montek Singh Ahluwalia, 1995, page 15.
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M. Ahluwalia also regards the gradualist approach to liberalize,on as an inevitable
outcome of India’s pluralist and democratic polity in which economic reforms can only be
implemented if they are based on a sufficiently wide consensus. 174 It is however
quest,onab,e as to whether there was w.de consensus for eeonomtc reform and
liberalization in particularly the agriculture and public sectors and among certain powerful
political groups in India, namely rich farmers and puhltc sector workers. Bu, i, is also
interesting to note that to date, several different government admtnis,rations have had an
have broken with the trend towards tncreased eeonomtc liberalization.
The principal national poltey actors associated with the move towards
hberalization are Pnme Mints,er Rao, his Ftnance Munster, Dr. Manmohan Singh and his
Commerce Munster, Mr P. Chtdambaram fata, the Funtnce Minister in recent United
Front Government). Cast as an unlikely reformer, Rao allocated the finance and commerce
portfolios to Dr. Singh and Mr. Chtdambaram respectively, and gave his unqualified
support for instituting deflattonary measures to avotd defaultmg on foretgn deb,. Dr.
Manmohan Singh had been a central planner in the 1970s, and the Governor of the
Reserve Bank of India in the 1980s, bu, later appeared more sympathetic to greater
reliance on markets. Curiously, Dr. Singh in his Ph.D. thesis (under Ian Little a, Oxford )
had done the first systematic analysts oflndia’s export performance and concluded that
174
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Indm « export pessimism in the 1950s was unjustified For almost three decades, he
had chosen no, to advocate or ac, on his own hypothesis, preferring instead to go with the
prevailing ethos to de-emphasize export-promotion in the Indian institutional context.
Presenting the Interim Budget ofl996 97 inct m rh
'
’
>
ust m°nths before the ruling Congress
Party lost at the polls, in marked contrail ra st to h.s earlier commitment to planning. Dr.
Singh, highlighted some of the achievements of the past fo
him.
ur years of liberalization. For
‘By any standards, this has been one of the swiftest and strongest recoveries fromserious macroeconomic crisis in the entire world.” 176
The achievements of liberalization under the Congress included the reduction of the annual
rate of inflation from 17 percent in August 1991 to below 5 percent in February 1996 (the
lowest level since 1988), an increase in economic growth which had slumped to less than I
percent in the crisis year of 1991-92 but was 5 percent ofGDP per annum in both 1992-93
and 1993-94 and to 6.3 percent in 1994-95 with an estimate of 6.2 percent predicted for
1995-96. 177
Support for economic liberalization in India has come from varied government
administrations. In its 13 day rule, the fundamentalist BJP concentrating desperately on
175 See Manmohan Singh, India's Export Trends (London: Oxford University Press
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securing pari,amentary SUpporr, managed
,o indicate Us supper, for contmumg thc^
o. economic liberalization. More reeen„y, the diverse interest
-socialise agrarian
populists- of the
,3 party United Front Coalition that replaced the BJP, endorsed their
Finance Minister. Mr. P. Chidambaram’s budget which Kept alive the five-year old
program of economic reform. Chidambaram, a Harvard Business School graduate and
ardent advocate of market reform, had been active in industrial policy reform ,n the Rao
administration. He followed Dr. Singh’s tradition of transforming the previously lackluster
annual presentation of the budget into a prime time media even,.
The new centre-left Government’s budget of July 22, 1 996 raised education and
health spending, and enhanced farm and food subsidies in an obvious move to woo the
rural populace. In line with its socialist and populist electoral roots, the United Front
Government proposed the Common Minimum Programme listing several measures for the
poor but did no, reverse any major economic policy of the previous Government, in large
part because the Congress Party provided much needed parliamentary support. 1,8 In his
discussion on the new Government’s interest in continuing market reforms, Rahul Jacob
notes that soon after becoming Prime Minister, Deve Gowda promised clear polices for
foreign investment, and pushed through a clearance for a S 1 .5 billion Cogentrix power
project promoted by the US and Hong Kong in his home state of Karnataka. When a well-
known coalition MP, Maneka Gandhi (an ex-Minister of Environment and the former
daughter-in-law of Indira Gandhi), openly criticized the Government for pushing through
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the project with unseemly haste while^ envuonmenta,„ ^^
immediately suspended from Deve Gowda’s Janata Dal Party. »
The Indian expertmen, a, BbertUization may he characterized as
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winch have largely been diverted to richer fanners. In addition, unlike many developing
and Centra, European countries wh,ch embarked on privatization because i, was seen as
an essentia, component of their liberalization package, India was cautious in privatizing its
public sector industries. Five years after the ,99, reforms, the United Front Government
recently announced the establishment of a Commission to determine which companies
should be privatized and how many shares should be sold. » Important exceptions have
been the power generation and hydrocarbon sector, including petroleum exploration,
production and refining which were quickly opened up for private and foreign investment
.
Currently, several State governments are actively negotiating with various foreign
investors for the establishment of private sector power plants. Additionally, unlike certain
large Latin American countries, India has not moved quickly to making the rupee fully
convertible on the capital account. Speaking to reporters after his statement at the annual
World Bank meeting, Chidambaram stated that India did not feel compelled to making the
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rupee fully convertible and that India would wait until it •ia it had gained greater control over
ls balance of payments and accumulated comfortable levels of reserves before
dotng so. The changes rnduced in industrial poUcy and foreign dtrec, tnvestmen. (FDI)
with the onset of liberalization are particularly relevant for the purpose of this study. A
brief overview of the policy changes in these segments, and their unpacts on policy
changes in the energy (renewable energy and power) sector will be considered below. The
climate change related policy implications of opentng up of the power and energy sector
will be constdered in light of changes in industrial policy and the Indian state’s desire to
attract foreign investment in the renewable energy and power sectors.
3.2.1 Industrial Policy
The first Industrial Policy Resolution outlining the importance of industrial growth
to the economy, was introduced in 1948. This was followed by the Industrial Policy
Resolution of 1956 whose objective was the acceleration of the rate of economic growth,
and the speedmg up of industrialization as a means of achieving a socialist pattern of
society. The 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution identified three basic categories of
industries: those reserved for development in the public sector, those permitted for
development through private enterprise with or without State participation, and those in
which investment initiatives would emanate from the private sector. The 1956 Resolution
gave primacy to the role of the State, and the State assumed a dominant and direct
responsibility for industrial development. The Resolution was modified through a series of
IKI
Sridhar Krishnaswami. “India in no hurry for frill convertibilitv/The Hindu .
October 4, 1996.
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Industrial Policy Statements in 1973 (identified hioK
g priority industries where investment
from large Indian industrial firms and fnrpi™ ^gn companies would be permitted), 1 977
(emphasized decentralization and the role of smaU-scale and collage mdustries), ,980
(foeused on Ihe need for promoling compe.ilion in ,he domestic market and laid Ihe
foundation for encouragmg foreign tnves.men, in high-technology areas) and more
recently m 1991 (outhned reform initiatives to be undertaken in tndustrial licensing,
foreign investment, foreign technology agreements and public sector policy). «
Industrial policy in India until the late 1980s was based on a high degree of
regulatory control. The system of industnal licensmg which required governmental
permission for new investments, as weU as for any substantial expansion of existing
capacity, ubiquitously known as the License Raj, has been largely abolished. In the past.
industrial licenses had to secured for a wide range of activities rangtng from production
capacity for individual enterprises, capital goods imports, and the acquisition of foreign
investment, technology and services. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices
(MRTP) Act, passed in 1969 was designed to ensure against the concentration of
economic power and exerted parallel but separate control over large industrial enterprises
and foreign investors. Firms registered in the MRTP Act needed to obtain prior approval
from the Government for the establishment of a new venture, substantial expansion.
mergers, or takeovers of another undertaking. Through its categorization of industries, the
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, Foreipn Direct Investment
and Technology Transfer in India
,
(New York: United Nations, 1992), page 128. The
industnal policy resolutions and policy statements are mentioned in the 1991 Statement on
Industrial Policy on trade and investment reforms introduced by the Government of India.
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industrial policy structure in India controlled the scohp f •pe of Pnvate domestic and foreign
capital in the economy.
The 1991 Industria. Policy Statement initiated major changes in industrial policy
procedural reforms
. A major aspect ofindustrial policy reform focused on
reducing the barriers of entry for firms to encourage compe.it,on. According the ,99,
Policy Statement, reforms in industrial policy were necessary to encourage Indian
entrepreneurs to meet the emergmg domestic and global opportunrties and challenges, and
to allow Indtan enterprises to respond to raprd ehanges m external market conditions in
•he 1990s. These reforms could only be done by changmg the role of Government from
that,
°!
°"ly Freising control to one of providing help and guidance bv makinrressentral procedures fully transparent and eliminating delays ” »
* 8
The 1991 Industria] Policy Statement abolished industrial licensing irrespective of
the level of mvestment in aU but 16 specified industries, including coal and lignite,
petroleum (other than crude and its distillates), sugar, paper and newsprint, electronic
aerospace and defense equipment, and hazardous chemicals. The 1991 Statement points
out that these specified industries will continue to be subject to compulsory licensing for
security, strategic or environmental reasons. The list of industries reserved for the public
sector has smee been reduced to six, and includes all types of defense equipment, atomre
energy, coal and lignite, mineral oils, minerals specified in the Schedule to the Atomic
Energy Order, and Railway transport. Many critical areas such as electric power
3
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations, 1992, page 130.
115
p'“"
-
_
h™ « ”1»~ ™>.ta—
licensing controls were maintained
administrations have been reluctant
in small-scale sector industries and subsequent
to remove the reservations preventing larger firms
from competing with small-scale industries for political reasons such as retaining the
Gandhian ethos of encouraging small-scale cottage industries.
3-2.2 Foreign Direct Investment
With a population of 929 million (mid 1995 estimate), India provides a big overall
market and an effective consumer market of over 150 million in the mtddle and upper
income groups. India has the additional advantages of having a huge resetvotr of trained,
sktlled and rela.tvely inexpensive labor and a wide variety of natural resources including
iron ore, coal and bauxite. Despite these advantages, India’s share of $1.6 biUion in FDI
by mid 1988, was not only insignificant as a percentage of the world’s total of over $1
trillion, but also low compared to other developing countries. In the late 1970s, FDI in
India as a percentage ofGNP and gross domestic investment was 2.1 percent and 1.1
percent respectively compared to 6.6 percent and 4.2 percent in Brazil, and 3.
1 percent
and 2.4 percent in South Korea. 184
Since the 1950s onwards, the dominant policy view in India was that the focus of
securing foreign capital was to acquire improved technology and supplement domestic
savings. With the emphasis on self-reliance and import-substituting industrialization came
184
Confederation of Indian Industries, “The Role of Foreign Direct Investment in
Economic Development”, in United Nations Centre for Transnational Corporations
ed.,1992, page 65.
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where the foreign partner a,so supphed much needed technology! inputs. With
liberalization, the provtstons of the Foreign Exchange Relation Act (FERA) of .973
.ha. nnposed restrict,ons on locally uicoiporated contpa.es with foretgn equ ,,y holdntg n
excess of 40 percent were removed. 185
Historically, India’s policy towards controlling foreign investment has not only
been highly selective but has often been perceived by fore.gn investors like Coke and IBM
as decided,, unfriend,,. Recogmzing the protective nature of FD, pohc, in ,ndia in 1990,
Ajit Singh, a fomter Munster of Indus.,, notes
.ha, Indian polte, on foreign utves.tnen,
has always been selecttve and was conducted largely on a case-by-case has*. - Ostenstbly
FD, regulations are par, of the FERA. bu, in reality no laws specif,call, dealutg with FD1
ex*t. The Government has almost sole discretion in mterpretmg and applyntg a complex
web of legislative enactments and policy directives to control FDI in the economy. m
Foreign investors were restricted to a maximum of40% equity except in certain high
technology areas, and foreign investment was generally frowned upon in the consumer
goods sector. Anita Mathur notes that the Government’s policy towards FDI has evolved
from “cautious promotion” in the late 1940s, to a brief period of “open door” in the
Centre for the Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), “The Regulatory Environment-
Foreign Exchange Controls,” Bombay, April 1996. The article is avadabie on the Internet
at <http://www. indiaserver.com/biz/iebo/regenvfx.html>.
186
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187 Mark Williams, “Foreign Investment in India,” Columbia Journal of'Transnational
Law, (Vol. 26: No.3, 1988), page 609-643.
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1950s, to a “policy of rigorous selectivity” in 1960s- 1970s, and then to a policy of
gradually "mcreasing liberalization” in the late
,980s. She argues lha, these policy swings
reflect the broader economic development objectives of the Government and are
embedded in a pohty that favors incrementalism over radieal change.
One of the much lauded changes since 1991, has been the significant spurt in FDI
approvals and Mows. But as Table 3.1 ind.eates there have been large shortfalls between
the FDI approvals and actual tnflows from 1991-1995. But estunated at US $ 2 billion in
1995-1996, FDI is 15 times higher than it was before the economy liberalized. '» The shift
in investment and trade policies has resulted in attracting foreign investment in power
sector in the form of proposals for independent power projects in which foreign firms
build and then run a power plant. A recent article in The Economist on the world
electricity business notes that independent power projects are the main form of private
investment in electricity in developing countries. The article points out that India leads all
other emerging developing country markets in the number of power plants under
development and provides the following figures for number of independent power plants
under development-lndia (84), China (74), Indonesia (23), Philippines (20), and Argentina
( 10 ).
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An analysis of FDI ventures approved by the Rao administration during i,s four
years
- power, reveals tha, the fire, industry including power and o« refinmg sectors
attracted the greatest amount of FDI. Of the total R« 77 non6 0 I s
- 33
’ 000 cr°res of FDI approved in
the four years, the fuel sector secured investments of Rs 7 567 3 ?u 01 ^ '.5 . 2 crores compared to Rs.
4, 025 crores approved in the metaUurgical industry. »' The International Trade
Administration of the US Department of Commerce notes that pnvate US compan.es have
submUted b.ds for 77 power projects in India totaling an investment cos, of about $33
billion. ™ In a desperate bid to attract foretgn investors' interest in the power sector, the
Indian Government has not only streamlined uives.ment procedures for power sector
investment bu, has designated eight power projects as “fast-track projects” elig.ble for
counter-guarantees of as much as 16 percent returns on equity. As discussed below in the
section on environmental policies in the Eighth Plan, the streamlining of investment
procedures has been extended to speedier and more limned environmental clearances for
energy projects, indicating that securing power sector investments is far more important
for the Indian state than a detailed, lengthy examination of environmental considerations.
Business Correspondent, "Fuel industry tops in wooing investment.” The Hindu
June 27, 1995.
International Trade Administration, US Department of Commerce, “India-Big
Emerging Markets
,
1996. This article is available on the Internet at <http://www.stat-
usa.gov/bems/bemsind/inbes.html>.
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Table 3.1
: FDI approvals and inflows. IQ3
(in millions ofUS dollars)
year
APPROVALS
1991
INFLOWS
359.09
154.54
1992
1,813.88
231.22
1993
3,573.67
567.75
1994
4,373.64
950.54
1995
11,198.57
1,958.97
3 3 ~e Eighth Five Year Plan: “A Plan with „ mkrence”
Th^ section examines the extent to which the 1991 economy-wide policy shift
towards liberalization has affected the Indian power, renewable energy and envtronment
sectors. It focuses on key aspects of the Eighth Five Year Plan and its sectoral outlays and
policies in environment and energy; and provides evidence to support the claim that
changes m energy policy drive Indian climate change policy stances. The Eighth Five Year
Plan ( 1 992-97) has been represented as a watershed in the history of centralized national
plans. Preceded by an Annual Plan ( 1 990-9 1 ), the Eighth Plan was presented against the
backdrop of a global trend towards trade and investment liberalization in Latin America,
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Republics, South East Asia, and Africa. Prime
Minister, P.V. Narasimha Rao, in his foreword to the Plan, highlighted the changes in the
international political order and noted that the choice was not between markets and plans
Excerpted from an article provided by the Economic Wing, Embassy of India
"Foreign Direct Investment in India-Useful Statistics”, Washington D.C., April 1 1, 1996.
The information is available on the Internet
<http://www.indiaserver.com/biz/emdc/fdi/fdi2/fdi.html>.
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but to effectively dovetail the two and make them iomplementary. In the preface to the
Plan, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission
been formulated in the face of serious fiscal
he wrote,
stressed the fact that the Plan had
and socio-economic challenges. This made it.
transition fro^c^ T*^ ** the
our socio-economic fabric." 194
C e<^ economy without tearing
Ostensibly the most distinctive features of the Plan was the redefinition of the
scope of the Plan itself and the role of the Planning Commission. The move from a "highly
centralized planning system" towards "indicative planmng”, and the estabhshment of a new
role for the Planning Commisston is a noteworthy break from past plannutg exerctses. But
the Plan is suttably vague on exactly what is meant by indicative planning. The indicative
nature of the Plan is dtscussed briefly in a segment entitled, “Salient Feature of the Plan”
but here the Plan merely mentions that it will: concentrate on building long-term priorities
for the nation; examine alternatives for the public sector, and work out sectoral targets for
the rest of the economy. ' ,5 Additionally, the “ indicative” Plan coyly provides only a very
brief projected estimate of what used to be termed “total planned outlay” but what is now
referred to as “projected financing investment of Rs. 798,000 crores” for the
lv4
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Plan period. - A more cymca, interpretation might ,ead to the conclusion that indicative
planning offers an escape route from explainmg why targets have been trussed.
Under the Eighth Plan, the role of the Planmng Commission was redefined. Rather
than merely advocatmg tncreases in seetoral outlays, the Planing Common now has to
examine actual tncreases in effictency, the effective utilization of allocations, and the
returns on investments for parttcular sectors. In its new role of concentratmg on the
optimal utilization of limited avatlable resourees, the Plannmg Commtsston has to
contribute to the “creatton of a culture of htgh productivity and cost efficiency in the
Government. » Although the exercise of planntng was circumscnbed, the Etgh. Plan was
seen as a mamage between planning and markets, with markets serving as an efficiency
promoting device, and plannmg used for keeping long-tern, social goals in perspective.
From the perspective of this study, it is interesting to note that Plan recognizes certain
areas where markets could not play an allocative role:
“The market mechanism is never adequate for protecting environment, forests and
ecology. Nor is it adequate m giving guidance about the use of scarce resources
like rare minerals, land and water. A long term perspective, and hence planning is
needed m these areas.” 98 6
Even though planning was deemed important for environmental protection, the
Eighth Plan issued a strident call for “private initiative” in industrial development and the
reduction of the role of the public sector. The move to involve the private sector while
196
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simultaneously curing the public sec,or in eeonom,c developmen, was a response ,o the
need ,o avoid the trap" that had beleaguered the Seventh Plan. The E.ghth Plan argued
against an overestunatton of the publtc sector outlay that could be financed by the balance
from the current revenues and contributions from publtc enterprises, nottng for tnstance
.ha, in the Seventh Plan these two sources could only finance halfof estunated 40 percent
Of the total publtc sector outlay, resulttng m a greater recourse to external borrow,ng and
creating an internal debt-trap and acute balance of payment crisis under the
Seventh Plan. 199
The need to correct the "fundamental weakness in India's BOP situation"
, and
con,am the current account deficit a, 1.6 percent of the GDP was deemed a policy
imperative in the Eighth Plan. However, containing the current account deficit meant that
special attention would have to be paid to restricting imports of crude oil, while
simultaneously ensuring adequate energy rnputs for sustamed economic growth. On the
energy front, a more concentrated effort to tap commercially viable sources of alternate
domestic fuels, monitor consumption and establish an appropriate pricing policy was
urged. The Plan identifies power, transport and communications as the three priority
sectors for India’s rapid economic development with the rationale that,
“...ifwe can provide these three essential ingredients in the urban and rural areas, it
will lead to accelerated economic growth.” 201
199
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The Plan underscores
.he importance of
.he linkage between meeting lnd,an growing
energy demands and susta.nmg economic development. In order to better understand the
relationship between env.ronmental and energy policies, patterns of energy consumption
and production and global climate change policy stances in India, i, is useful to examine
the Eighth Plan's sectoral outlays and policies in energy and environment.
Energy Policies and the Eighth Pion
This section examines the extent to which liberalization has resulted in a new set of
sectoral policy parameters in the energy and environment sectors under the Eight Plan
period. As the evidence below demonstrates, liberalization has had a more significant
impact on energy policy than on environmental policy. This is hardly surprising given the
overwhelming importance allocated to the energy sector championed as the engine of
growth. Under the Eighth Plan, the strategy for energy development was seen as an
integral component of the overall economic development strategy. In the Energy Chapter,
(chapter 8), the Plan states that the efficient use of resources and long-term sustainability
are the two important objectives of economic planning. 202 The Plan points out that coal
will continue to be the main source of primary commercial energy, both for direct use in
industry, and for indirect use through power generation, 203 while fiielwood, supplemented
by dung and crop residues, will remain important sources of energy for rural needs. Coal
was seen as a vitally important energy source, with India accounting for 5.7 per cent of the
' Planning Commission. Eighth Plan. 1992-1997: Vol II
.
(New Delhi: Government
of India Press, 1992), page 159.
203
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world’s proven reserves, while estimates of 1mate t geological reserves were revised at 196 billion
tonnes compared ,o .56 billion assessed in ,he beglnnlng of the Seventh p|an 2M
Highlighting the prob.em of India’s dependence on oi, tmports, and the tmpae, of
such dependence in dratntng foretgn exchanges reserves, the Plan argued tha, the oil
in each sector of the economy would
intensity and dependence on petroleum products
need to be exanuned. and ways to contain and compress demand for these products
*0““ haVe *° bC S°U^lt ' “5 The «*« need for demand management in the petroleum
sector, and the search for commerctally viable alternatives to tmported oil, in light of the
stress imposed by limited foretgn exchange reserves during the .991 crisis, had three
significant policy implications. One, i, highlighted the growing tmportanee of the need for
improving nattona, energy efficiency and conservation strategy Two, it contributed to
the Indian state’s rapid embrace of power sector privatization as a route for seeurmg
investment and building capacity. Three, it underscored the relevance of using
commerctally viable alternative energy sources and technologies as a supplement to
domestic fossil fttels usage and domestic R & D efforts. During the Eighth Plan period, the
Advisory Board on Energy even recommended the establishment of a National Energy
Conservation Organization backed by comprehensive energy conservation legislation. 206
There are several distinctive aspects of the Eighth Plan’s energy strategy. Unlike
previous plans, the Eighth Plan focuses on the need for an energy pricing policy that
204
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reflects the true resource costs of energy production and suppiy. The admin,stered price
regime, and the iow tanff charged on the saie of eiectnetty to the agncultura, sector, had
resulted in heavy financial losses to the SEBs. the wasteful use of electric,ty, and
difficulties in implementing energy consetvation. » Accordingly, the stated policy
imperative was the adoption of a “rationalized tariff structure", reflecting the costs of
energy production and supply. This tariff stntcture, i, was argued, would ensure efficient
energy use, and provide producers with returns to expand production in conjunction with
demand. - The Plan noted that most of the SEBs were not earning the statutory mtnimum
rate of return under the Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948, at least than 3 percent on their
fixed assets. Many SEBs had large operating deficits while others had deteriorating
finances due to the “irrational tariff structure adopted by them”. * Special mention was
made of the heavy subsidies to agricultural consumers which had resulted in inefficient use
of electricity and other resources, and “acted as a strong disincentive” for electricity
conservation. 210
In addition, the Eighth Plan focuses a considerable deal of attention on an
comprehensive energy strategy covering short, medium, and long-term priorities. The
short term measures include reduction of losses in production, transportation and end-use
of all energy, reduction of energy intensity of different energy consuming sectors, and
207
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reduction of inequities in rural and urban energy use. The medium term measures tnclude
mcreases in the subst.tution of petroleum products by coal, lignite and natural gas so as to
achieve self reliance in the energy sector, and the accelerated development of all renewable
energy resources, as well as the promotion of R & D efforts in alternative energy
technologies. Both the short and medtum term measures signtfy in.erestmg departures
from the conventional Indian policy position of favoring fossil (dels, primarily coal. The
long-term measures tnciude the promotion of an energy supply system based largely on
renewable sources of energy, and technologies of production, and the transportatton and
end-use of energy that is environmentally benign and cost-efficient. 21
1
Both measures are
signposts of an Indian energy policy shift towards favoring renewables. The Plan was also
notable in that the environmental implications of coal mining, including the degradation of
valuable agricultural and forest land and the displacement of population, was mentioned
for the first time. However this was followed immediately by a discussion on the delays in
project implementation caused by the processes of securing environment and forest
clearances and acquiring land
,
2,2
indicating the Indian state preference for speedier
environmental related clearances which would not encumber the rapid development of
coal mining projects.
Despite the stated commitment towards renewables and energy conservation, no
direct references to linkage between fossil fuel consumption and global climate change can
be found. Although India was an active participant in the international negotiations on a
211
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UNFCCC, the Plan makes no menfion of the envuonmental impacts of coal usage nor
does i, mem,on any data on per capita or aggregate greenhouse gas emtssions from fossil
fuels. Coal was still considered a major national energy resource and its development
constituted an important element of Indian long-term energy strategy. » The only
environmental side-benefit associated with the increased emphasis on coal usage was the
move to unprove coal quality. Desptte India’s abundant reserves, the high ash content in
coking coal supplies and the tnadequate availability or vanations in quality of htgh grade
coal for industries has always been a problem. In response, the Plan proposed the
following solutions: reduction of the ash content by modifying existing washeries, fine coal
beneficiation and ensuring uniformity in crushing, screening and sizing through coal
handling plants. 214 Although these solutions were instituted to improve thermal power
efficiency, they also had attendant environmental benefits in reducing pollutants and
promoting energy conservation.
Two critical differences between the Eighth Plan and its predecessors was the
importance allocated to private sector participation in power generation projects, and to
market applications of renewable energy. Recognizing that the public sector would not be
able to raise sufficient resources to meet the demand for power, the Eighth Plan stressed
the importance of power sector privatization and liberalization. Nevertheless, the Plan’s
outlay for power of Rs. 79, 589. 37 crores in the public sector still represented an increase
in absolute terms, compared to previous planned outlays, and represented approximately
213
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10 percent of the Plan’s total financing of Rs 798,000 crores. But as the later discussion
indicates, government power sector outlays have consts.ently faded to reach planned
evels and rematn unltltely to be me, a, the end of the E.ghth Plan. Table 3.2 tndica.es the
anticipated genera,mg capacity a, the end of the Etghth Plan. The Plan envisaged that 2,
8.0 MW of the anticipated 30,538 MW of addhtonal tnstalled capactty would be from
private sector power projects with a potential 3,000 MW to be added later. 2,5
Table 3.2: Ejg^hPlan’s anticipated electricity generating capacity. 2“
HYDRO THERMAL NUCLEAR TOTAL
Actual capacity
as of 3 1.3. 1992
19,189 48,108 1,785 69,082
Anticipated
additions
9,282 20,156 1,100 30,538
Total anticipated
capacity
28,471 68,264 2,885 99,620
An interesting change in the Eighth Plan was that focus on renewable energy. One
incentive for the development of alternative energy sources was the overall national
scarcity of fossil fuels and the costs of transporting conventional energy to remote rural
areas.
17 The Eighth Plan notes that the contribution of renewable energy in meeting the
total national energy needs had been marginal under the Seventh Plan. In contrast to
previous Plans, the Eighth Plan envisaged the installation of 750-1000 MW of power
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crores
capacity from new and renewable energy sources. ™ A total outlay of Rs. 1162
was set aside for non-conventional energy sources which represented only 0. 1 5 percent of
the Plan’s total frouncing of Rs. 798.000 crores bu, was still m lnCrease from previous
sectoral outlays. Wtnd power product.on and solar photovoltatc were to be taken up as
focal areas under the Eighth Plan with along with a program for the indtgenous
manufacture of wtnd turbines and an anfrcipated breakthrough in the development of
amorphous sihcon technology. “» Additionally, the Indian Renewable Energy
Development Ageney (IREDA) was to fimction as a principal partner in collaborate with
other financial institutions in extending financial assistance for the development of cost-
effect,ve, commercially viable and marketable new alternative energy technologies and
renewable energy projects. 221
3*3.2 Environment Policies and the Eighth Plan
As in previous Plans, the causes of environmental degradation were differentiated
between those emanating from prevailing conditions of poverty and underdevelopment,
and those resulting from the process of development itself. Polluted water and air,
increasing contamination by chemicals and other toxic substances and unplanned urban
growth were cited as examples of environmental degradation threatening national socio-
economic progress. In the Eighth Plan, the environment and forests were jointly dealt with
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m ChaPtCT 4 ' The P,an ident,fKS three «** of threats to the nature, env.ronmenfi
pollution, over-use, and destruction; and two broad response strategies: prevents.
(through ,aw enforcement and pubhc awareness) and regulation (through the prepare,
.on
of pollution reports, strengthens^ of Centra, and State PoUution Boards and dialogue
with industries and NGOs). No spee.fic allocations have been made for addressing these
response strateg.es. A top MOEF official notes that the key difference in the two
stra,eg.es is that prevention strategies such as law enforcement of infringements have
consistently received much less emphasis by the Indian state whUe regulafion strategies
auned at presenting the environmental status quo have received more attention. “ Severa|
major tasks were also identified including decentralization of control over nature and
natural resources, formulation of a nat.onal policy for the environment and an appropriate
institutional and legal framework in support of the policy, and fostenng institutional
accountability through the development of suitable methodology for quantiiying
environmental costs and benefits. 223
Unlike previous plans, a linkage between energy and environment was drawn
through the stated need for conservation, development of mini-hydroelectric generation
capacity and the environmental management of thermal, hydro and other energy
programmes. 224 The Plan calls for the internalization of environment related costs and
““ Personal Interview with Mr. Bakshi, Additional Secretary, MOEF, New Delhi
September 13, 1995.
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benefits and the d.sconfinuat.on of the ’busmess as usual’ approach which had treated
environment* costs and benefits as qua,ita„ve externals. - Review,
„
g environmental
monitoring under the Seventh Plan, the Eighth Plan notes that unpac, assessment
procedures have been streamhned to "a single wmdow machmery" for speedy clearance,
and that 1, 464 nver valley hydroelectric, muung, industrial and thermal power projects
were subjected to EIA and appraised during 1985-90. » This suggests a policy shift
emphasizing an easmg of environmental requirements particularly for energy related
projects and indicates that environmental considerations are less unportant in the Ind,an
state’s desire to implement energy projects. In fact when Dr N. Krishnan, the Secretary of
MOEF, was asked to descnbe what policy changes had occurred in the environment
sector since the shift towards liberalization, he stated that,
“MOEF is committed to clear a project in 120 days. All the big power projectsneed environmental clearances. There is a great deal of burden on the governmento assess what each proposal does to the environment and we do not tove the
assessments"” OT
Pra,Sa'S ' We are CUITent|y reappraising policies for impact
Following the tradition of earlier Plans, the Eighth Plan also proclaims the need
for integrating environmental concerns into the planning process. The Plan states that two
separate expert groups comprising of industry representatives and intellectuals were
constituted under the Chairmanship of the Member, Planning Commission to “reconcile
the conceptual confrontation between environment and development.” In keeping with the
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disjunction between intent and action, interviews with key environmental policy makers
have not revealed any concrete results and in fact
these expert groups existence!
several MOEF officials were unaware of
The environment chapter of the Eighth Plan also discusses for the first time the
emergence of current mtemational environmental issues such as the depletton of the ozone
layer, greenhouse gases and climate change, biodiversity and the role of forests. In
addition, the Plan mentions that some of these issues are to be discussed shortly at
UNCED 1992, and states that:
Tt is essential that these negotiations recognize the aspirations of large masses of
theh
^°P
6
^
n°‘ lmP°Se any bUrden °" devek
>Ping countries, respectingeir sovereign right over their resources." 228
But, unlike the discussion on energy, the Eighth Plan does not mention any special
initiatives or outline environment sector policy to be followed during the Plan period. The
Eighth Plan outlay of Rs 828. 1 1 crores for the ecology and environment sector
represented an increase in absolute spending in this sector but amounted to a 0.1 percent
of the total planned outlay of Rs. 798,000 crores, which is similar to the Seventh Plan’s
proportion for environment. 229
3*4 Liberalization and Climate Change-Related Energy Policies: 1992-1996
This section provides an overview of some of the key developments and climate
change related policy changes undertaken within the context of liberalization in 1992-
228
Planning Commission, Eight Five Year Plan. Vol II 1992, page 100.
29
Financial outlays excerpted from Eighth Five Year Plan. 1992-97: Vol I 1992,
page 63.
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1996. Only Ihose policy changes which have unp,
.cations for global climate change have
been considered. These pohcy changes have occurred princ.pally within the energy sector
and not in the environment sector. Consequently, this section examtnes the effects of
liberalization on those Indian energy sector policies wh.ch have a dtrect linkage between
patterns of energy consumption and production and the problem of global climate change.
All these policy changes were instituted after the publication of the Eighth Plan but during
the Eighth Plan period (1992-1997).
Economic reforms have had a significant impact on energy sector policies with
regard to coal, power and renewable energy. The principal reason behind the Indian state’s
rapid move toward power and renewable energy privatization and institutional reform in
the coal sector is the serious and growing gap between power supply and demand which
jeopardizes the Hiding of industrial development under liberalization. Noting that India's
demand for power would rise to 142,000 MW by 2007 against an existing installed
capacity of 81,164 MW, and satisfying demand would involve an enormous investment of
$150-3160 billion. Salve states that.
There’s no way out but to realize how desperately the nation needs expansion of
the power sector.” 230
Voicing concern over the shortage in power generation, the Power Minister, N.K.P.
Salve, said that due to “resource constraints”, only about 20,000 MW of total envisaged
power generation under the Eighth Plan would be achieved by March 1997, the end of the
30 Dev Varam, “Power Sector Investment in the Dark,” News India, September 15
1995.
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"'a11 ™S SeriOUS aWKipated » power generation that has contnbuted to rapid
embrace of power sector privatization by the Indian state.
Reforms undertaken as a consequence of liberalization in the coal, power and
renewable energy sectors are particularly critical to formulatton of Indian climate change
policy stances not only because of the Imkages between GHG emissions released as a
consequence of coal fired electricity plants but also because of beneficial (reducing GHG
emissions) impacts of moving towards renewable energy sources. Since the
nationalization of the coal mines in 1971-72, the coal industry represented by Coal India
Limned (CIL) has been under governmental control with the exception ofsome coal mines
controlled by a private sector steel company. Economic reforms undertaken since 1 99
1
have not resulted in the privatization of the coal industry
. The coal industry is still a public
sector undertaking controlled by the Centre through a Union Ministry of Coal.
Until very recently liberalization had not resulted in any significant policy changes
m the coal sector. But starting in July-August 1996, the United Front Government has
announced a senes of policy changes which have implications for global climate change.
First, after enforcing the much-talked about emission norms for vehicles in April 1996, the
Environment Ministry decided to require all thermal power stations to switch over to
washed coal by 2000 A.D. Power plants commissioned after July 1, 1996 will get a four
year grace period (that is until 2000) to cut down the ash content in their coal by 30
percent. Thermal plants to be set up by 2000 will need to certify that the coal they intend
to use would generate less than 30 percent ash. From a perspective of addressing the
135
adverse impacts of global climate change there are stgnificant envtronmental benefits of
instituting the washed coal policy. An article in India Power Daily, states that,
“The notoriously high ash content in Indian coal and the resulting carbon dioxideemissions from them, makes them one of the most polluting industries ThtZfpower plants traditionally use the cheaper, inferior grades of coal, SLousTrgenerating enormous quantities of fly ash.” 231
The public sector C1L is setting up two washenes with a capacity to beneficiate 1 1 million
tons of coal and the capacity to wash another 20 million tons is expected from private
sector investments.
Second, in August 1996, the Union Ministry of Coal in consultation with the
Ministry of Power, indicated plans to standardize a penalty formula for CIL should it slip
up in providing coal to the 8 so-called fast-track power projects. CIL has had to assure
supplies to at least three of the 8 projects currently under negotiation. 232 The decision to
make it mandatory for CIL to supply washed coal to the fast-track power projects means
that these projects will have an assured supply of low ash-content coal- a demand that was
raised by many private power developers. 233 This decision also brings with climate change
mitigation benefits and indicates a beneficial linkage between liberalization, coal usage and
global climate change. Third, the Ministry of Power decided to grant automatic approval
31
Staff Reporter, “Centre to introduce pollution norms for power plants,” India
Power Daily, July 22, 1996. The article is available on the Internet at
<http://www.power.indiaworld.com/open/ news/jul22.html>.
232 Madhumita Chakraborty, “Ministry move to end CIL row with power projects,”Ihe
Financial Express
. August 9, 1996.
Soma Banerjee, A reluctant CIL agrees to supply washed coaL,” The Economic
Times. August 6, 1 996.
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to coaL hydro and non-convenfional energy based power projects for ,00 percent fore.gn
equity hohhng ,n August 1996. These power projects would no, need clearance front the
Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) or the Cab.net Commtttee on Foreign
Investment (CCFI) once the Reserve Bank of Indta has given them an approval. - This
decision is indicative of the Indian state s commitment towards securing power sector
investments to ensure adequate power supplies.
Unltke the coal industry, power whtch had been under the public sector since
independence was opened for private sector investment from 1991 onwards, through an
amendment of the Electricity (Supply) Ac, of 1948. Until 1991, only five private power
utilities existed and they could only sell their power to the SEBs at pre-determined prices.
Since 1972, India demonstrated a consistent inability to meet sectoral targets
,
and
consequently a widening gap opened up between power supply and demand. Responding
to the above, the dual objectives of the policy move towards liberalization in the energy
sector sought to bring in additional investment for power generation; reduce the yawning
gap between electricity demand and supply; and, bring increased efficiency into the power
sector’s operations. 235 The creation of separate Ministries of Power and Non-
Conventional Energy Sources in July 1992 is another critical institutional reform
undertaken during liberalization. The Ministry of Power was allocated overall
responsibility for perspective planning, development, regulation, conservation, processing
234 Shubham Mukheijee, “Government slashes red tape on foreign owned coal, hydro
power projects,”The Economic Times August 22, 1996.
235 TERI
' Environmental Consideration and Option in Managing India’s 1
,ong-Term
Energy Strategy: Sectoral Details (New Delhi: TERI/UNEP, 1995), page 12.1.
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investment deepens, monitoring projects, tratning and the enactment oflegtslatton
regarding power generation, transtmssion and distribut.on » while the Mimsfry ofNon-
Conven,tonal Energy Sources had responsibility for the planmng, development and
promotion of renewable energy sources and technologies. From an mstitutional
perspective, the extstence of a separate Ministry of Non-Conventional Sources sets a
precedent for the tmjority of other developed and developing countries which do not have
a separate Ministry dealing with alternative energy and is also an indication of the Indian
state's commitment towards securing additional energy from commercially viable
alternative energy sources.
The power sector reform was deemed critical to the liberalized growth strategy
because of infrastructure development, particularly power, held the key for mdustrial
development. In an interview, the Secretary of Power, Mr. Vasudevan, states that private
power policies were uncharted territories for Indian administrators used to centralized
command and control policies. Consequently, models from all over the world were
examined, including the UK, US, Thailand, Malaysia and China. He notes that in 1991,
there was hardly any interest shown by private power investors, but after a high powered
international road show undertaken by the Secretaries of Finance, Cabinet and Power,
offers began trickling in. He points out that the decision to use a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) approach was undertaken because the Indian economy was in
shambles and the power sector was in a state of disarray. Recognizing the subsequent
36 Government of India Press Information Bureau
,
“Power Booklet,” August 1996,
page 2. The electronic version of the booklet is available on the Internet at
<http .7/www.nic
. in/India-Image/PIB/bpower.html>.
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problems created by an MOU process undertaken without clear pricing pohcy framework
Vasudevan notes.
,he ba
1
of support ftom ,he ussr
flows had also become a dribble from 1985^9^7 T P°SSib 'e ' W°r'd Bank
and we could no, ge,
ds and short of power. But we needed a higher plateau to get into the
th3t ‘he M°U ”“*» WaS - accepted
Adhering to the MOU process in an effort to woo fore.gn investment, as discussed
earlier, the Indian state has attracted significant private sector investment in its power
sector primarily from US investors, bu, this interest has no, been easily translated into
actual increases in power supplies. The actual track record ofeconomic reforms in the
power sector reveals that the power sector continues to be plagued by problems even after
liberalization. Nitin Chittal in the Indian Express Investment Week, notes, that the
privatization of the power sector has brought in numerous difficulties and controversies.
He argues that.
„.the Government slowed down its efforts in adding power generation capacity in
the hope that this would be taken up by the private sector. Yet, it failed to provide
the conditions which would make this pious hope a reality. This has left the nation
even more impoverished on the power front than before. 238
Personal Interview with Mr. Vasudevan, Secretary, Ministry of Power (July 1992-
June 1995), New Delhi, September 14, 1995.
38
Nitin Chittal, “ An overview of the Indian Power Industry,” Indian Express
Investment Week
.
April 1
,
1 996, page 1 . The article is available on the Internet at
<http://www.power. indiaworld.com/open/bgnd/537 l-OOO.html>.
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He pomts out .ha, the annual rate ofgrowth in capacity additions has declared from 8.4
percent in the 1980s to 5.2% in the first halfof the 1990s. »
Several major factors contributed this slowing down in the rate of power
generation at a period when more, and not less was expected of the power sector. First,
the government owned power compan.es- Natronal Thermal Power Corpora,™ and the
National Hydro Power Corporation- have not been able to collect the money which States
owed them for consumed electricity. The cash shortage has mean, tha, these companies
could no, finance any expansion. Second, the States have been either wUhng to, or have
been compelled by the Center to offer electricity at subsidized tariffs to the agriculture
sector whose consumers represent a powerfi.1 political lobby. Consequently, the SEBs
charge the highest tariffs to the industrial and private sectors. Unpaid electricity bills, huge
losses in transmission and distribution and increasing power thefts have bankrupted the
SEBs and slowed down the pace of national power generation. 240 With increasing
demands and a slowdown in growth of power generation, power cuts-black outs and
brown outs- have been the order of the day. Industry, even in large megacities like
Bangalore and Bombay, has been forced to set up its own in-house power generation
capacity, thereby diverting valuable industrial resources.
The shortage of domestic capital in the power sector has led to a strong interest in
securing foreign as weU as domestic private sector participation in electricity generation.
34
Nitin Chittal, 1996, page 2.
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Personal Interview with Mr. Vasudevan, Secretary, Ministry of Power (July 1992-
June 1995), New Delhi, September 14, 1995.
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The Rao admiration created a policy package oflfcnng financial, legal and
administrative tncentives to attract private mvestment. The essential elements of this poltcy
package are that: private entrepreneurs can set up thermal, hydro, solar and wind energy
projects of any size, private compames can set up capttve power plants; up to 100 percent
foreign equity partidpation is permitted for foreign pnvate investment projects; and, a
guaranteed rate of return of 16 percent on equity, in the currency in whtch the investment
ts made is assured
. The Ministry of Power has also set up an Investment Promotion
Cell to provide assistance to prospective investors. But the Rao administration did not
raise the issue of a delivered price, nor did it choose to link the privatization ofpower
generation to the privatization of power transmission and distribution. The policy moves
attracted bids for private power project and 8 so-called “fast track projects” were seen as
eligible for counter-guarantees of 16 percent return on equity. 7 of these 8 totaling some
$5.7 bUlion involve US firms as partners. But the fate of the most prominent of these fast-
track projects- the $2.8 billion project by the Houston based Enron Corporation- reveals
some of the pitfalls of undertaking rapid power sector privatization, in particular the
process ot negotiating project bids in the context of Centre-State factionalism and in the
absence of clear pricing policies.
Enron Corporation’s 2015 MW power project at Dabhol, Maharashtra was
heralded as one of the country’s most important foreign investment projects, by the then
ruling Congress Party. The original Dabhol Power Project proposal was for 2500 MW but
241 TERI, Environmental Considerations and Options in Managing India’s Long-Term
Energy Strategy: Sectoral Details (New Delhi: TERI/ UNEP, 1995), page 12.2.
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u was subsequently scaled down to 20,5 MW and dtvtded into two phases of 695 MW
and 1300 MW after the World Bank raised doubts about its feastbUity. *» Under
nego.ta.ion for three years, the first phase was cleared and a Power Purchase Agreement
(PPA) was signed between Enron and the State and the Union governments. However, the
Enron deal was opposed by the Hindu fundamentalist Shiv Sena-BJP alliance dunng state
elections. When the Shtv Sena Party won the state elections, i, moved to scrap the Enron
project arguing that the deal was unfan because it padded costs, escalated the urn, price of
power, did not involve competitive bidding, used imported liquid natural gas, and had
been secured by bribing Congress Party officials. Pointing to a statement made by Enron
Vice-president, Linda Powers (who testified before a US Congressional sub-committee)
that the company had spent about $ 20 million (Rs. 60 crore) alone on the so-called
“education and development” process in India, Shiv Sena leaders said that they “would
throw Enron into the Arabian Sea.” 243
On August 4, 1995, 24 hours after Maharashtra’s Chief Minister M. Joshi
announced the cancellation, Enron served legal notice of its intention to collect damages
through international arbitration. Enron claimed that the PPA between Enron and the
Maharashtra SEB was enforceable while Shiv Sena counsels argued that the PPA itself
was illegal and invalid. The legal ground for the latter argument was shaky since the
Bombay High Court had previously dismissed petitions which sought to break agreements
242
Express News Service, “Enron Phase II likely to change: Salve.” Indian Rxnress
January 14, 1996.
H. S. Sanotra and S.Jain, “ The Power Fallout,” India Today
. August 31, 1995
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on the grounds of an absence of competitive bidding. Moreover,
been a willing signatory to the PPA. 244
the Maharashtra SEB had
The crisis died down when the Shiv Sena Government announced the creation of a
smai, expen eommtttee to study the Enron dea, and both parties agreed to renegotiaring
the deal. On January 8, 1996. the Chief Mtnts.er of Maharashtra announced the c.earance
of the Enron power project. * Key features of the renegottated deal were highlighted by
Dr. Kmt Parikh. a member of the expert committee (and the husband of Dr. jyoti Pankh. a
leading Indtan clrmate change expert and only one oftwo developtng country lead authors
m the IPCC). First, the total capital cos. of the plant would be reduced from $ 2.84 billion
to S2.5 1 billion. Second, the plan, would provide addttional generatmg capadty a. no
extra cost, and at the end of phase I and II, exportable power would be 740 MW and 2184
MW respectively. Thrrd, the plant would be made multi-fuel in response to the concern
over the dependence on unported fuel. Phase 1 would run on imported naptha but the cost
ofUSS 35 million would be borne by Enron. The cost of the multifitel plant was revised
down from S 1 .427 million per MW to 1 . 1 49 million per MW. Fourth, the capacity charge
was reduced from Rs 1.40/kilowatt hour payable for 86 percent plant load factor to Rs.
0.98/kilowatt hour payable for 86 percent plant load factor. 246 The proposed tariff was
44
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fimher reduced from R, 1.89 per uni, (offered by Enron dunng renegotiation agams, ,he
original tariff of Rs. 2.40 per unit) to Rs. 1.86 per unit. 247
The Enron controversy revealed severai unportan, lessons relevant for the fUture
development of Indian power sector private,ion One, power projects must tnclude
competitive biddtng and ought to be opened up to domestic bids. Two, the government's
wiUingness to concede inflated costs as the pnce of signaling its desne to secure foretgn
investment, needs to be preceded by a clear policy framework in winch pricing of projects
and transparency of deals are factored in. Three, the faUout from the Enron deal may be
more cautious foreign mvestment in the Indian power sector. S. Tnpath, notes that since
1991, India has attracted $280 bUlion in foreign investment with 39 percent in the power
sector, but whenever state governments change, these investments appear less secure. He
points to the Congress government’s reassessment of the 420 MW lb Valley project
approved by the previous Janata Dal government in Orissa, and to Siemens agreement to
absorb the appreciation of the Deutsche mark in their power project after the BJP replaced
the Congress in Gujarat. 248
In contrast to the above, the Mangalore based 1000 MW fast-track Cogentrix
power project which was approved by the outgoing Congress Party in Karnataka was
'46
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cleared by the United Front Covenant as a policy stgnal to foreign investors. ~ S.G.
Warner argues that the haste with whieh the Cogentnx project was cleared by the United
Front Government, and the assignment of a cut offfigure for power project investment
below whtch environmental clearance will not be required, is in marked contrast to the
Urnted Front’s pre-election rhe.onc on need to preserve the environment and adopt green
policies. ™ The speedy clearance of the Cogentrix power project, and as discussed earlier,
the dismissal of Maneka Gandhi. a United Front Member of Parliament for pointing out
that environmental aspects of the project were ignored, indicate that the current
administration favors energy projects at the cost of environmental considerations.
To speed up the establishment of power generation projects, the United Front
Government announced that counter guarantees to all fast-track projects would be granted
by September 30, 1996 251
; all power projects with investments of up to Rs. 1000 crores
( 1 crore equals 10 million) approximating 250 MW capacity will no longer require
technical and economic clearance of the CEA and a high powered Cabinet Committee
on Infrastructure would be established to give final clearance, and assess progress of major
R. Mohan, "Cogentrix Project clears last hurdle,” Business 1 ine July 1 6. 1 996 and
Financial Express News Service, “ Cogentrix raises many an eyebrow.” The Financial
Express. October 13, 1996.
s
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The Economic Times. August 17, 1996.
252 New Delhi Bureau, “No more CEA nod for power projects upto 250 MW,”
The Economic Times. August 21, 1996.
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power and coa, projects. » These pohcy changes are tntportan, signals of the tndian state
desire to secure investments in the power sector even a, the cos, of environmental
concerns.
The experience of liberalization in the renewable energy sector has been quite
different from that of the power sector. As discussed previously, the rattonale for
renewable energy technologies tncluded the need to supplement conventual energy
systems from fossil fuels, and reduce dependence on oil imports. Addittonally, renewable
energy sources were seen as suitable for decentralized applicattons, parttcularly in rural
areas. Eugene Linden argues that alternative forms of energy are increasingly favored by
developing countries who want to provide power to billions who live in smog-ndden mega
cities like Delhi and Beijing, and also because renewable energy is gaining marketplace
respect. 254 Although an analysis of earlier Plans reveals that an early interest in renewable
energy, very little by way of actual power generation was achieved. In addition, budgetary
allocations to the renewable energy sector had previously remained low. From 1980-92,
cumulative allocations in the renewable energy sector totaled Rs. 1 1 .5 billion compared to
Rs. 812 billion in the power sector, and Rs. 158.5 billion in the coal sector. The Eight
Financial Express News Service, “Centre sets up committee on infrastructure,”
The Financial Express. October 13, 1996.
54 Eugene Linden, “A Sunny Forecast,” Time Magazine V0 1 144* No 19 November
7, 1994.
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Plan allocation to the renewable energy sector represented 0.8% of the total fbnds
allocated to the energy sector. 255
Front an institutional perspective. India’s renewable energy program was inihated
in 1982, with the estabhshmen. of the Department of Non-Conven.tonal Energy Sources
wtthtn the Ministry of Power and Non-Conventiona, Energy Sources. India is untque
amongst both developed and developing countries in having separate Ministries for
renewable energy. The creat.on of a hilly-fledged Ministry, and the transference of the
Integrated Rural Energy Programme to the MNES indicate a policy promotion of
renewable energy. Since its inception in 1992, the MNES has undertaken a number of new
policy initiatives which include the preparation of a new “Strategy and Action Plan”; a
thrust towards commercialization and market orientation; and, the phased reduction of
subsidies and introduction of soft loans as a replacement.
An MNES background document notes that the Ministry has,
“ moved to a liberalized policy regime by bringing market forces into play. It is
e t that direct cash subsidies needs to be replaced by a package of incentives and
financing arrangements to remove the constraints and deficiencies of the subsidy-
ase approach. It is also felt that a suitable policy environment and support for
market mechanisms would lead to increased private sector participation in the
production and utilization of non-conventional energy sources.” 256
Venkata Ramana and C.S. Sinha, “Renewable energy program in India,” in
Venkata Ramana and Keith Kozloff, eds.. Renewable Energy Development in India (New
Delhi: Tata Energy Research Institute, 1995), page 27.
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Wi'h thC 0nSe‘ ofliberalization, and the fetation of a separate MNES in
.992, India has
made raptd gatns in renewable energy, particular,y in the areas ofwmd and soiar energy.
The gatns in renewable energy have been associated pnmanly with institutional reform of
thts sector and with the appheation of marketable technologies. » The activation of a
separate financial mstitution - IREDA (established in 1987)- to provtde short-term loans
<o renewable energy projects with demonstrable commercial v,ability has also galvamzed
-he renewable energy sector by providing financial support for the increased eommerctal
appheation of renewable energy technologies. Under the new liberalized pohey regime.
IREDA plays a key role in the MNES strategy and action plan for the promotion of
renewable energy technologies. 258
The move towards a liberalized pohey regime was sponsored during the tenure of
Mr. Krishna Kumar who was Minister from 1992 until 1995. Discussing the impact of
liberalization, the Personal Secretary to the Minister states that,
“Since switching from R & D to a market oriented strategy, we have generated
more MW from private sector resources without any budgetary allocations from
the Planning Commission.” 259
The Secretary of MNES, Mr. B.R. Prabhkara, states that the MNES felt that a liberalized
policy regime would provide a better environment for renewable energy development than
Personal Interview with Mr. T.N. Achary, Personal Secretary to the Minister,
MNES, New Delhi, September 1 1, 1995..
Venkata Ramana and C.S. Sinha, “Renewable Energy Program in India”, 1995,
page 3
1
Personal Interview with Mr. T.N. Achary, Personal Secretary to the Minister,
MNES, New Delhi, September 1 1, 1995.
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Odd Bank and TERI on the opportunities for commercialization of renewable energy
techno,
o
gles revealed ,ha, supper, for market mechamsms wou,d lead ,o
.creased pnva.e
sector participation. Consequently, the MNES re-oriented its programmes emphasizing
ket applications rather than the earlier strategy of demonstration and extension. 261 The
role of TER, m sponsoring institutional reform in the renewable energy sector is evidenced
MNES documents like the one cited above, and in interviews with MNES officials
including Mr. Prabhkara and Dr. Chopra, Senior Adviser (Wind and Hydro Energy),
MNES. In the 1970s and 1980s, the policy focus was on decentralized, rural applications.
primarily of biogas plants through domestic R & D efforts, but the new policy emphasis
centers around the accelerated development of renewable energy technologies already
developed and applied elsewhere rather than attempting to reinvent them. The application
of marketable renewable energy technologies was seen to be,
in line with the current approach in terms of economic liberalization.” 262
Under the new liberalized policy regime, budgetary resources allocated to the
MNES were to be strategically used for priority projects which had commercial and
technical viability and which could be used to leverage institutional financing on a
Personal Interview with Secretary, MNES in New Delhi on September 14, 1995.
Under the parliamentary system, the Secretary is the highest ranking bureaucratic official
in a particular Ministry and even though Ministers may come and go, bureaucrats from the
Indian Administrative Service remain.
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commercial basis. Conscious of the need «o prov,de policy impetus to renewable energy
development, one area ofMNES focus was the "framing of appropnate policies for
achieving the objectives” of the commercialization of renewable energy technologies. ®
Under the liberalized policy regime, Indian policy makers have looked to the US
and no, the USSR for know-how and information on renewable energy technologies. The
1994-95 Annual Report of the MNES states tha, one of the major highlights of tha, year
was the intensified cooperation between India and the US on renewable energy. 2« In July
1994, US Energy Secretary, Hazel O' Leary, signed a joint Statement of Intent for
enhanced cooperation in the field of non-conventional energy, and in December
.994, a
high level Indian delegation led by Minister Krishna Kumar visited the US and announced
that 22 MOUs were signed between companies and institutions.
The exchange of ideas on renewable energy also took place at the level of non-
governmental organizations and research institutions. An international seminar sponsored
by TERI and the WRI in January 1995, aimed at reflecting key developments in
renewable energy in India, and providing feedback from US experiences in this sector. 265
In the seminar’s report, C.S. Sinha and V. Ramana argue that the commercialization of
renewable energy technologies since 1992, has resulted in a perceptible shift in renewable
M
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energy implementation strategies. The policy focus in renewable energy has slutted front
state-supported development and demonstration projects to the commerctahzation of
technolog,es. They fmd that the programmatic move from being government-driven to
relying on the market has strengthened fiscal incentives, phased out subsidies and resulted
in noticeable success in renewable energy power generation. “*
The MNES action plan envisaged a four-fold increase of 2000 MW generating
capacity against the original Eighth Plan target of 500-600 MW through the mobilization
of bilateral and multilateral funding and private sector investments. In order to achieve tins
target, the MNES notes that it will: extend institutional financing from IREDA for
commercially viable projects, along with private sector participation and assistance from
the World Bank, GEF and other agencies; and promote private investment through fiscal
incentives such as tax holidays, depreciation allowances, facilities for wheeling and
bankmg power for the grid and remunerative pricing for power provided to the grid. 267 In
the Eighth Plan, a total outlay of RS. 1 162 chores was set aside for non-conventional
energy sources which represented 0. 15 percent of the Plan’s total financing of Rs. 798,000
crores.
268
The Minister of State for Non-Conventional Energy, Prof. P. J. Kurien (who
replaced Krishna Kumar) estimates the national renewable energy potential to be about
266
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1 26,000 MW which includes a potential of 20,000 MW in wind, 10,000 MW in small
hydro,
power.
17,000 MW in biomass/bio-energy; and, 79,000 MW m ocean, tidal and wave
M
°f the 2000 MW '° added under the MNES new action plan, a total capacity
of about 800 MW has already been tnstalled. The wind energy Programme which had a
target ot installing 500 MW has installed 730 MW of which 517 MW are in the private
sector and expects to reach a final capacity of 1,200 MW by the end of the Eighth Plan. 27°
Highlighting the success of the wind energy Program. Kurien writes that India is now the
second largest wind producer in the world after the US. 271 In addition, India will soon
have one of the world’s largest solar photovoltaic programmes including 1 million solar
lanterns, 50,000 solar pumps and 300,000 square meters of solar collector area. 272 Given
the achievements in the sector, the MNES has decided to introduce a renewable energy
legislation m the Parliament and is currently working on formulating a national renewable
energy policy.
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Times
,
December 14, 1995.
70 Government of India Press Information Bureau Release, “2000 MW of Grid Quality
Power from Renewables,” August 16, 1996. The information is available on the Internet at
<http://www.nic.in/India-Image/PIB/PIBR 1 60896.html>.
P.J.Kurien, ‘Renewable Energy for Sustainable Development,”
The Economic Times. December 14, 1995.
Interview with C.S.Sinha, Convener, Centre for Information and Research on
Global Warming, Tata Energy Research Institute, New Delhi, September 13, 1995.
152
3 5
Policy Fn,m~. ,oo.
Policy frames, representing key, identifiable sectoral policies can be constructed.
based on the sectoral review of the Eighth Plan and the Eighth Plan period. The key
characters of the energy policy frame under the overall liberalized national policy
regime include: 1 ) increased policy comnutmen, to build additional electricity production
capacity to meet tncreased den^nd, 2) an tncreased comnutmen, to reduce otl imports, 3 )
an tncreased reliance on domestic coal reserves, 4) a severe shortage m electricity power
generation due to endemic gaps between anticipated and actual electricity generation, 5)
institutional reforms in the power, coal and renewable energy sectors, 6) a poUcy shift
towards privatization in both the power and renewable energy sectors, 7) acceptance of
the need for rapid clearance of independent power projects funded by foreign investors. 8)
an increased policy commitment to secure additional energy supplies through alternative
energy sources, 9) a marked policy shift towards the application and implementation of
commercially established, marketable applications of renewable energy technologies rather
than decentralized, rural applications of pilot projects based on national research and
development efforts, 10) a policy shift towards the reduction of energy losses and ensuring
of energy efficiency through measures such as coal-washing and reducing the fly-ash
content of Indian coal, and 1 1) the need to establish clearer and more transparent
procedures for negotiating bids for private sector power projects.
The environmental policy frame under liberalization from 1991-1996 includes the
foliowmg key features: 1) a recurrent bifurcated characterization of the causes of
environmental degradation, with the two categories being those emanating from poverty
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and underdevelopment and those emanatmg from the process of development itself, 2) the
dent,f,cat,on of two types of response strateg.es
-prevent,on and regulation- nether of
whrch were spec.fieaUy allocated funds, and neither of winch tnvolve the momtonng of
environmental threats or the negation of environmental concerns through institutional
reforms or policy changes, 4) a linkage between energy and environment through
development of mini-hydroelectric generation capacity 5) the streamlimng of EIAs to a
single window tor speedy clearance of power projects, 6) the establishment of two experts
groups to work on conceptual reconciliation of envtronment and development but no
actual evidence as to whether these experts groups have actually conducted any work, 7)
only a bnet and cursory reference to international environmental issues such as global
climate change, 8) same level of sectoral funding maintained in Eighth and Seventh Plan,
3.6 Conclusion
In an article entitled, “Liberalization and the Environment”, R. Sudarshan argues
that despite the claim that liberalization will eventually provide a better life for the
majority, it has to date,
“...exacerbated environmental problems which threaten livelihoods of marginalized
people, and those of future generations.” 273
Under the liberalized policy regime in India, rapid economic growth takes predominance
and is viewed by Indian state and its policy makers as a panacea for all ills, in contrast to
the much more cautious growth rate advocated under the phase of centrally managed
economic development. In the aftermath ot foreign exchange crisis triggered by rising oil
273
R- Sudarshan. “Liberalization and the Environment.” The Hindu. April 19. 1996.
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Prices during the Pers,an Gulf War, India appears ,o be even more committed to limit,ng
its dependence on tmported oil, and to usmg domesric coal reserves to fuel its economic
development. From ,99, onwards, India has also demonstrated a keen tnterest in
commercialization of renewable energy technologies. As the two frames d,scussed above
indicate, the greater attention paid to energy sector issues even within the context of the
environment sector attests to the greater influence of energy sector policies over
environmental ones within the context of a liberalized national policy regime.
There has there been no national outcry nor any visible grouping of environmental
NGOs in response to the global climate change issue after it burst on to the international
arena in the 1990s. National environment policies and sectoral outlays after 1991 remain
largely unchanged from those prior to 1 99 1 . India has not developed any clear
environment related institutional mechanism nor has it undertaken any clear mitigation or
adaptation strategies in response to the global climate change issue. In fact, the
streamlining of EIAs to a single window for the speedy clearance ofpower projects, the
linkage between energy and environment through the construction of mini-hydroelectric
power projects indicate that environmental concerns are either restricted or cast in light of
energy needs.
Liberalization has had a more direct impact on the energy sector as a whole, than
on the environment sector. With the onset of liberalization in 1991, there have been
considerable policy changes in both the power (including coal-fired electricity) and
renewable energy sectors. Mongia, Sathaye and Mongia argue that if liberalization
succeeds then the economy is projected to grow at the rate of over 6 percent per annum
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with a corresponding growth in industrial production,
energy utilization and increased GHG
Accordingly, they argue that.
In these circumstances, increased
emissions, particularly carbon dioxide are inevitable.
2'Z1""iSKKSCSR-*•,7—
world during the next three decades ” ™
P 8 C°Untries 1,1 the
Liberalization has simultaneously highhghted the growing pauc.ty of national
power supphes, the yawrnng gap between energy supplies and energy demand, and the
voracious nattonal demand for power. The wtdentng gap between energy supply and
demand has sponsored an mcreasing interest in securing private sector partition in the
power and renewable energy sectors. Several characteristics of energy use in India in the
1990s need to be considered for their impact in influencing the formulation of Indian
policy stances on global climate change.
One, India remains committed to using coal as its primary energy source. Mongia,
Sathaye and Mongia state that coal accounted for the bulk of commercial fuel use (60
percent) during 1980-1990 followed by oil (25 percent). They argue that dominance of
coal in the Indian economy’s energy resources will be maintained at least until 2025. 275
This contmued heavy reliance on coal and the increasing demand for power generation
based on thermal power as a consequence of liberalization in India are two relevant factors
that directly impact on the issue of global wanning. In addition, the high ash content of
274
N. Mongia, J. Sathaye and P. Mongia, “Energy Use and Carbon Implications in
India,” Energy Policy, (Vol.22: No.l 1, 1994), page 894.
2/5 N
- Mongia, J. Sathaye and P. Mongia, 1994, page 900.
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Indian coal reserves have serious environmental implications, but the recent policy move
to ensure washing of this coal offers an environmental benefit.
Two, the growth of Indian energy consumption based on coal for power
production has serious global warming implications. In a study of national energy policies
and the greenhouse effect, Grubb, Brackely, Ledic, Mathur and others note that the most
probable scenario for the future shows Indian energy consumption continuing to grow
rapidly dominated by coal for power production in which case, a six-fold increase in
carbon emissions can be expected over the next 40 years. They argue that policies such as
integrated energy pricing, appropriate macroeconomic policies that encourage energy
conservation and efficiency, a greater reliance on renewable energy sources, and support
for multi-party “barter or swaps” of technology could help to constrain carbon dioxide
emissions to perhaps a four-fold growth by 2030. 276 The primary policy objective since
the mid 1970s has been to reduce dependence on imported oil, primarily by substituting
coal for oil, and secondarily by emphasizing the need for energy conservation and
efficiency and alternative sources of energy. A study on energy demand in five major
Asian developing countries reveals that energy intensity in the Indian economy is one of
the highest among developing countries in 1990, while energy efficiency remains low. 277
276 M. Grubb, P. Brackley, M. Ledic, A. Mathur, S. Rayner, J. Russell, and A. Tanabe,
Energy Policies and the Greenhouse Effect . 1991, page 421-424.
Masayasu Ishiguro and Takamasa Akiyama, Energy Demand in Five Major Asian
Developing Countries, (Washington D.C: World Bank Discussion Papers, 1995), page 31.
1 he authors point out that: use of outdated technologies, the extensive use of cost-plus
pricing, protective import tariffs and the gap between energy supply and industrial sector
energy demands forcing the use of middle distillates are some of the factors causing high
(continued...)
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The move towards energy efficiency and eonservation sponsored by the economie reforms
has the potential to restram carbon emissions. Mongta, Sathaye and Mongta find that.
use of |
hOUld
‘° mcre^fnc!e
n
ncy ^energy u^r^Z^^tacre^the
tohnototte ” ™
86 °f permittinS the use of ^ore-energy efficient
Three, despite the privatization of power, the power sector in India is severely
hampered by a rapidly increastng gap between electricity demand and supply. I„ absolute
terms, China and India will account for the vast majority ofgrowth in planned and actual
rates of average annual growth of installed power capacity between 1991 and 2001, with a
continued strong reliance on coal and severe power shortages in both countries. 279 In a
desperate attempt to augment power supplies. Central Government policy makers have
pushed through several policy reforms guaranteeing automatic clearances for 250 MW
power projects, while reducing the number of clearances required for other power
projects.
Four, the projected increase in the gap between power supply and demand, has
forced the Indian Government to initiate market reforms in the renewable energy sector.
:77
(...continued)
energy intensity and low energy efficiency.
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Mongia, Sathaye and Mongia, 1994, page 905.
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S. Meyers, N. Goldman, N. Martin and R. Friedman, “Prospects for the power
sector in nine developing countries,” Energy Policy, (November 1993), page 1123.
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The policy reforms undertaken in the renewable energy sector as a consequence of
liberalization have resulted in India becoming the second largest wtnd producer, and
initiating the world’s largest solar energy Programme. Five, mstitutional reforms
undertaken since 1991, such as the establishment of separate Ministries of Power and
Non-Conventional Sources have facilitated a greater policy focus on power sector reform
and renewable energy technologies.
These characteristics of energy use in India in the 1990s do not lend themselves to
charting a coherent and comprehensive national response to the global warming issue.
Instead, these may at first glance appear contradictory and difficult to resolve into a clear
policy package comprising of mutually supportive responses. The bottom line is that India
is hungry for energy, and this hunger is the motivating factor behind Indian participation
in global climate change negotiations. Although the emphasis on coal usage might appear
to be contradictory to the search for marketable renewable energy technologies, in reality
both issues emerge from a common desire to increase power supplies and fuel economic
development. The stated policy preference for coal reflects an economic and natural
resource reality, but recent moves to ensure coal washing and improve coal quality offer
positive environmental benefits for the concern over global climate change. As the
following chapter demonstrates, Indian policy makers at international climate change
negotiations have insisted that India’s right to economic development not be jeopardized
by a global environmental problem which it did not cause. But they have also showed a
willingness to participate in bilateral arrangements which might benefit national energy
efficiency and conservation and which might facilitate the application and
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commercialization of renewable energy technologies. In addition, as Chapter 5
demonstrates, Indian policy makers have also been effective in using international
institutions like the World Bank and the GEF for pilot project appl,cations of energy
efficient and environmentally friendly technologies.
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CHAPTER 4
INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE
negotiations
4.1. Introduction
The chapter examines the relative impacts of two development related policy
ffames-environment and energy-in setting the policy parameters for Indian pohcy stances
at the international climate change negotiations from 1991-1995. The chapter also focuses
on the role played by certain national policy experts in the formulation of national climate
change policy stances. It may be noted at the outset that the chapter will not provide
conclusive evidence as to why things happen the way they do in the overall international
climate negotiations, because the objective of the study is not to explain negotiation
outcomes or the lack of international cooperation in the climate change negotiations, but
to outline India s positions on global climate change.
The primary focus of political science literature on the international environmental
negotiations has been to explain how, and why cooperation occurs, or alternatively to
outline the impediments to international environmental cooperation. Work on international
environmental negotiations may be broadly grouped into three theoretical approaches.
The first, the mtemational negotiations approach, focuses on the processes of negotiations
themselves in an attempt to explain the outcomes of the negotiations and the participation
of international actors including governments, intergovernmental organizations and
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NGOs. » The second, the mteruational regime approach, examtnes the institutional
factors, rules, and actors that predonunate or help explatn coopera,ton or non-coopera,ton
tn international negotiations. - The third, the cognttive approach, examtnes the role of
ideas and belief systems in the formulation of rules, procedures and outcomes of specific
environmental negotiations. As discussed in Chapter 1, proponents of the cognitive
approach such as Peter Haas, have argued that groups of actors and experts or “epistemic
communities”, perceived to possess specialized knowledge required for understanding
complex envtronmental issues, have an impact in setting the policy parameters for the
consideration of particular environmental problems. 282
The first two theoretical approaches outlined above focus on exogenous
(international) factors and hence do not provide sufficient insights for an explanation of
the endogenous (national) factors that motivate Indian participation in the international
climate change negotiations The third approach is however useful because it focuses on
Gunnar Sjostedt ed.. International Environmental Negotiation
. (London: Sage
Publications, 1993), James Sebenius, “Designing Negotiations Towards a New Regime:
The Case of Global Warming,” International Security
.
(Vol. 15: No.4, 1991), page 1 10-
148. William Zartman, Positive Sum: Improving North-South Negotiations Vnpw
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987)
Steven Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables,” in Stephen Krasner ed., International Regimes
.
(Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1983), page 1-21, Robert Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
~ 8
~ Peter Haas, “Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination,”
International Organization, (Vol.46: No.l, 1992), (also reprinted by the University of
South Carolina Press, 1997) and Leiv Lunde, Science or Politics in the Global
Greenhouse?: The Development Towards Scientific Consensus on Climate Change (Oslo,
FridtjofNansen Institute, 1991).
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the manner in winch national or international actors acqune. process or respond to
environmental problems and devtse appropnate responses. As dtscussed in Chapter 1. the
study as a whole, does not use the tarn “epistenhc community” to refer to the group of
national policy experts. Instead, this chapter evaluates the validity of two claims. First,
that a select group of national policy experts, respond to the global climate change
problem from the perspective of energy related development needs and not envtronment
related development needs. Second, that these national policy experts have an impact on
influencing Indian policy stances at the international climate change negotiations.
The central question under investigation in this chapter is which energy sector
policies drive Indian policy responses at the international climate change negotiations. The
argument presented in this chapter is that coal, power and renewable energy sector
policies, patterns of usage and technologies are directly linked both to ftieling national
economic development and to either increasing or limiting C02 emissions. Previously
identified energy sector reforms and policies in these areas have significant implications for
national policy stances on global climate change. The chapter seeks therefore to
demonstrate, through an examination of Indian policy stances at international climate
negotiations, and the nature and content of national climate change policy expert
interventions, that Indian policy actors (policy experts and policy makers) respond to the
global climate change issue from a shared energy
-related development policy frame rather
than an environment-related one.
One empirical problem that confronts any researcher interested in tracing shifts in
national policy stances at the international climate change negotiations is that until
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nsensus v,ews or ascnbe particular views to broad categories of countries with terms
such as some countries noted”, a “few countries argued”. These INC reports do not in
general link particular positions to particular countnes, the only exception betng when a
country expressly asks that the report reflect its
Consequently any researcher studying the
reservations on a particular point,
positions advocated by any country from 1991 -
995, would either need to attend all the INCs dunng this period, or else be forced to
glean data on national positions from government documents and statements of those
participants who did attend.
In this context, it is also worth pointing out that literature on the post-UNCED
climate negotiations remains scarce. Consequently, sources of inhumation for the post-
UNCED period are the actual reports of the meetings, interviews, speeches and
documents, includhig “non-papers” or informal contributions made by India which were
given to the author when she attended the post-UNCED INCs (INC-9, INC- 10, INC-1 1)
the first Conference of the Parties (COP-1) held in Berlin in March-April. 1995. the first
session ot the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM- a principal outcome of the
From INC-1 1 onwards (1995) Earth Negotiations Bulletin, provided a daily one-page summary of the conference proceedings in which the positions taken by particular
countnes are noted. But the Bulletin is one page and consequently cannot report
extensively on any one country’s position.
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first COP) held in Geneva in August 199s fj, c5, and the first meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies
Of the UNFCCC held in Geneva in August
-Sep,ember ,995.
Interviews with national chmate ehange pohey aetors reveal tha, although global
dtmate ehange emerged as a eompletely new faetor affeetmg ,nd,an pohey making, Indian
pohey aetors operating withm the nation! context of a newly liberated economy.
respond to the chmate change
.sue because they see a direct linkage between the new
international desire to limit anthropogenic enusstons ofGHGs and fhture economic
growth, industrial development and patterns of energy consumption and production. *
The participation and involvement of national pohey experts from CSE, TER] and IGIDR
m the formulation of Indian chmate change pohey stances is made evident by the fact that
both the MOEF and the MNES commissioned pohey inputs from these experts, and also
named these experts as advisors to the Indian delegation during the various international
climate change negotiattons is evidence of the role played by these pohey experts in
influencing Indian policy stances on global climate change 285 Tracing the influence of
. .
T
1Tn:rLdfCUSrd m Chapter 1 and is based "teiviews conducted by authord.™g 1994-1996 with MOEF official and national pohey experts in which actors were
asked to describe in their own words how they characterize the climate change problem,
what concepts they associate with the climate change problem and whether they see theproblem as linked to any other issues.
The sections below focus on Indian policy stances from 1 99 1 onwards and on the
content and nature of pohey information provided by national climate change experts to
national pohey makers. As discussed in chapter 1, key international chmate change actors
such as the Executive Secretary of UNFCCC-Michael Zammit Cutajar, the Secretary of
the IPCC- R. Sundararaman, and other developed and developing country diplomats
during 1994-1995 have pointed out to the author that experts from these three
organizations have assisted the Indian government and consequently need to consulted for
their policy views on chmate change.
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previously identified nattona, poltcy experts on poUcy makers in a developuig country
context is difficult because poUcy experts seidom publtsh papers explaunng the factors
influencing then poUcy advice. To the extent feasible, documentary evidence of pohey
advtce or papers pubhshed by experts from CSE, TER] and IGIDR will be examuted for
then relevance to Indian poUcy stances taken at the tntemattonai cUmate negotiattons.
The remaining portion of the chapter is organtzed as foUows. Fust, the chapter
provides a brief overvtew of the hrstory of uitemat.onal cLunate negottat.ons leadmg up to
UNCED ,992 with a focus on india’s roie in the early chmate change negottattons. Thts is
followed by a dtscusston of the poUcy stances advocated by the Indian deiegatton in the
p st UNCED intergovernmental cUmate change negotiations (until early 1996). In both
sections, the role played by previously identified national poUcy experts in the
development ot national cUmate change poUcy stances from 1991 onwards will be
hrghhghted by looking specif,cally a, the nature and content of poUcy expert tntervention
m the dCTel0Pn™, of Indtan cUmate change poUcy stances. Both sections will also
examine the relevance of the energy and environment related poUcy frames in influencing
national cUmate change responses. Next, a brief review of relevant poUtical science
Uterature dealing with the role of developing countries in the international cUmate
negotiations will be considered. FinaUy, a brief conclusion will summarize the findings of
various sections.
4 2 Early International Responses to Global Climate Change: 1988-1991
The emergence ot organized international scientific interest in the anthropogenic
impacts ot global climate change may be traced back to the First World Climate
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Conference held by
.he Wor.d Me.eorologica, Organs, ion ,WMO) in ,979. The
Conference led to the creat.on of the World Clnnate Programme.
,o eondue, research on
•he causes and effects of global clnnate change. - One of the earhes, internationally
recognized pohcy initiatives addressing global environment in general, and cbmate change
" Par,KUlar
’^ thC
^e Worid Commission on Environment and
Development in ,983. - Respondmg to the concern tha, anthropogemc mcreases of
GHG emissions aggravated the natural greenhouse effect, the WMO and UNEP
established the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988.
The IPCC became an influential international scientific forum providing
assessments on science, impacts and responses to climate change research for
governments. Its three working groups focused on assessing scientific data related to
climate change, evaluating socio-economic and environmental impacts of climate change,
and formulating response strategies to the issue. The firs, IPCC Assessment Report
adopted August 1 990 played an important role in providing pohcy makers with data on
the impacts and possible responses to global climate change. A spate of conferences on
climate change from 1988-1991 served to translate the emerging scientific consensus
fostered by the IPCC into international political action. Table 4.1 provides the principal
recommendations of the key conferences.
86 World Meteorological Organization, World Climate Conference; Extended
Summaries of Papers Presented at the Conference
. (Geneva: WMO, 1979).
-
7 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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Table 4.1: List of key international conferences: 1988-1991 288
Tide
1 oronto Conference
Date & Sponsor
June 1988, Government
of Canada
Key Recommendations /Conclusions
1 Reduction of CO, emissions by 20% of 1988 levels by 2005
3 Pl!?a
Ve
.
ment
^.
energy efflciency by as much as 10% by 2005
- reparation of the principles of a framework treaty for dieprotection of the atmosphere (including climate change, ozonedepletion and atmospheric pollution.
Tata Conference on
Global Wanning
February, 1989, UNEP
and WR1.
1 Highlighted developed country responsibility, recognized theC
!!f
,C,^een deVelopment 30(1 Proposed climate chinge measuresand noted that development prospects of developing counties should
™,
'm,n 'Shed
i.,
NOtCd th3t 20% ofGHG ^sions which
byr =te ^TfdeT'0p,ng C0Untnes 00111(1 nse to over 50%
Hague Declaration on
the Atmosphere.
March 1989, Dutch,
French and Norwegian
governments.
.vz. mvnupuig country participation.
E Emphasized the need for a new approach in international law and
nsntutiona 1 mechamsmsto deal with atmospheric problems. (US,SK, China, Belgium & Greece were not invitedl
Noordwijk Ministerial
Declaration on climate
change
November 1989,
' S“rfC°2 emissions emissions of other GHGs notcontrolled by die Montreal Protocol. 2. Recognized a number of key
concepts included in the UNFCCC, namely, climate change as a
common concern of mankind, and common but differentiated
responsibilities of states. 3. Called for convening the Second WorldClimate Conference.
Cairo World
Conference on
Preparing for Climate
Change
December 1989,
Egyptian Government and
UNEP
E FJaboration of a framework climate treaty in time for adoption byUNCED. 2. Governmental support to IPCC work. 3. Developed
countries to provide developing countries with the means to cope with
climate change.
Bergen Conference on
Sustainable
Development
Norway and ECE 1 Dedared ECE willingness to assume a major responsibility to limit
or reduce GHG emissions. (No emission targets adopted due to US
opposition) 2. Listed measures to combat causes of climate change
including renewable energy technologies, energy efficiency and
conservation etc.
Second World Climate
Conference
October 29-November 7,
1990, WMO, UNEP &
other International
organizations
Conf. divided into scientific session and ministerial segment 1
. Strong
statement issued by scientists on the risk of climate change,
highlighting scientific consensus on estimated range of global
warming, and calling for measures to reduce sources and increase
sinks of GHGs. 2. Ministerial Declaration accompanied by hard
bargaining but no targets specified. 3. Declaration urged developed
countries to establish targets and/or strategies to limit GHG emissions
Beijing Ministerial
Conference of
Developing Countries
on Environment &
Development
June, 1991, Chinese
Government
Emphasized need to incorporate firm commitment by developed
countries on. tech, transfer to developing countries on a preferential
basis and provision of new and additional resources in the future
framework climate treaty.
See Information Unit on Climate Change (IUCC), “Fact sheets No: 201 and 215-
222
,
(Geneva: UNEP, 1993). The author prepared and updated fact sheets for UNEP’s
Information Unit for Conventions on: the international responses to the climate change,
the history of the negotiations, the decisions ofCOP-1 and COP-2, the Berlin Mandate
Process, the needs of developing countries, national communications, and the GEF. The
fact sheets were published on January 1997.
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TERI, IGIDR and CSE and TERI was involved in providing inputs to Indian
negotiators from 1990 onwards 289
Spurred by international climate conferences' recommendations, the UN General
Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolutron sponsored by Malta, recogmzing climate change
as a “common concern of mankind” in 1988. - This was followed in 1989, by a series of
UNGA resolutions to emphasize developing countries' concerns over climate change »'
and, focus on the specific adverse effects of sea-level rise on rslands and low-lying coastal
states.
292
In 1990, the UNGA adopted a resolution that established the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change which was
mandated to formulate an international convention on climate change and to adopt this
SeptemterTu m”*™
WUh Dr PaChaUri
' °C ‘0ber 27
’
1994 md Minister Kamal Nath,
290
,
.™G
_
A
’ "!>rotection of the 8lobal chmate for present and future generations of
mankind. Resolution 43/53 December 6, 1988.
m “f
rotec * i«" Of the global climate for present and fhture generations of
mankind. Resolution 44/207, December 22, 1989.
2,2 UNGA, “Possible adverse effects of sea-level rise on islands and coastal areas,
particularly low-lying coastal states,” Resolution 44/206, December 22, 1989.
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convention in tune for its stgnature at UNCED. »
,n 1990
, WMO and UNEP established
Working Group of Governmental Representatives to discuss the structure of
he climate negotiations. The Group met in Geneva from September 24-26. ,990 and
proposed that all mtemational climate change negotiations take place under a single forum
nothin the UN. The UNGA created a Trust Fund to cover the costs of the INCs as well as.
a Special Voluntary Fund to enable developing countries’ participation. »
Five sesstons of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) were held
between Febrtuuy 1991 and May 1992, with over 120 States and numerous
intergovernmental organizations and NGOs participating. The decision to locate the
climate change negotiations within the UN framework, and to ensure the universal
participation of countries within the INC foimat was welcomed by developmg countries
because it provided an opportunity for wider participation. Ms Meanwhile, the active
participation of NGOs, and research foundations, including TER] (has attended all the
INCs and the COPs from INC-3 onwards and assists Indian negotiators at these meetings)
; the Foundation tor International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD-a
UNGA, “Protection of global climate change for present and future
mankind,” Resolution 45/212, December 21, 1990.
generations of
IUCC, “Fact Sheet No.209: The Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for aframework Convention on Climate Change,” (Geneva: UNEP/WMO, 1993).
Tariq Osman Hyder, “Looking Back to See Forward”, in Irving Minzter and J.A
Leonard eds.. Negotiating Climate Change: the Inside Storv of the Rin Convention
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), page 203.
United Nations, “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Third Session,”
A/AC.237/12, October 25, 1991, page 6.
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London based organs, i„n assists the Allianee ofStnall
.sland States
-AOSIS. in its pohcy
stances,; the Globa, Cnnate Coalition (GCC-a groups of energy industry iobbytsts who
work to ensure a business-as-usual, Ifee-trade response to the climate crists) and. the
CUmate Act,on Network (CAN-a grouping of environmental NGOs who work to ensure
that countries undertake appropriate elunate change related pohcy action) is an md,cation
of these groups’ interests in influencing d.verse national climate change pohcy stances.
4 3 India’s Role in the INCs and IINCED: 1991 -lQtn
Both the sections below reflect an Indian-centered outline of the international
climate negotiations from 1991-1995, in which policy positions advocated by India are
evaluated for poss.ble linkages to national energy or environment related pohcy prionties.
Both sections also evaluate the role of national pohcy experts from CSE, TERI. and
IGIDR by examining, when available, pohcy inputs provided by these experts to Indian
pohcy makers, and by looking at the nature ofpohcy expert panic,pation in specific
climate change meetings.
The first session of the INC (INC-1) was held in Chantilly, Virginia ( a suburb
close to Washington D.C.) from February 4-14, 1991 with representatives from 105 States
attending. Linking the climate negotiations with energy issues, the Report of INC- 1 notes
that.
A common theme was the need to undertake at present, actions that were also
justified on other grounds, such as increasing energy efficiency and developing
new, alternative and renewable sources of energy.” 297
- 91
United Nations, “Report of Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its the First Session,”
(continued...)
171
Now it can be argued that the arttcuia.ion of a cotntnon thetne in which energy related
.sues are featured does no, necessarily tndtcate tha, energy concerns were the filter for
perceptions of Chnate change issues. The articulafion of a contnton energy related thetne
could for instance mdtcate a search for rafionales that would increase countries’
willingness to aet by showtng ,ha, multiple goals eould be me,. Bu, even if energy issues
emerged on, of a cross-section of countries' desires to increase willmgness to ac, on
global climate change, „ is possible, on the basts of policy mtemews, to conclude tha, the
Indian delegation was keen to ensure tha, climate change negotiations become a vehtele
for energy related issues such as the promotion of energy efficiency and energy
conservation measures. 298
From INC- 1 onwards, Indian negotiators have been very active in the climate
negotiations, and India was elected to the Bureau of INC- 1 as one of four Vice-Chairs.
India managed to retain its seat as Bureau member until COP-1 (one of the longest
running tenure as a Bureau member) indicating not only its interest in influencing the
negotiatmg process, but also the fact that other countries in the Asian group, m were
willing to concede to India remaining a Bureau member. UNFCCC Secretariat staff have
7Q7, .
(...continued)
AJAC.237/6, March 8, 1991, page 12.
See Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 for lists of policy actors interviewed.
299
The Bureau is composed of two members from each of the five UN regional
groups- Asia, Africa, East Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, Western Europe and
Others- and one member from AOSIS. The allocation of a seat for an AOSIS member is
testimony to the effective lobbying efforts of AOSIS members and is currently being
contested by OPEC countries who would like to see a seat allocated to them.
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pointed ou, tha, India under the leadershtp of both Ambassador C. Dasgup.a and
Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan has played an influential role from INC-1 onwards » Prof
.
,rVin8 MmtZer °f tHe St°Ckh0ta E~n, Institute, a long-time observer of the INC
negotiation process noted that the Indian delegation has in terms ofpublic statements a,
the INCs, “been the focal point for ideas
based,” adding that,
upon which compromise and consensus could be
r°
re R,°' ,he ind,an
INC- 1 revealed what would become a persistent division among developed and
developing States as to whether the Convention should contain genera, principles and
obligations with the possibility of subsequently negotiated protocols, or, whether the
Convention should include specific binding commitments. A plethora of views were
expressed ranging from the need to avoid arbitrary mechanical targets, to the need to
stabilize the emission ofGHGs by around the year 2000 at 1 990 levels, and the need for
"immediate and significant cuts” in GHG emissions by industrialized countries. INC-1
also provided the first forum for a rallying cry from India and other developing countries,
that an effective Convention should be based on the principles of “equity” and “common
"rf"rieWS W 'th the Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC and senior staffo the UNFCCC Secretariat during INC- 10 (August-September 1994) and INC-1
1
(February 1995).
301
Personal Interview with Dr. Irving Mintzer, Stockholm Environment Institute in
Geneva, August 31, 1995.
302
United Nations, A/AC.237/6, March 8, 1991, page 13.
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but differentiated responsibility* taktng u«o aceoun. the need for the increases in the
energy consumption in the economie development of deveiopmg eountnes.
The key dectston ofINC-, was to estabhsh two Workmg Groups to prepare draft
texts which could he consumed by fiiture INC participants. Workmg Group 1 focused on
preparing text related to “appropriate commitments” for limiting and reducing net GHG
emissions;
'‘adequate and addit.onal financial resources” to enable deveiopmg countries to
meet incremental costs required to fulfil their commitments and to facihtate the transfer of
technology on a “fair and most favourable basis”; and, addressing the special situation of
deveiopmg countries taking into account their development needs, including the problems
ofsmaU island developing countries, and areas threatened by flooding and desertification.
Working Group II focused on preparing text related to legal and institutional mechanisms
including: the Convention's entry into force, compliance and assessment and review;
scientific cooperation, monitoring and information; and, “adequate and additional financial
resources*’, cooperation and technology transfer to developing countries in relation to the
commitments agreed to within Working Group 1. 303
Representatives from 127 States attended INC-2 in Geneva from June 19-28,
1991. Under the leadership of Ambassador C. Dasgupta (from INC-2
-INC 6), the Indian
delegation was very active in spearheading developing country negotiating positions
leadmg up to UNCED. The major issues emphasized by India at this and all the
subsequent INCs mcluded: the linkage between energy consumption and global climate
change, the principle of equity, the need for a per capita-based emission ceiling, the
303
United Nations, A/AC.237/6, March 8, 1991, page 24.
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common but differenced responsibilities of State, and the meetrng ofMI tncremental
costs by new and addttiona, financial resources from devetoped countnes. Outlintng the
importance of the nego.tattons from an energy-related rather than an envtronmen.-reta.ed
development perspective
. Ambassador Dasgupta stated that,
>eve,s and patterns of
responsible for tncremental global warning, it follows!, they tavH
At INC-2, many delegations submitted written text containing substantive
proposals for the Convention »5
,
including the full text of a possible draft framework
convention circulated as a non-paper’ by India. 106 The Report of INC-2 highlights the
general acceptance of the view that all developing country Parties to the Convention
would need additional financial resources and transfer of appropriate technology including
Ambassador Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, “Statement by Leader of the Indian
Delegation at INC-2,” July 19, 1991. Statement provided to the author by UNFCCC
Secretariat.
United Nations, “Set of Informal Papers provided by delegations,”
A/AC.237/Misc.l/Add. 1-9, May-June 1991. The informal papers are also known as
Non-paper’ submissions to INC-2 and were provided to the author by UNFCCC
Secretariat.
06
United Nations, “Set of Informal Papers provided by
delegations,”A/AC.237/Misc.l/Add.3, June 1991.
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energy related technologies, to enable them to fulfil their obligations under the
Conventton. - Front INC-2 onwards ddferences atnongs, developed and developtng
perststed. Indta and other developing countnes contutue to date, to rests, the nominafiou
of the GEF as the permanent financial mechanism for the UNFCCC, in the hope that
financial resources to address clrmate change would be broadened beyond those avatlable
within the GEF's narrower focus on four global envtronmental areas.
A. INC-3 held in Nairob, from September 9-20. 1991, most delegations agreed on
the need to include a chapter on principles which would give guidance to the
Convention s commitments and related mechanisms. Within Working Group I, divisions
remained regarding the application of commitments, with developed countries argutng that
general commitments should apply to all Parties, and developing countries argutng that
specific commitments should be considered and made applicable only to developed
countries. “ Once again, India and other developing country delegations argued that their
ability to fulfill commitments hinged upon the provision of financial resources and
technology transfer.
Delegates to INC-4 (held in Geneva from December 9-20, 1991), considered draft
text to various chapters of the Convention including the preamble, principles, objective,
general and specific commitments, and elements relating to mechanisms. The Report of
307
United Nations, “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Second Session ”
A/AC.237/9, August 19, 1991, page 13.
308
United Nations, A/AC.237/12, October 25, 1991, page 18.
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INC-4 notes general agreement on several
,ssues of specta, tnteres, to developtng
countries: the precautionary princlp,e; the spectfic needs of deve.opmg countries; and, the
need for Integra,mg environmental pro,ec,ton and eeonomtc development. » A, INC-4, a
group of 43 developing eountries meluding Chma and India submttted a proposal whteh
called on developed countnes to provide the “foil incremental costs” for ehmate ehange
related measures undertaken by developing eountry Parries, and made other measures
contingent upon the developed eountry Parties’ pronouncement on commtrinents. ™
Indta’s, and in parricular TERI’s role India, in sponsoring the GEF dtseussion on the
defoution and application of incremental costs is discussed in Chapter 5 with regard to the
GEF. Because the GEF only fonds the incremental costs of projects in its four focal areas,
the definition of “incremental costs” is key to GEF project selection and allocation.
The Report of INC-4 also notes the continued divergence of views on qualitative
targets for stabilization and reduction of emissions, the choice ofGHGs to be included, the
nature of measures to be undertaken and whether commitments should be implemented
individually or collectively. Jn As discussed in Chapter 1, the issue of the choice ofGHGs
to be included in any foture protocol negotiations was a particularly sensitive one for
countnes like China and India. Both countries’ contribution to global methane emissions
w
United Nations. "Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
ramework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Fourth
Session,”A/AC.237/15, January 29, 1992, page 9.
310
United Nations, “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Fourth Session)-Commitments,” A/AC.237AVG.1/L 7
December 18, 1991, page 2.
3
" UNGA, A/AC.237/15, January 29, 1992, page 10.
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from rice cultivation and ruminants were consider^ n • „cred numerically significant. From INC-4
onwards, ustng the d,station drawn by the CSE, India maintained that its cmtssions were
“survival” emtsstons and consequen„y cou!d not be equated with the excessive emissions
carbon dioxide charactenzed as “luxury” emtssions emanating from
developed countries. 312
INC -5 took place in New York in two parts, the first on February 18-28, 1992
and the second on April 30-May 9, ,992 to finaltze outstanding tssues before the
anttcipated opening of the Climate Convention for signature at UNCED. Discussing the
dynamics of the negotiates in INC-4 and INC-5, Ambassador Dasgupta noted that few
attempts were made to narrow down the substantive North-South differences and that
basic differences remained unresolved until the first part of INC-5. Supporting this
view, Daniel Bodansky points out that states stuck to their positions at INC-3 and INC-4,
and did not work towards compromise language. Consequently, delegates at INC-5 were
presented with largely bracketed Convention text, and were given very little time to work
out any significant compromises. 314
Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, “Global Warming in an Unequal World ” ( New
Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment, 1991). Minister Kamal Nath used this concept
in several speeches from 1991 until 1995 (COP-1). See also section on role of policy
experts.
,
?l3
Ambassador Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, “The Climate Change Negotiations”, in
Irving Mintzer and J.A. Leonard eds.. Negotiating Climate Change 1994, page 41.
Daniel Bodansky, “Draft Convention on Climate Change,” Environmental Policy
and Law, (Vol.22: No. 1, 1992), page 5.
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On May 9, 1992- the last day of INC-5, delegates adopted the text of,he
UNFCCC and recommended i, for stgnature during UNCED. The Report of the second
par, of INC-5 notes that most delegates agreed that the Conventton was no, an ideal
one. The Convention was described as “carefully balanced package” that.
srr .ha, cou,d be
The designation of a finanetal mechanism was one of the areas where differences of
opinion among developing countries, who preferred a newly established financial
mechanism, and developed countries, who preferred to use the existing GEF, remained
unresolved. As a compromise, delegates finally agreed to define a mechanism for the
provision of financial resources on a grant or concessional basis that would be accountable
to the COP, without specifically invoking the GEF, which was to operate as an interim
financial mechanism for the Convention.. 316
With regard to the discussion on the UNFCCC, the Indian position prior to
UNCED remained focused on ensuring that no limits be imposed on developing countries’
right to development. 317 At UNCED. the Indian delegation maintained its resistance
against any attempts to broaden the responsibility for climate change by including
United Nations, “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of the second part of its Fifth
Session,”A/AC.237/ 1 8 (Part II), October 18, 1992, page 9.
' 16 !UCC, “The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change ”
(Geneva:UNEP/WMO, 1992), Article 1 1, paragraph 1.
317
Staff Reporter, “Climate change outcome appears bleak: Developing Nations
reluctant on commitment to carbon reduction goals,” The Observer of Business and
Politics. March 5, 1992.
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developing countries, and is even reported to have considered the oprion of boycotting the
climate convent,on in retahai.on aga^st the US decs,on to boycott the hiod.vers.ty
convent,on. In his UNCED address, the Indian Mimster of Environment and Forests,
Kamal Nath noted that.
P
e COnSerVatl0n 0fBl0d'—y have
they form the
“d Protocol,
nnnrfor *»,. , •
acKground of a globalized economy where oneUpmeS^
on selective environmental concerns ” 319
y US e tocus
In the end a. UNCED, the INC Chairman, Jean R.per, of France brokered a comprom,se
document that requued industrialized countries to develop national emission limits and
report on national climate change related programs and polices, without specifymg any
clear enussion targets or dates by which targets should be met. 320 The UNFCCC received
155 signatures from States at UNCED 1992 and entered into force 90 days after the
deposition of the 50th instrument of ratification.
The Role of National C limate Change Policy Experts: 1990-1992
An analysis of Indian negotiators’ policy statements, such as those made by
Ambassador Dasgupta at INC-2, and those made by Minister Kamal Nath at UNCED,
Staff Reporter, “India may opt out of climate convention: Retaliation against US
decision to boycott bio-diversity convention,” The Observer of Business and Politic
19 Ka™J Nath
’ “Environment:Top of National and International Agenda: Address to
UNCED,” in Nath, India’s Environmental Concerns 1995, page 86.
320
Parson, Haas, Levy
, 1992, page 13.
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reveals
.ha, Indian climate change policy makers sough, ,o ensure ,ha, no lands be
imposed on economic developmen, and pu, nations economic and energy related
development concerns a, the forefront of international cltmate change negations. Had
the global climate change negotiations no, been pnmartly about those processes that
contribute to the additions or reductions ofCO, enusstons-tha, is energy related processes
and patterns of national energy consumption and production, then India as an oil
importing, developing country with large reserves of coal would no, have had any reason
to ensure that global climate change negotiations no, impose any limits on national
economic development. I, is precisely because the UNFCCC is about the Unkage between
energy consumption and productions patterns and economic development that the oil
exporting developing countries (which is how OPEC countries refer to themselves in the
context of the climate negotiations) are very active participants in the climate change
negotiations. 321
The discussion below reveals that formulation of Indian policy stances on climate
change from 1991 onwards was influenced by policy inputs from CSE, TERI and IGIDR.
The principal policy input provided by the CSE, and cited as influential by Minister Kamal
Nath, was a report entitled, “Global Warming in an Unequal World”, written by Anil
IUCC, “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, (Geneva:
WMO/UNEP, 1992) page 11. OPEC countries have consistently opposed any discussion
on a possible protocol limiting GHG emissions and have been advised to do so by
greenhouse skeptics identified by Ross Gelbspan in Chapter 1. In fact. Article 4.8 of the
UNFCCC which lists developing countries which have special needs and concerns arising
from the adverse impacts of climate change includes small island countries, countries with
low-lying coastal areas and countries whose economies are highly dependent on income
generated from the production, processing and export, and/or on consumption of fossil
fuels and associated energy-intensive products.”
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Agarwal and Sunita Narain 322 Critim.ino wptn lqumg^ estlma“* of India's GHG emissions, the
authors argued that the WRI report was less based
motivated and mathematical jugglery, and that the
on science and more on politically
mam mtention of the WRI report
seemed to be allocate blame to developing countries for global warmrng. » The authors
castigated as “irresponsible and highly partisan” as well
preaching the world has ever
as, constituting the worst form of
seen”, statements made in the West by both the head of
WRI, and the head of the environmental group of the International Energy Agency,
arguing for the control of the levels of coal used by countries like China and India.
When questioned about CSE’s role in influencing the Indtan clnnate change policy debate.
Ravi Sharma notes that CSE’s critique of WRI,
^generated lively interest in the issue and also put policy makers from MOEFand the Ministry of Economic Affairs in the dock because they realized that the
CrE
e
'fca
>
ll7
re
d^
nd ',n8
K
WaS
u
rnUCh h0“er tha" ‘hey th0Ught
- K3™1 Nath loved the
.
“ f dls*mgu,shing between survival and luxury GHG emissions because
this gave him an opportunity to raise the North-South equity issue’ 325
The idea that climate change concerns could serve as a mechanism for dealing with
national energy related development concerns is a powerful factor explaining early Indian
interest in the issue, especially in light of the energy related policy inputs requested by the
MOEF from TERI from 1991-1992 and those published by Dr. Jyoti Parikh of IGIDR,
Anil Agarwal and Sunita Narain, "Global Warming in an Unequal World,” January
1 99 1
.
3 3 Agarwal and Narain, January 1991, page 2.
3 4
Agarwal and Narain, January 1991, page 2.
3 5
Personal Interview with Mr. Ravi Sharma, Deputy Director, Center for Science and
Environment, New Delhi, September 13, 1995.
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only two developing country lead convening authors in the IPCC. Both Dr R.K.
Pachaur, and Dr. Jyoti Parikh, whose opinions were solicited by the MOEF pnor to eveiy
INC from 1991 onwards, may be classified as energy experts.
A review of work done by Dr. Parikh from ,989-1992 establishes her credentials
as a national energy policy expert and reveals a predominant energy foeus in the climate
change related policy work done by her. In several papers, issues such as improving
energy efficiency and energy conseivation measures in coal-fired power plants,
manufacturing industries and grid-level electricity have been emphasized. In a report
prepared for UNCED, entitled “Consumption Patterns: The Driving Force of
Environmental Stress, Parikh notes.
After nearly two decades of rise in oil-prices, with the exhaustion of global
atmospheric canying capacity and its overload by the profligate life-style ofdeveloped countries, new handicaps may be imposed on developing countries inhe form of emission reduction protocols, carbon tax and so on. It would be indeed
tragic, it in the name of environmental concerns, the growth process of developing
countries is once again disrupted.” 327
F B
n .
Jyoti Parikh
' “Energy Conservation in Indian Manufacturing Industries,” Journal of
I’roducnvily
.
(Vol.30: No.4, 1990); Jyoti Parikh and Madhuri Pai, Superconductors in
Power Systems: A Technology Assessment for India (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1990);
Jyoti Parikh and V.Hariharan eds., Power Systems for the Year 2000 and hevnnH (New
Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill Publishing, 1990); Jyoti Parikh and J.P. Painuly, Compressed
Natural Gag in Transport Sector: Techno-economic Assessment for India (Bombay
IGIDR Report No. DP-9 1-49, 1991); Jyoti Parikh and S.Gokam, Climate Chanpe find
India's Energy Policy Options , (Bombay: IGIDR Report No. DP-92-76, 1992), and J.
Parikh and D. Chattopadhyay, CO-, Emissions Reductions from Power Systems in India
(Bombay: IGIDR Report No. DP-92-79, 1992).
327
Jyoti Parikh, Consumption Patterns: The Driving Force of Environmental Stress
Report prepared for the UNCED
.
(Bombay: IGIDR, October 1991), page 42.
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Of«he three institutions identified, only TER, established a specialized utformalion
and research unit-the Global Warming Centre which received a grant from the MOEF to
provide policy related professional and analytical support to the Government.” 328
According to its Perspective Plan, the Centre provided technical support to the
Government of India’s negotiating team to the INCs at the request of MOEF. 3» The list
of papers submitted to the MOEF from 1991-1992 by TERTs Global Warming Centre
are given in Table 4.2 below.
List of TERI papers commissioned by MOEF: 1991-1992. 330
Author(s) Title of paper & Date of Submission
Dr. R.K. Pachauri Global Warming-Cause, Impacts and Responses, June 1990
Dr. R.K. Pachauri &
Dr. P. Ghosh
International Energy Policy Issues from an oil importing, developing
country perspective, June 1991.
Dr. Ligia Noronha Principles and Commitments to Limit Climate Change January 1992
Dr. Ligia Noronha Energy & Sustainable Development in Developing Countries, June 1 992
Dr Ajay Mathur et.al Adaptive Strategies for India, June 1992.
Dr R.K. Pachauri et. al Reappraisal of WRI’s estimates of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, June 1992
Dr Ajay Mathur Technological Options for reducing GHG emissions from coal-based power
generation, June 1992
328
Personal Interview with Dr. Pachauri, New York, October 27, 1994.
TERI, “Global Warming Centre: Perspective Plan-2010", mimeograph provided to
author by TERI, page 1.
330 The bulk of the articles focused on the energy related implications of global
warming.
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As described above the bulk of papers provided by TER I have an energy focus and
prov.de evidence of TER] ’s role in sponsor,ng ,he cnergy-globa, wanning Hnkage wiib.n
.he MOEF. The fact ,ha, the TER, papers were officially requested by the MOEF. also
indicates that MOEF officials were interested in understand,ng the policy implications of
global climate change from an energy and not a strictly environmental perspective.
Excerpts from TERI papers provided as an input to negotiations from 1991-1992
highlight the emphasis placed on understanding the energy unplications of global climate
change and on TERFs role in influencing national responses to key concepts to be
included in the UNFCCC text. The emphasis of these papers were on understanding the
Pol'cy lmP'ications o'' India’s reliance on coal, securing energy efficiency and energy
conservation measures ,n coal fired electricity plants, and moving towards renewable
energy sources as a supplementary (not a substitute) source of commercial energy. The
identification of policy concerns such as a reduction of dependence on oil imports and
ensuring that no limits are placed on developing countries right to firel their economic
development arc identical to claims made by Indian policy makers and are also reflected in
the energy policy frame for this period.
In a paper on international energy policy issues from an oil importing, developing
country perspective, Pachauri and Ghosh argue that the rapidly increasing concern for the
global environment has important connections to energy use patterns and is an important
185
facer in the current inremat,ona, energy arena. » Outhnmg eienrents of a new approach
to energy wi.hm the context of global climate change concerns, the authors state,
since their resource endowments nftPn , • ,
^ ,or ec°nomic growth,
eTectncif’
^ bCCaUSe SWftS fr°m ^itiondbblss "*
nci y is an important attnbute of increasing living standards.” 332
In h,s paper outlining the technolog,cal options for reducing GHG emissions from
coal-based power generation, Ajay Mathur argues that the reduetion of specific emissions
of carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxides “during coal-based electricity generation is
dependent on increasing power plant efficiency.” » In both papers, crucial features of the
national energy policy frame such as increased reliance on domestic coal reserves, the
importance of providing additional energy supplies to meet economic growth objectives,
the need for increased energy efficiency, and the need to increase electricity power
supplies are evident.
TERI also provided commentary on key concepts such as “climate change as a
common concern of mankind”, “the precautionary principle”, and “common but
differentiated responsibilities of states” which were debated during the early INCs and
331
R.K.Pachauri and P.Ghosh, “International Energy Policy Issues from an oil
importing, developing country perspective,” June 1991, page 19. Mimeograph provided to
author.
332 R K. Pachauri and P. Ghosh, June 1991, page 27-28.
Ajay Mathur, Technological Options for reducing GHG emissions from coal-based
power generation,” June 1991, page 99. Mimeograph provided to author.
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Wh,ch would be included in the negotiated UNFCCC text. With regard to the reference of
cl,mate change as “a common concern of mankind” L. Noronha writes that.S luc^^atforanfeSond ‘he °Uhe^
—
;
a C
?
mmeM 0ften heard of forests ” **ent times. Forests J’e beltedw,thm a nat,on s territory and as such are subject to its sovereignty
In TERI's view, the global sinks which would mitigate the effects of climate change are
not to be viewed as global commons. Indian policy actors have not referred to the global
climate change as a global commons problem in interviews. When national policy experts
were asked what key concepts they associated with the climate change issue, the concepts
they listed were, “common but differentiated responsibilities of states”, the polluter pays
principle, the precautionary principle and the princple of equity with reference to basing
responsibility for global climate change on per capita GHG emissions. 335 Citing the
UNFCCC preamble. Minister Kamal Nath notes that "all countries do not share equal
responsibility in interfering with the climate system.” 336
' 34 L - Noronha. “Principle and Commitments to Limit Climate Change: A
Commentary,” January 1992, page 3-4. Mimeograph provided to author.
15
Personal Interviews with Ravi Sharma, Dr. Pachauri and Dr. J. Parikh of IGIDR.
Dates of interviews listed in Table 1.2 of Chapter 1.
336
Personal Interview with Minister Kamal Nath, September 1 1, 1995.The UNFCCC
preamble notes that, “the largest share of historical and current global GHG emissions has
originated in developed countries
,
and that the “share ot global emissions originating in
developing countries will grow to meet their social and development needs.”
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4 5
Nenotia . mo.
The core outcomes of the UNCED for India were summarized by Minister Kamal
Nath:
“
1
.
2
2 .
3.
4.
Environmental problems cannot be seen in isolation, and the basicvelopment needs ol developing countries must be tulfflled beforeenviromnen, by itself ean take precedence over other concerns
.Global environmental concerns largely require unmediate action by thendustriahzed world: both corrective and preventive. Developing countnes
e^ra eln re^r'
6 the Wherewithal «*
Greater financial flows and the transfer of environmentally soundtechnology to developmg countries must be ensured,
o international debate on the environment, or on development can
resoufcer
S°Vereign righ
' °f '^ C0Un,ry °Ver ,he use of its natural
For globally sustainable development, a global partnership on the basis of
equality, with equity as a pre-requisite, is imperative.” 337
Indian negotiators adhered to the positions articulated above at the post UNCED INCs
but also incorporated within their basic negotiating policy framework, some new pohcy
positions on issues such as the adequacy ofcommitments and Joint Implementation (JI).
The INC for the UNFCCC was the first negotiating body of an international
environmental convention that continued to extensively meet after the Convention was
adopted. Unlike the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Convention on Biodiversity
which met only twice before the first COP, the INC for the UNFCCC met an additional
six times to prepare for COP-1
. INC-6 met in Geneva from December 7-10, 1992, while
INC-7 met in New York from March 15-20, 1993 with Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan
Kamal Nath, “For those who suffer the consequences most: Statement to the 47th
General Assembly of the United Nations- Report of the UNCED,” (November 1992), in
Kamal Nath, India's Environmental Concerns 1995, page 96.
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replacing Ambassador Dasgup.a as Vice Chan of the INC, and as head of the Indian
delegation. INC-6 was an important meettng because delegates agreed on a program of
work leading up to COP-1 in three baste Custers: matters relattng to commttments:
matters relating to arrangements for the financial mechanism and for technical and
financial support to developtng country Parttes; and, procedural and legal natter. Working
Group I was to deal with the first cluster and Working Group II was to deal the other
two. 338
Until INC- 10, the “hot-button” issue for developing countries was the question of
securing financial assistance for global climate change responses. 339 From a developing
country perspective, issues related to the financial mechanism including policies, program
priorities, eligibility criteria, governance, accountability, amount of funding were of
paramount importance. For India, the process of restructuring the GEF to ensure
transparency and democratic governance, was essential for the implementation of the
UNFCCC. A 1994 Ministerial note states,
“The recent collapse of the GEF negotiations only highlights the precarious nature
ot this agreement. The GEF was an unsatisfactory arrangement, but was accepted
as an interim funding mechanism for the Conventions on the clear commitment that
it would be suitably restructured and adequately replenished.” 340
United Nations, “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Sixth
Session,”A/AC.237/24, January 6, 1992, page 10.
339
Personal interviews with key developing country negotiators, including Ambassador
Sreenivasan of India.
340 Kamal Nath, “Basic Issues, Prospects and Opportunities,”Background Note:
Ministerial Consultation on the Environment, February 24-25, 1994, in Kamal Nath,
(continued...)
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Ind,a was active in GEF restructunng negotiations because the provision of adequate
“new and additional resources” was deemed critical to the achievement of post-UNCED
outcomes.
Indta. like other developing countries insisted that Convention's landing
mechanism assist developtng countries in covenng the agreed full costs (different from the
concept of incremental costs) of implementing the Convention. India pushed for the
replenished GEF (1994-96) to take account of the landing needs of developing coantnes
m connection to the reporting of national climate change related information required
under Article 12.1 of the UNFCCC. Agreement was reached a. INC-8, to give priority to
meeting the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in complying with
their obligations under Article 12. 1 (communication of national information) of the
UNFCCC
.
,4
' Consequently, the GEF is obligated to pay the full costs of preparing and
submitting developing countries’ national communications, in which developing countries
provide a national GHG inventory and information on climate change mitigation and
adaptation measures.
4.5.1 India and the Adequacy of Commitments
By INC- 10, other issues such as the review of the adequacy of Annex I Parties
(developed countries) commitments and criteria for Joint Implementation (JI) began to
340
(.. .continued)
India's Environmental Concerns . 1995, page 188.
41
United Nations, “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Eighth Session,”
A/AC.237/27/Rev.l, June 16 1993.
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play an increasingly imp„rtan. role in negotiating positions of developing countries. For
India, one of,he most carefully watehed over issues for the MOEF was the tssue of
commuments. whtch tneluded the adequacy of commitments and Jl. India, hke many other
developing countries argued that commitments by developed country Part.es under Article
4.2 (a) and (b) of the UNFCCC were inadequate for the long term „he period beyond
2000), and that further additional action would be needed to achieve the Convention's
obieettve. Although the UNFCCC was suitably vague on the issue of eommttments and a
protocol, at both INC- 1 0 and INC- 1
1
various delegations supported the need to consider
the following alternatives an amendment to the Convention and/or a protocol to be
negotiated at, or subsequent to COP-
1 , or a resolution or decision to be adopted a, COP-
1
that would reflect a political statement of will by the Parties.
Suggestions by Annex I Parties to broaden the scope of action through additional
commitments by developing ( non-Annex I) country Parties were resisted by developing
countries. Developed countries like the US, expressed the need for “a cautious approach’
based on a thorough review of existing national communications of Annex I Parties, and
while developing countries like India and Brazil, argued that currently available scientific
information from the IPCC and the International Energy Agency (IEA) indicated the
inadequacy of present Annex I Parties’ commitments. 342 COP-3 in 1997, was seen by
many delegations as a suitable date for agreeing on a protocol and it was decided that
United Nations, “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Tenth
Session,”A/AC.237/76, October 10, 1994, page 15.
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proposals for a protocol or deciston to be consumed by COP-1 would have to submhted
before September 28, 1994. 343
Ot September 20, 1994, Trinidad and Tobago on behalfof AOSIS submitted a
draft protocol for considers,on by INC-1
1 (Februa^ 6-17, ,995) in prepara.,on for COP-
1 to be held in Berlin from March 8 to April 7, 1995. Article 3 of the AOSIS draft
protocol refers to targets for GHG etntssions reduction with each Annex I Party betng
called upon to,
“Reduce its 1990 level of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide by at least 20percent by the year 2005; and adopt specific targets and timetables t0 orreduce other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol ind H'
targets and timetables for methane, n,irons oxide
L Mee^Tf dd ‘t,0nal COmmitmen,s t0 be negotiated and adopted by the
the Parties.” 344
The lead Indian climate change negotiator. Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan viewed with a
considerable degree of caution the listing of additional GHGs such as methane and nitrous
oxide in the AOSIS protocol. 345
The AOSIS draft protocol submission was followed by a proposal submitted by
Germany on September 22, 1994 entitled “Elements for a comprehensive protocol to the
United Nations, AJAC.237/76, October 10, 1994, page 16.
United Nations, “Matters Relating to Commitments: Letter dated September 20
1994 from the Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to UN to the Executive
Secretary of the interim secretariat, transmitting a draft protocol to the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change on Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reductions,”
A/AC.237/L.23, September 27, 1994,
page 4.
345
Personal Interview with Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan, Deputy Permanent
Representative, UN Mission of India, New York, October 21, 1994.
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UNFCCC In its preambular section, the German proposal highlights the need for
negotiating a comprehensive protocol for all r,nrr a nt all GHGs and all sectors without delay. But the
proposal also notes that in establishing new commthnents, additional
to be paid to.
attention would have
.... work towards balanced commitments on the part of the industrialized anddeveloping countries, for example, by means of farther reporting commitments fornon-Annex I Parties and commitments to limit the nse inLsSSTastofcertain more advanced developing countries. 346 ^ case o
The German submission dovetaUed the AOSIS target reduction on carbon dioxide, with
the only difference being that the former proposed that a “certain portion yet to
determined” of the reduction commitments may be met by joint implementation. * It also
included a reference to action from “certain more advanced developing countries”. The
inclusion of this phrase in the German proposal sounded alarm bells for large developing
countries like India, China, Brazil and Malaysia who argued vociferously against the
extension of new commitments on developing countries and any attempt to separate
certain developing countries from within the Group of 77 (G-77) and China fold. 348
United Nations, “Matters Relating to Commitments: Letter dated September 22,
1994 from the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear
Safety of Germany to the Executive Secretary of the interim secretariat, transmitting
proposals for further elements of a protocol to the Convention,” A/AC.237/L.23/Add 1
September 27, 1994, page 3.
347
United Nations, A/AC.237/1.23/Add.l, September 27, 1994, page 4.
348 The G-77 is an U. N. intergovernmental caucus that was formed in the early 1960s
in preparation for the 1964 U.N. Conference on Trade and Development. It derives its
name from an original membership of 77 states but the group now includes 138 states.
China is not officially a member, but G-77 texts are commonly introduced on behalf of
both the G-77 and China.
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Given the coincidence and timing of the two
the AOSIS protocol was one of
proposals, India’s initial response to
suspicion. Prior to the INC-1 1 discussion on the two
proposals submitted above. Ambassador Sreenivasan i
Committee argued that.
n a statement to the UNGA Second
acceptlraUhtXe
m
ut"T*^ ' PartieS W1" *
defend for foe
°
Ur VKW ‘hal 3 diSCUSSi°" ^ould be
When questioned about India’s position on the draft protocol and the Gennan elements
paper. Ambassador Sreenivasan said.
"“a
m
S
|
fi™ POS,t,°" iS lhat w
,
c« *• w«ling >o engage in negotiations on aprotoco! wh,eh would even indirectly bring about a restraint on the energy relatednomic development activities of developing countries. The data has not
7f
S6e n° reaSOn f0r “V Pro 'oco1^ developing countries. In any
“
*
,
7
C
. ,
We arC n°‘ 8°lng t0 accept the initiation of negotiations on aprotocol but let us see what happens at the COP.” 350
At INC-1 1, there was diplomatic gridlock in the negotiations on the adequacy of
commitments and JI. 351 Large developing countries like China and India, argued that
negotiations on the AOSIS draft protocol were premature, while OECD countries with
the exception ol the US, supported the initiation of negotiations on a comprehensive
Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan, “Speaking Notes of Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan,
Deputy Permanent Representative of India in the Second Committee on the protection of
global climate change for present and future generations of mankind,” October 21,1 994
Mimeograph provided to author.
350
Personal Interview with Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan, October 21, 1994.
C.Carpenter, P. Chasek, A. Cherian and S. Wise, “Summary of the Eleventh Session
of the INC for the FCCC: 6-17 February 1995,” Earth Negotiations Bulletin (Vol. 12:
No. 1 1 , February 6-17, 1 995), page 6.
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protocol beginning a, COP-,, w„h Sw.tzeriand and Japan calling for the conation of
protoco, negottations by COP-3. » The final dectsion ofINC-1, (Decision I ,/,) on the
adequacy of commitments was bastcally a non-decision whtch does no, contain any
reference to the inadequaey of the commitments and instead recommends that COP- 1 take
“appropriate action" based on the proposals and views expressed by Parties a, INC-9.
INC- 10 and INC-11. 353
Pnor to COP-1, the Indian Environment Minister, Kamal Nath circulated a letter
to key COP- 1 counterparts in which he indicated support for the AOSIS protocol, but
rejeeted suggestions to modify the AOSIS proposal by “encumbering developtng countries
with obligations under the Protocol, that they do not have under the Convention.” The
official Indian position shifted from blocking negotiations on the AOSIS protocol to being
supportive of it, while opposing any move to extend commitments to developing
countries. At COP-1, the official G-77 and China position, strongly supported by India,
was that the current commitments of Annex I Parties was inadequate and that
responsibility for the implementation of commitments should not be shifted to non-Annex
352
C.Carpenter, P. Chasek, A. Cherian and S. Wise, “INC-1 1 Highlights, Thursday 9
February 1995,” (Vol. 12: No.5, February 10, 1995), page 1.
353 United Nations, “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Eleventh Session: Part II-
Recommendations to
the Conference of the Parties,” A/AC.237/9 1/Add. 1, March 8, 1995, page 50-51.
354 Kamal Nath, “Official Government of India Letter sent by Minister Kamal Nath”
March 24, 1995. Mimeograph provided to author.
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. Part.es. ’» In his statement during the Min.s,enal segment of COP-1, Kamal Nath said
that India was wholly sympathetic to the concerns of AOSIS but he rejected, “the
insidious moves to divide the developing countnes into new categor.es”, as these moves
amounted not only to rewriting the UNFCCC, but also to reopening the entire
environment versus development debate. Refemng to the free-riding of the North on the
South, he noted that the North ought to pay a 100 billion dollars annually “environmental
rent to developing countries for “eating into their environmental space.” He reiterated the
pre-UNCED Indian position, that no comparison should be made between the “survival-
emissions of developing countries and the “luxury emissions” of developed countries. ®
At COP-1, Indian negotiators such as Antony De Sa, played a key role within the
G-77 and China in securing developing countries’ support for a draft mandate for protocol
negotiations based on the AOSIS proposal. India circulated an informal paper within the
G-77 entitled “Proposed Elements of a Mandate for consultations on Commitments”
which stated that the consultations will: “not introduce any new obligations whatsoever
for developing country parties”; be based on the AOSIS protocol proposal; and, take
place in an open-ended Ad Hoc Group of Parties to be established by the COP. 357
355
C. Carpenter, P. Chasek, A. Cherian and S. Wise, “Summary of the First
Conference of the Parties for the FCCC: 28 March -7 April 1995.^ Earth Negotiations
Bulletin
,
(Vol. 12: No.21, April 10, 1995), page 3.
Kamal Nath, Statement by Karnal Nath, Minister of Environment and Forests to
the COP to the Climate Change Convention: April 6, 1995,” in Nath, India's
Environmental Concerns , 1 995, page 26 1
.
357
Informal Paper by the Indian Delegation circulated within the G-77 and China at
COP-1, March 28-April 7, 1995, “Proposed Elements of a Mandate for Consultations on
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Subsequently, India supported by Philippines (servtng as ehair of the G-77 and China),
Cluna, Brazil. Malays,a, Argenfna, AOSIS members - the so-called “Green Group” of 32
developing countries put forward a proposal on a mandate for protocol
„egot,at,ons wh,ch
except for some minor editrng changes was
.dentical to the Indian proposal. In their
journal, £CO, envnonmen.al NGOs highhghted the “s.gnifican, shift by India and Chma”
who had been previously opposed to a protocol fearing that it might through the German
proposal lead to commitments from developing countries. ’» Arguing that the “green
paper”, offered the best way out of the impasse at COP- 1 . Haig Simonian noted that.
"Annex I countries are bamboozled: no one expected developing states, including
eavyweights such as China, India and Brazil, to make such a U-turn.” 359
COP-1 negotiations on the protocol were protracted, tense and revealed new
divisions among developed countries, with the EU and Canada (breaking away from
JUSCANZ-an alliance of Japan, US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) willing to
endorse a mandate for GHG reductions and Japan, US and Australia resisting any
reductions commitments in the proposed mandate. 360 An article in the Daily Telegraph
,
noted that “the EU was at loggerheads with America” over the latter’s refusal to accept
357
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Commitments”. Mimeograph provided to author.
358 Eco Reporters, “G-77 Moves on Protocol,” ECO. (Vol. 89‘ No 4 March 31
1995),
'
’
page 1.
Haig Simonian, Springing a U-tum on climate: Developing countries have shifted
attitude,” Financial Times. April 6, 1995.
360 Eco Reporters, “Mandate Movement?,” ECO. (Vol.89: No 2, March 29 1995),
page 1.
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any text which would force it to reduce foc«iltossil fuel emissions and cited an attempt by the
a meeting with of industrialized and
British Environment Secretary, John Gummer to hold
develop^ countries, mcludmg the US, Russia, China and India to broker an agreement.
'6I
Consensus was finally brokered after all night negottations. Decision 1/CP. 1 entitled,
"The Berlin Mandate” states that the current commttments under Article 4.2 (a, and (b, of
the UNFCCC are not adequate, and that “a process” should be initiated to enable the COP
to take.
‘‘...appropriate action for the period beyond 2000 including the strengthening ofhe commitments of the Parties included in Annex I to the Convention...
, throughthe adoption of a protocol or another legal instrument.” 362
8
The process put into place is referred to as the Ad Hoc Group on the Berlin
Mandate (AGBM), and these AGBM meetings continue to be convened periodically.
Although the move to extend commitments to “certain large developing countries” has
been contained for the short-term, it looms as long-term possibility. At a workshop held at
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, shortly after COP-1, in which negotiators,
academics and NGO representatives took part in their personal capacities, one speaker
argued that “the more populous developing countries must be” involved in emissions
reductions for there to be long-term climatic benefits. 363 Refuting the claim that
1995
Staff
^Reporter, “Deadlock over greenhouse gas cuts,” Daily Telegraph April 5,
United Nations, “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session:
Action taken the COP-Part II,” FCCC/CP/1995/Add.l, June 6, 1995, page 4.
363
Michael Grubb and Dean Anderson, The Emerging International Regime for
Climate Change, (London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1995), page 13. The
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developing countries need to take on enusstons reductions, another commentator stressed
the need to distingutsh between luxury and survival emtssions. and to focus on
appropnate per cap,.a carbon emissions, rather than total emisrions. * A, the workshop
segment entitled, “Government perspeet.ves”, a speaker presenting the perspee.ive of
developing countries argued that,
“. the most important objective of India and other developing countries at COP Ihad bee to ensure that no additional commitments are requtred ofthem bae^g
SectTve--”
'
" ,he f0rm ad0pted
-
had been 3 way of achieving thrs
8
Consequently, India’s move, from being suspicious of the potential linkage between the
AOSIS draft protocol and the German elements paper, to being more proactive in pushing
lor the AOSIS protocol, was an expedient negotiating tactic to demonstrate its
commitment while simultaneously ensuring that no new commitments be made for
‘certain” developing countries.
4
-5 -2 India and Activities Implemented Jointly
The other controversial post-UNCED issue for Indian and other developing
country negotiators was the issue of JI. In the discussion below, changes in the official
Indian position on JI will be documented in order to support the claim that with increased
energy sector liberalization from 1993-1994 onwards, Indian policy actors are actively
363
(...continued)
report does not identify individual speakers since participants took part in their personal
capacities, but the Indian representative’
s position can be easily identified.
64 Grubb and Anderson, 1995, page 17. The commentator’s argument sounds
remarkably similar to those made by Indian negotiators.
365 Grubb and Anderson, 1995, page 39.
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looking for new bilateral, cooperattve measures in energy efficiency, energy conserve
and the application of marketable renewable energy technologies. Article 3.3 of the
UNFCCC which states that, ‘-efforts to address donate change may be earned ou,
cooperatively by mterested Part.es” contains a genera, reference to the concept of J,
. The
more specific reference is found in Article 4.2 (a) which states that Annex I Parties may
implement policies and measures on mit.gation ofdonate change “jointly with other
Parties” ” * The wording of Article 4.2 (a) makes i, clear that J1 can take place between
Annex I Parties, bu, the real bone of contention was whether i, could take place between
Annex I and non-Annex I Parties and what the implications of this may be.
The issue of Jl was first placed on the agenda at INC-7. Discussions by developed
country Parties on widening the scope of Jl coverage to include developing countries was
initiated at rNC-8 but were seen by developing countries as an attempt by developed
countnes to shift or shirk their commitments under the UNFCCC. At INC-8 and INC-9,
India and other developing countries with the possible exception of Costa Rica (an ardent
proponent of Jl) expressed two basic concerns. The first was that Annex I Parties not use
Jl as a means to avoid national policies and measures to meet their current commitments.
The second was that the application of the concept of Jl be supplemental to, and not
substitute for, financial mechanisms established under the UNFCCC.
A document prepared for consideration by INC- 10, entitled “Criteria for Joint
Implementation ’ notes that Jl is an untested and controversial issue and that consensus on
' 66 IUCC, “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,” 1992, page 6
and page 8.
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“ migh‘ 1,6 d,ffiCUlt t0 achieve “ ,ime for COP-1
.The document defines the concept of JI
as the “financial or teehnologteal participation” by an “investing” participant in one
country ('A’), providing all or most of the total investment for an activity which would
ltmit or reduce GHG emissions or mcrease GHG removals, undertaken together with
another “hosting” panic,pant in another country (B’). Given the newness of the
concept, a plot phase was envtsaged which would allow for conceptual refinement and
testing as well as, the gathering of experience. The document also highlights developing
countries' concern over whether JI could take place on a volunta^ basis between Annex I
and non-Annex I Parties, and suggests that any system of “crediting” for reductions of
GHG emissions be excluded from the pilot phase
. At INC- 10, India's position was that
the pilot phase not include any credits for GHG emissions reductions; not allow for the
deferring of credit accruals from pilot phase projects to a later date; and, be confined to
Annex I Parties. 369
The key issues which remained unresolved at the close of INC- 10 were the criteria
of eligibility for participation; the range of activities for a pilot phase; and, the starting date
and duration of the pilot phase. Brazil, China and India remained critical of JI at the close
of INC- 10. INC-1 1 was however notable in that the skepticism and concern expressed by
367
United Nations. “Matters Relating to Commitments: Criteria for Joint
Implementation”, A/AC.237/66, August 16, 1994, page 5.This definition is a summary of
the text used in the document.
368
United Nations, A/AC.237/66, August 16, 1994, page 6.
369
Indian delegation, “Intervention by India with regard to criteria for joint
implementation”. INC- 10, August 1994. A mimeograph copy was given to author.
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China and India on JI, gave way ,o cautious optimism. At INC-11, China circulated a non
paper indieating for the first time its support for JI between Annex I and non-Annex I
Parties. Prior to INC- 1 1, Indian negotiators conttnued to insist that JI should not become
a vehicle for developed countries (Annex I Parties) to avoid their own emissions
reductions or for developed countries to shift the responsibility for emissions reductions
on to developing countries, but that they could support JI if i, involved source-based -
energy efficiency and conservation, and fossil fuel substitution projects- rather than sink-
based-namely forest conservation projects. !7° When asked about the Indian delegation’s
position on JI in October 1994, (before the INC-1 1), Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan said.
There are a section of people in India who believe it is a good thing because it
will bring in investments in the energy sector and their argument is that we should
not allow JI for the creation or enhancement of sinks” 371
The shift in the Chinese and Indian position on JI was significant in brokering a new
attitude towards JI within the G-77 and China. In the final days of INC- 1 1 , G-77 and
China drafted a text on JI which stated that.
Joint activities to address climate change undertaken between developed country
Parties and developing country Parties are different from joint
implementation. ..and that such joint activities shall be compatible with and
supportive ot national sustainable development priorities and strategies and shall
promote technology cooperation, including technology transfer and capacitv
building...” 372
370
Personal Interview with Ambassador. T.P Sreenivasan, New York, October 21
1994.
' 7I
Personal Interview with Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan, New York, October 21
1994
37
‘ G-77 and China, “Draft decision of the Committee on Criteria for Joint
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Despite some agreement to test the concept of J, through a pUo, phase, a gridlock
on language remamed. Thts mean, tha, INC-, I submitted to COP-., three different draft
decisions on JI proposed alternatively by the US, (supported by Japan, Australia and
Canada,, the EU and the G-77 and China. Unlike the US proposal whtch sough, a pilot
Phase for JI beginnmg immediately after COP-,, the G-77 and China proposal limited J, to
Annex 1 Parties, prohibited credtts in the pilot phase and recommended that COP-1
recommend critena for the implementation of JI. ”3 A number ofthe Wes(em
and non-industry based NGOs including the US-based, Environmental Defense Fund
(EDF) also lobbied developing countries to support a JI pilot phase with credits. At INC-
1 1, EDF published a position paper urging less developmg countries to support JI because
...would reap both economic and environmental benefits from such projectsbeginning w,th the revenue and/or technology transfer such projects would
In contrast to the G-77 and China proposal, the EDF position paper argued in favor ofthe
accrual of emission credits for Annex I Parties stating that joint implementation could be
engine for the transfer of low-emitting technologies. According to EDF, “by creating
372
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Implementation”, February 15, 1995. Informal paper circulated by G-77 and China which
was collected by the author during INC- 1 1
.
373
Carpenter, Chasek, Cherian and Wise, “Summary ofthe Eleventh Session ofthe the
INC for a FCCC: 6-17 February, 1995,” Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1995, page 6.
Environmental Defense Fund, “Joint Implementation: Strategies for the Pilot
Phase, February 1995, page 2. This position paper was collected by author during INC-
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additional value in the fonn of greenhouse gas reduet.on eredits. joint indentation
helps to bndge the cos, gap between low-emitting and htgh emitting technologies tnaking
the choice of the former easier.” 375
The process by which India's initial skepticism gave way to a more favourable
v,ew of J] is critical to the argument that Indtan responses to ehmate change are framed by
energy-related development needs. Noting the change in position of certain developmg
countries, Mendis, Gowen and Maya argued at a 1994 UNDP sponsored J1 workshop that
despite some skepticism, J1 is “now considered an opportunity for financial resource and
technology transfer from the North to the South”. » The case of JI also provides an
interesting test of the influence of certain national policy experts on the Indian
environmental policy apparatus. Indian negotiators actively solicited and were receptive to
policy advice from two particular sources
-TERI and the IGIDR whose principal climate
change experts were energy experts and proponents of an energy related policy frame
rather than an environment pohcy frame. Minister Kamal Nath, Dr. Pachauri and Dr.
Parikh confirm that Indian climate change negotiators sought policy advice from Dr.
Pachauri and Dr. Parikh on JI prior to INC-1 1 and COP-1. 377 In addition to attending the
Environmental Defense Fund, February 1995, page 5. Particular emphasis (bold)
was added to this sentence.
7b Matthew Mendis, Marcia Gowen and R.S. Maya, ‘‘A Strategic Approach to
Cooperation on JI Activities for Developing Countries,” in UNDP, Workshop Report on
Designing Joint Project Mechanisms to Promote Benefits for Developing Countries- 1V1 S
December 1994, (New York: UNDP, 1994), Annex: page 4.
Personal Interviews with Minister Kamal Nath, Dr. Pachauri, and Dr. J. Parikh
confirm that these two policy experts participated in policy consultations with MOEF
(continued...)
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“ negotiations stnce INC-3, experts from TER,. ,ed by Dr. Pachaun. were act.ve in
providing policy adv.ee on J, to MOEF officials. In add.,ion. TERI's collaboration with
Center for Intemat.onal Clnnate and Energy Research-Oslo (CICERO) on the issue of J,
™^ itS Partidpati°n at *ntemati°naI fora such as the workshop sponsored on JI by
UNDP in Brazil (1994) is another indication of its involvement a, both the nat.onal and
international level. In a paper presented at the UNDP Workshop, R.K. Pachauri and P.
Soni noted that INC-9 had indicated that priority be given to JI activities resulting from
enussions limitations rather than sink enhancement because sink enhancement projects
provided a cheaper, and more exhaustible opt.on that might not be avaUable to developing
countries to satisfy any of their future commitments. ™ Pachauri and Soni also stated that
developing countries could rank potential JI projects on the basis of then national
priorities and negotiate accordingly with Annex I Parties, since there was no unanimous
perspective on JI. 380 Dr. C. Sinha of TERI notes that MOEF officials periodically
solicited TERJ and IGIDR’s policy advice on JI by convening briefing meetings prior to
the INCs and COP-1. He also points outs that any initial misgivings in the official Indian
377
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officials prior to INC-1 1 and COP-1. For dates of interviews, see Table 1.2 in chapter 1.
At INC-1 1, CICERO submitted to the interim Secretariat, a document entitled
Joint Implementation under the Climate Convention” which was mentioned in a note
prepared by UNFCC Secretariat. United Nations, “Criteria for Joint Implementation:
Addendum, A/AC.237/MISC.44/Add. 1, February 6, 1995.
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was seen as opportunity for bilateral
position about JI had changed by COP-1 and JI
cooperation in the energy sector. 381
Dr. jyoti Parikh was the pnncipal source of climate change policy advice from
IGIDR. In two papers published in 1993, Dr Parikh focused attention on the possibtlities
for carbon dioxide emissions reductions in the Indian power system. “ Outlming
perspectives on sectoral carbon dioxide emissions, she urged Indian planners to study
options that would increase energy efficiency and consen-ation in light of the current
debate on global warming. She also stated that India would have to continue to substitute
domestic coal for imported oil because a substitution of 10 percent of oil and gas for coal
would lead to “additional costs of Rs. 10, 416 billion. ’» Dr Parikh also published a paper
entitled, “North-South Cooperation in Climate Change through Joint Implementation”
which was given in draft form to the MOEF in 1993. In it, she argued that.
Developing countries have provided environmental space to the industrialized
countries at no cost for decades, and will continue to do so for many decades in
future, before the regional emissions balance is altered. Annually this
environmental subsidy is estimated to be US $70 billion. Therefore, its is
reasonable to ask to reverse this and to expect some North-South flows for a small
portion of this subsidy.” 384
381
Personal Interview with Dr. Chandrashekhar Sinha, TERI, September 13 1995
New Delhi.
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Jyoti. Parikh and S.Gokam, “Climate Change and India’s energy policy options”.
Global Environmental Change
,
September 1993, page 276-291 and D. Chattopadhyay
and J. Parikh “C0
2 Emissions Reductions from the Power System in India”, Natural
Resources Forum
,
November 1993, page 251-261.
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Jyoti Parikh, North-South Cooperation in Climate Change through Joint
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Interestingly, in his speech to COP-1, Mims.er Kamal Nath emphas,zed the need to ensure
“equ,table benefit sharing of environmental space”, and expanded on Parikh’s point by
argurng that the “privileges enjoyed by the North for excess emissions are worth 100
billion dollars annually.” » Indian policy makers such as Antony De Sa have used the
concept of the "limited carrying capacity of the Earth and have associated this concept
w,th the idea that developing countries have provided environmental space to developed
countries at no costs for decades and that developed countries have inequitably eaten into
shared global environmental space. 386
In her paper on JI, Dr Parikh notes that,
As long as JI projects are related to the development priorities of developing
countries, there is a long-term advantage to the global environment as well as to
the parties involved in such project”. 387
Making a strong case for the immediate extension of JI to developing countries, Parikh
states that waiting until after 2000 will be too late, because by then the gains made by
industrialized countries in reducing carbon emissions will be nullified at faster rate by
384
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385 Kamal Nath, “Statement to the Conference of the Parties to the Climate Change
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Concerns . 1995, page 261.
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aggregate emtssions from developing countries. » Focusing on the reduction of carbon
ennsstons through increased energy efficiency, she lists a series of ideal JI projects
including reducing oil imports through unproved energy efficient technologies; investment
in reducmg power supply system losses; consetvation of fossil fuel resources such as coal
and gas; reduction of methane emissions from gas flaring, leakages from coal mines, and
sewage and wastewater; and, the reduction of btomass burning through the development
of efficient cooking stoves.
While presenting a strong case for energy efficiency based JI projects, she argues
against JI projects for the enhancement of carbon sinks such as the preservation of existing
forests and afforestation, as such projects present considerable difficulties for the
calculation of credits. 389 In a paper presented at workshop on JI in Bermuda (January 9-
1 1, 1994) sponsored by the Woods Hole Research Center, Parikh writes that.
Joint implementation projects to reduce emissions form given activities by
increasing efficiencies should have priority over enhancing sinks because:
• there may be a problem of calculation of credits for sink projects.
• there are problems of uncertainty and asymmetric information related to
sink projects.
• there are no conflicts with development priorities.” 390
The distinction between JI as a means for energy efficiency versus JI as a vehicle to
enhance sinks was one highlighted by policy makers such as Minister Kamal Nath,
388
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Ambassador Sreenivasan and Antony De Sa dunng personal interviews. In a personal
interview. Ambassador Sreenivasan stated that a dominant segment of Indian policy
experts viewed JI as a good thing because it would bring in foreign investment but he also
noted that India should not allow JI ventures to be used for the creation or enhancement
of carbon sinks. 391
The issue of JI was formally considered by COP-1 delegates on April 30, 1995.
China and India appeared supportive of a pilot phase of JI as long as there would be no
accrual of credits to Annex I Parties. China argued that the provision of financial resources
for JI projects should not be counted as support for developing country Parties, while
India stated that JI should be voluntary, bilateral and directly related to national
development priorities. 392 Only Brazil remained consistently critical of developing country
participation in the JI pilot phase, noting in a submission to INC-1 1 its concern that
developed countries were engaged in diverting their commitments through a JI regime by
which international reductions ofGHG might be used to offset the non-attainment of
domestic targets. 393 At COP-1, the head of the Brazilian delegation strongly opposed the
extension of JI to non-Annex I Parties, adding that his delegation did not want to
391
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exchange '‘smoke for rices” »- a dear reference ,o moves by developed countries to push
for sink-based JI projects. Perhaps the only common position agreed to by all G-77 and
Chma members was the need to distmguish between joint initiatives and JI, highlighted in
the G-77 and China proposal under consideration by COP-1
After four days of informal discussions at COP-1, intense consultations on JI
began in the evening of April 4, 1995 under the coordination of M. El Ghaouth
(Mauritania) and continued until 6:30 am on April 5, 1995. Antony De Sa, the personal
secretary to Minister Kamal Nath has been credited with crafting the text and securing
consensus on what would be termed
-Activities Implemented Jointly (AI J) , which was
seen to be a more acceptable version of JI from a developing country perspective. 395
Arduous negotiations ensued on the issue of credits and the length and nature of activities
to be undertaken in the pilot phase. There were many divisions among the G-77 and China
with some Latin American countries, namely Costa Rica, Colombia and Chile eager for the
extension of JI to non-Annex I Parties, while African countries with the sole exception of
Mali, preferred to limit JI to Annex I Parties.
Delegates to COP-1 finally agreed that a new term AIJ be used rather than JI, to
imply that there was still no agreement on the criteria for JI and to distinguish between JI
which could take place between Annex I Parties and AIJ which could take place between
Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. It was decided that: a pilot phase for AIJ be established
which could entail the voluntary participation of non-Annex I Parties; AIJ should be
Carpenter, Chasek, Cherian and Wise, April 10, 1995, page 5.
39S
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compatible with, and supportive of, national environment and development priorities; the
financing of such activities would be additional to the financial obligations of Annex 1
Parties under the UNFCCC and current official development assistance (ODA) flows;
and, no credits would accrue to any Party as a result of reduction or sequestration ofGHG
emissions during the pilot phase. In addition, it was decided that the Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)
,
in coordination with the Subsidiary Body
for Implementation (SBI) would establish a framework for reporting to subsequent COPs
on possible global benefits, national unpacts, and any practical experience or technical
difficulties encountered in the pilot phase. Finally, it was agreed that a comprehensive
review and a conclusive decision on the pilot phase was to take place no later that “the
end of the present decade.” 396
De Sa s role in developing text on AIJ was subsequently recognized by the
UNFCCC Secretariat which selected De Sa to present the developing country perspective
at technical panel on AIJ held during the first meeting of the AGBM on August 29, 1995.
In his presentation, De Sa argued that from a developing country perspective, AIJ was not
merely a new nomenclature for JI but was something quite distinct from JI. He pointed out
that JI could take place between Annex I Parties, while AIJ needed to be approached more
cautiously. He concluded by stating that it was easier to say what AIJ should not include
namely that it should not permit credits, it should be supplemental to the objectives of the
UNFCCC, and it should be seen as a avenue for the fulfillment of current Annex I
396 United Nations, “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session:
Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its First Session (Part II),”
FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.l, (Decision 5/CP.l), June 6, 1995, page 19.
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commitments. ' Needless to say, all these factors were issues strongly advocated by the
Indian delegation and other developing countries at COP-
1
4 6 Developing Countries andjheinternational Climate Chan^
Negotiations: A Brief Revipw
Global climate change means different things to different countries. 398
International agreement on climate change is plagued by difficulties since the benefits from
such an agreement are not immediately perceivable or uniform and, international
discussions on such an agreement are easier when the parties involved are relatively equal;
and, when they have the same responsibility for, and similar resources with which to
respond to the problem. 399 As Ann Hawkins argues, contested struggles occur over the
social construction of global environmental issues such as, global climate change. She
states that these struggles are not just conceptual but are also material in that,
“••• the framing of environmental issues will have major implications for the
livelihoods and well-being of particular social groups, classes, regions and nations.
Consequently, not only does global climate change promise to have physical
impacts, but the outcomes of these struggles to define and construct’ the
parameters of global climate ehange-and thus the responses to it- will also lead to
real, material effects.” 400
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(continued...)
The idea .ha. policy actors in different „a.,ons perceive and construe, the global cl,male
change issue differently is central to this study. The trouble is that very little attention has
been patd to the process by which global environmental issues such as climate change have
been constructed in developing countries or to the process by which policy frames which
influence climate change policies translate into consensus or conflict in international
negotiations.
For Hawkins, struggles over construction of global environmental problems result
in three different ideal-type paradigms which are: the global managerialist emerging out
the globalization of the commons belief, and stressing expert/managerial intervention; the
redistributive development focusing on equity issues such as, developing countries’ calls
lor technological and financial assistance to encourage energy efficiency and conservation;
and, the new international sustainability order seeking socio-economic and environmental
sustainability which she dismisses as being utopian and impractical. 401
An examination of developing country policy stances at international climate
negotiations indicates that the first two paradigms described above are not necessarily in
contestation, while the third is deemed unrealistic by Hawkins. Although developing
countries contest the globalization of the commons belief, and hold developed countries
responsible for the spoiling of the commons, they are not at all averse to expert
400
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intervention, preferring that the clunate change-related intervent,ons of their national
experts be paid for by developed countries. Equ,ty and redistribution are of course critical
tssues in the negoriating platforms of developing countries, bu, developing countnes do
not negotiate as a monolith. In fact, serious differences exist among them on appropriate
climate change responses. One such division is between the AOSIS, who have forcefiilly
argued for stronger action using their status as the inadvertent victims of global climate
change, and OPEC countries, who see action to curb anthropogenic GHG emissions as a
threat to then oil exports. Another division exists between those countries who have
embraced bilateral mechanisms to address climate change (activities implemented jointly) -
Costa Rica, Chile, and now India and China, and others who remain suspicious of such
activities, namely, Brazil, many African countries and the AOSIS.
Developing countnes’ responses to climate change are further complicated by the
fact that the main contribution of developing nations to the greenhouse effect is as a result
of forest destruction and coal usage, which are heavily concentrated in a few countries. As
Durham points out, these so-called “Great Polluters” - Brazil, China, India and Indonesia
are.
“...in a position to try and balance demands made upon them by developed
countries with counter-proposals for their reduction ofC0
2 emissions....The fact
that among underdeveloped countries, the great polluters are those which might
benefit most from possible financial aid directed towards climate change control
and which also have a strong bargaining position, gave them a great weight in the
negotiations of the Climate Convention.” 402
402 Durham, 1994, page 69.
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Unfortunately, despite India’s role as a signifieant emitter of aggregate GHG
emissions, very little policy or political science related work has been conducted on India’s
responses to global climate change. Sheila Jasanoff’s work in this area is therefore
particularly noteworthy. Jasanoff argues that an examination of Indian environmental
politics reveals startling parallels with international global warming politics, in that both
within India and at the international level, similar conflicting views exist on the cause of
environmental degradation. For her. the conflict is between a moral paradigm attributing
environmental degradation to the consumption patterns of the rich, and an ecologically-
based paradigm focusing on overpopulation and unsustainable resource use. 405 She
argues that these “within-country dynamics of conflict” force a rethinking of conventional
accounts of the distribution of interests in international environmental
negotiations. According to Jasanoff, global environmental change “seemed custom-
made to test India’s alleged commitment to an alternative development path” - the so-
called middle ground between free market forces and state sponsored socialism. 405 But as
Chapter 3 demonstrates, global climate change has not tested India’s alleged commitment
to an alternative development path because India appears eager to embrace market in the
energy sector, even at the cost of environmental concerns. Moreover, India’s so-called
alternative development path under the aegis of planned development amounted to little
403
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more than the creation of envtronmen.al and energy bureaucracies whose fitnet.omng and
capabilities left much to be desired.
Although Jasanoff provides an mterestmg account of key societal actors' early
responses to global donate change, she is hard pressed to offer concrete examples of the
conflict between the paradigms. The views attributed to the CSE allocating responsibility
for the cause of global climate change to the consumption patterns of the North are widely
shared by national climate change policy makers as demonstrated by their policy
pronouncements at international climate change negotiations. Moreover these views have
not been contradicted by national groups representing the ecologically based paradigm,
because such groups simply do not exist or have not been heard from in the national
climate change policy debate. Jasanoff ‘s claim that India represents a test case for a
conflict between the moralist and ecologically-based paradigms responding to global
change problems cannot really be supported. By her own account, there is “striking
agreement” among Indian policy makers, scientists and NGO activists that the global
warming is a real threat and that emissions reduction on a global scale is the only viable
option. Consequently, she argues that Indian responses have focused on the issue of equity
and the allocation of responsibility. 406 Where then is the polarization of views? Discussing
the linkage between economics and the environment in the light of liberalization, she
notes the more uniform distribution of support for a “more market-sensitive approach to
406
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nvironmental regulation
. Jasanofl sees private sector involvement in environmental
issues as counterpoint to the moribund and corrupt public sector, but since the public
sector can hardly stake a claim to the ecological paradigm, the question of conflict
between the moralist and the ecologically based paradigms once again remains
unanswered.
From the perspective of this study, Jasanoff s point that energy conservation,
primarily as a vehicle for achieving greater energy efficiency, is a prominent issue in Indian
industry’s stated environmental objectives is a useful one. It ties in very well with the
claim that Indian policy makers influenced by energy sector liberalization, and interested in
augmenting power supplies, link global climate change to national energy related
perspectives and needs. But India is not unique in this response, as many developed
country Parties to the UNFCCC, including the US appear reluctant to adopt GHG
emissions limits and to push for national changes in energy consumption and production
patterns that such limits entail. 408 Indian policy stances at international negotiations cannot
therefore be seen as the outcome of an internal conflict between moralist and ecologically
based paradigms, because no such conflict exists at the national policy level
. Indian policy
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stances at the international climate negotiations include an emphasis on issues of equity,
such as a preference for action based on per capita rather than aggregate GHG emissions,
the right to fuel economic development through available domestic tiiel resources, and the
need for new and additional resources from developed countries to support developing
countries actions addressing climate change. Grubb, Brackley, Ledic, Mathur and others
writing on the role of national energy policies and the greenhouse effect in India offer
support for the study’s claim that national energy policies frame Indian policy stances on
global climate change,
“Global warming is a low priority issue-it is, in fact, an issue in India, only because
the international debate has potential implications for the Indian development
process. The consensus within the establishment in India is that many of the
options to be exercised to minimize global warming are desirable for India on other
grounds. ..There is also consensus that energy consumption cannot be decreased: in
fact, it will continue to increase well into the middle of the next century.” 409
The policy stances stressed by Indian policy makers at international climate negotiations
may be characterized as politically and economically expedient responses of a populous
state seeking rapid economic development, while simultaneously being confronted with
escalating energy demands, rising energy shortages and a UN Convention aimed at
curbing GHG emissions
4.7 Conclusion
An examination of the policy pronouncements made by India from 1991 onwards
at the international climate negotiations does not reveal any linkage with the
environmental policy frame constructed in Chapter 3. Indian climate change policy actors
109 Grubb, Brackley, Ledic, Mathur, Rayner, Russell and Tanabe, 1991, page 430.
218
have responded to the climate change issue both in their personal interviews and in their
public and written statements in terms of energy related development needs and not in
terms of national environmental concerns. Parikh and Gokam argue that the focus of
global climate change negotiations has been primarily on C02 and energy issues because,
C02 ,s the most important GHG” in terms of magnitude and radiative forcing, and
because C02 emissions which are increasing more rapidly than methane emissions, “can
be most reliably measured from national energy balances because they are directly related
to energy consumption and cement manufacturing.” 410
Issues such as industrialization and associated patterns of national energy
production and consumption, profiles of national energy sources, energy technologies and
energy efficiency and conservation measures lie at the heart of the contention over the
UNFCCC because they are issues which directly influence the extent to which emissions
from the most important GHG-C0
2 - may be increased or off set. There is no evidence to
support the claim that there is any alternative policy frame other than the energy related
development policy frame which drives India’s climate change actors to respond to the
global climate change problem. Policy makers from MOEF, MNES and diplomats from
the Ministry of External Affairs have turned to a select group of national policy experts for
policy advice. There is no evidence to indicate that policy makers have sought policy
advice from experts who advocate responding to the global climate change problem from
a strictly environmental or ecological perspective. The policy advice provided by experts
410
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Ike Dr. Parikh and Dr. Pachauri have focused primarily on the linkage between global
warming and national energy policy options and needs. MOEF and MNES officials have
actively solicited and been responsive to the views proffered by these two experts. In
addition, CSE’s focus on equity and on highlighting the differences in North-South energy
consumption patterns have found a receptive ear in Minister Kamal Nath. 411
Interviews with Indian policy experts and policy makers concerned with climate
change issues, conducted from 1994-1996, reveal that these policy actors tend to
characterize the climate change issue from an industrial development and energy related
perspective. Indian policy makers, such as Minister Kamal Nath have argued that the
central challenge with regard to global climate change was changing wasteful energy
consumption and production pattern. 412 India has taken a leadership role with the G-77
and China in coalescing developing country support for issues such as the need for:
stressing equity issues, new and additional funding to assist developing countries in
responding to climate change, and environmentally friendly, energy efficient, cost-
effective technology transfer to mitigate the adverse effects of climate change. India’s
election as a Vice Chair of the Bureau from INC-1 to COP-1, clearly indicates India’s
interest in maintaining an influential position in the climate negotiations. India’s ability to
41
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retain its Bureau seat for such a long period (1991-1995) reflects its role and position
within the overall negotiations.
Highlighting Indian policy positions taken at the INCs, a recent OECD publication
entlt,ed
’ £toe Change Policy Initiatives- 199S/1Q96Update, describes the climate
change related views of twenty countries and the energy policies undertaken by these
countries to mitigate climate change. Noting India’s active participation in the INC
process and the IPCC as a strong proponent of developing countries’ positions, the report
states.
The Indian delegation to the INC worked hard to have included in the
Convention factual statements such as, ‘the largest share of historical and current
global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated in developed countries, that
per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively low and that the
share of global emissions originating in developing countries will grow to meet
their social and development
needs”. 413
With regard to India’s response to climate change and its national emissions reduction
policies, the reports states that.
The more direct contribution to limiting growth in C02 emissions are expected to
be brought about by the Government’s energy efficiency and conservation
programmes and renewable energy programmes.” 414
In one sense the direct linkage between patterns of energy production and
consumption and GHG emissions is a critical factor explaining developing country
participation, in particular oil, importing developing countries with large domestic coal
413
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reserves, and oil-exporting developing countries. It is also one that cross-cuts the
individual national climate change policy stances of many of these countries, so that while
there may be perceptible differences among the policy stances of individual developing
countries, the shared concern is to ensure that international action to limit anthropogenic
GHG emissions does not limit or restrict their economic development.
In both the pre-UNCED and post-UNCED phase, a constant theme in Indian
policy stances at the rNCs and COP-1 has been to stress the issue of equity, mainly by
highlighting the discrepancy between the per capita GHG emissions from developing and
developed countries. Indian negotiators have at numerous international fora related to
climate change stressed that India and other developing countries’ right to fuel their
economic development must not be sacrificed for concern over global climate change.
Indian negotiators have been vigilant in ensuring that no new commitments are imposed
on their energy related development needs. In their quest for new mechanisms to ensure
energy efficient technology transfer, and augment national energy supplies, Indian policy
makers have altered their perspectives on AIJ and now view it beneficial for the following
national energy objectives: energy efficiency, energy conservation and substitution of
renewables for fossil fuels. 415
415
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CHAPTER 5
THE ROLE OF THE WORLD BANK AND THE GEF
5.1 Introduction
International organizations play a prominent role in international negotiations on
global environmental problems. Those engaged in studying the relationship between
international environmental negotiations on global climate change and international
organizations have focused on the structure, adaptability, and performance of
international organizations in implementing the provisions of the recent UNFCCC. 416
Less attention has been paid to the impacts of energy and environment projects of
international financial institutions on the formulation of national climate change policy
stances. Any study focusing on the relationship between Indian energy related
development objectives and national climate change policy stances has to account for the
role of multilateral financing in the national energy and environment sectors.
The objective of this chapter is to study the impacts of thermal, renewable energy
and climate change-related projects of two specific institutions - the World Bank and the
GEF- in India. There are several reasons for focusing on international institutional aid in
general, and on the World Bank and the GEF in particular. One, both conventional and
concessionary aid has been, and will increasingly be, used to address global climate
4I(
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change. 417 Two, in absolute terms, India is the World Bank's largest single borrower
with cumulative lending of around US $ 42 billion at the end of tiscal year 19%, and Bank
lending to the Indian energy sector accounted for the largest (30%) share of the total
national portfolio of US $ 2,078 million, while agriculture and trrigation accounted for
21%. 414 World Bank lending in the Indian energy sector has direct implications for Indian
climate change policies, given the connection between patterns of energy production and
consumption and CO, emissions. Three, the linkages between global warming and
international adjustment lending in the energy sector have not been adequately studied. 419
Four, the role of GEF, conceptualized and heralded as a precedent-setting binding
mechanism lor global environmental problems including climate change merits serious
attention. 420
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The chapter examines the impacts of the World Bank’s coal and power projects «'
and the GEF’s national climate change projects on the Indtan energy-envtronment policy
nexus. Though the World Bank is one of the three implementing agencies of the GEF, for
analytical purposes, it is useful to distinguish between its funding in the coal and power
sectors and GEF climate change projects. The chapter does not seek to extend the concept
of framing to characterize the impacts of these institutions on national climate change
policy making because the energy and climate change related projects of these institutions
do not result directly in the formulation of national climate change policies but instead
impact on the implementation of national energy and environment sector policies, which in
turn influence the formulation of national climate change policies. Although the Bank has
had a greater impact on the coal and power sector after liberalization, these two
institutions are not the source of the policy frames, they are funding sources of projects
which have climate change related policy implications. Indian responsiveness to these
institutions is not a result ot direct institutional influence, but is subject to the demands of
the Indian state’s energy related development policies and needs.
The chapter will not speculate on the nature of Bank involvement in the Indian
move towards economic liberalization nor will it focus on the process by which policy
makers in the Bank interact with national energy policy actors because the object of the
study is not the role of national or international energy policy actors or the framing of
421
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energy polices, but the role of previously identified nattonal climate change policy actors
and the framing of climate change policy stances. 422
The chapter advances the following claims. One, with the onset of liberalization,
the Bank’s decision to fond coal and power projects and push for sectoral reforms has
been welcomed by the Indian state eager for additional energy from domestic coal reserves
and alternative energy sources. Prior to 1991, the Indian power and coal sector were both
public sector ventures securely in the grips of centralized planning with no signs of
carrying out privatization, institutional and pricing reforms, all of which are hallmarks of
Bank s energy sector policy advice. But, through an examination of the Bank’s projects in
these sectors, the chapter demonstrates that the Bank has exerted much greater influence
on Indian energy sector policies under liberalization. Under the new liberalized policy
regime, the Indian energy sector has undergone a considerable transformation,
characterized by a higher degree of private sector investment in power sector and
increasing reforms in the coal sector, both of which are policies long advocated by the
Bank. But the impact of Bank’s projects on Indian energy sector policy is not
unidirectional, that is, from the institutions to the domestic policy arena but is
bidirectional. Certain energy sector policies and projects of the Bank fit in well with stated
Indian energy sector policies and objectives and have direct climate change implications
for India in terms of increasing or decreasing carbon dioxide emissions. The policy
4
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implications of the Bank’s mvolvement in India energy sector are serious, given dtreet
linkages between patterns of energy lending, energy use and carbon dioxide enussions.
Second, Indian clunate change pobcy actors have sough, to ensure that national
climate change-related projects proposed for GEF funding have reflect the national energy
related development policy frame rather than an environment policy frame. India has
sought to use the GEF as an appropriate funding mechanism for the submission and
application of marketable renewable energy technology and energy efficiency and
conservation projects which are economically viable and environmentally beneficial. Third,
the World Bank’s energy related projects and the GEF climate change projects have not
had any significant impact on Indian environmental sector policies.
It must be noted at the outset that research on the World Bank is difficult to
conduct because in spite of a stated commitment to ensuring transparency and increasing
public access, the Bank’s voluminous repository of internal documents are not available
for public citation or reference. The task of providing a comprehensive and through
examination of the environmental impacts of the Bank’s energy projects is severely
constrained by the limited number of Bank documents in the public domain. Not
surprisingly, very little detailed work has been conducted on this issue. Research on
India’s and developing countries role in the GEF is complicated by the fact that, unlike
the climate change negotiations, no external reporting on GEF meetings is allowed. GEF
pilot phase negotiations remained closed to external observers, including NGOs. Flowever,
227
smce the inceptton of the restructured GEF, selected NGO representat.ves, pnmarily from
developed countries, have attended GEF meetings. 423
First, the chapter briefly dtscusses the relevance of political science literature
dealing with international environmental institutions. Next, it discusses the key
institutional factors of the World Bank in general and focuses on the Bank’s fossil fuel and
renewable energy sector lending in India. Special attention is paid to the linkages between
the energy sector liberalization and the Bank fossil fuel and energy projects as well as the
climate change related implications of the Bank’s projects. This is followed by a discussion
on the evolution of the GEF as a multilateral environmental fonding institution, an
overview of developing countries’ responses to the GEF pilot phase, and an examination
ol GEF climate change projects to be undertaken or currently underway in India. The
chapter focuses on determining the extent to which national energy related objectives are
linked with the GEF’s focus on climate change by examining the GEF climate change
portfolio in India, and by conducting interviews with relevant policy actors.
5.2 International Environmental Financing Institutions: A Brief Review
Political science literature on international environmental institutions tends largely
to be derived from work focusing on international institutions as an appropriate
explanatory variable, determining conditions of international cooperation. 424 Proponents
423 Under the restructured GEF, the Secretariat has been paying for a few developing
country NGO representatives and Ravi Sharma of the CSE has attended GEF meetings
until 1996. TERI has an office in Washington D.C. and its members have been active in
preparing GEF project proposals for India, Sri Lanka and other S. Asian countries.
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of the study of international envtronmental institutions, argue that the degree of sueeess of
international environmental eoopera.ton is tnfluenced by the ehotee, design, strueture and
effectiveness of the relevant institutions. « But the overlap between international
environmental negotiations and the institutions that have emerged as consequence of these
negotiations, makes it difficult to conceptualize environmental institutions as strictly
explanatory variables determining international cooperation. Drawing heavily on Krasner’s
definition of international institutions, Bemauer offers a definition of international
environmental institutions as,
...sets of international regulations and organizations that were intentionally
established by preexisting actors (states) through explicit, legally or politically
binding, international agreements in order to regulate anthropogenic sources of
negative externalities affecting the natural environment.” 426
Bemauer argues that current research on international environmental institutions is
plagued by two types of weaknesses, confusion about the dependent variable and vague
424
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defirations of the explanatory variable-international institutions. 427 But though Bemauer
attempts to offer an alternative research strategy, namely the measurement of institutional
outcomes and effectiveness in terms of goal attainment, he does not provide any detailed
examples of international environmental institutions on which his research method is
based.
For the purpose of this study, it is important to note that the GEF may, as defined
by Bemauer, be classified as an international environmental institution but the World Bank
cannot because it is not governed by, or the output of, legally binding international
agreements regulating adverse anthropogenic impacts on the environment. A more
appropriate description of the two institutions is offered by Robert Keohane in his analysis
of the operation and effectiveness of “financial transfer institutions for the
environment”. 428 Keohane argues that it is not clear whether the GEF or the Montreal
Protocol Fund have systematically altered attitudes or governing coalitions in recipient
countries in ways that generate local concern”. 4-9 But clearly the impact of international
institutions on developing countries’ responses to global climate change is constrained
because policy makers in these countries argue that global climate change problem has
been caused by developed countries.
427 Bemauer, 1995, page 355.
428
Robert Keohane, “Analyzing the Effectiveness of International Environmental
Institutions,” in Robert Keohane and Marc Levy eds.. Institutions for Environmental Aid .
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996), page 5.
429
Keohane, 1996, page 10.
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Rather than viewing the GEF as the fountainhead for global climate change
policies in developing countries, it may be more useful to characterize the interaction
between such institutions and developing countries as bidirectional rather than a
unidirectional, that is from the institutions to the countries. This chapter demonstrates the
Indian state has been active in securing project funding for the GEF that satisfies in
national energy related development needs, in the areas of commercially viable
applications ot renewable energy and energy efficiency and conservation.
5.3 I he World Bank and the Energy- Environment Nexus
The World Bank is composed of five organizations: the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Development Association
(IDA); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA); and, the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes (IC1SD). The Bank is governed by a Board of Executive Directors, which
represents all members and decides on all Bank policies and practices.
Founded in 1944, the IBRD was established as one of the organizations to help
implement the Bretton Woods agreement and it is the World Bank’s main lending
organization. It lends to developing countries with relatively high per capita incomes for
development projects and charges an interest rate (calculated at market rate) which is
changed every six months on its loans. The IBRD is owned by its 179 member countries,
and each country has voting power based on their shareholding. The size of a country’s
shareholding is determined by the size of the country’s economy relative to the world
economy. The largest industrial countries (the Group of Seven) have about 45 percent ot
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the share of the Bank, with the US as the largest shareholder (17 pereent), having the
power to veto any change in the Bank's capital base and Articles of Agreement (85
pereent of shares are needed to effect these changes). In fiscal year 1995, the IBRD lent
$16,852 billion for a total of 134 projects. 430
The IDA was established in 1960 to provide assistance on concessional terms to
the poorest developing countries. IDA loans, ubiquitously known as “credits” are interest-
free to countries with annual per capita incomes of about $ 800 or less. IDA resources are
derived from contributions from governments, IBRD profits and repayments on earlier
IDA credits. IDA has 168 member countries each ofwhom must be members of IBRD
before joining the IDA. The IDA approved of $ 5.7 billion in credits for development
projects for the fiscal year 1995. 431 Since 1949, the IBRD has made 179 loans totaling
approximately US $18.9 billion and the IDA has extended 257 development credits
totaling US $22.5 billion as of July 1996. 432
Highlighting the importance of energy as a catalyst for economic development, and
the role of energy-related investments in the portfolios of even the poorest developing
countries, the World Bank notes that, “the efforts of development institutions in the
430 World Bank, “The World Bank: A Global Partnership for Development,”
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1996), page 1-2.Available on the Internet at
<http://www.worldbank.org/ html/extdr/glance/html>.
431 World Bank, 1996, page 2.
432 World Bank, “India: A Social Profile,” Washington D.C: World Bank
, 1997, page
4. This information is available on the Internet from the World Bank’s official information
site at<www.worldbank.org>.
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financing ot energy projects cannot be understated.” 433 While the Bank has long been
considered a major actor in the energy lending field, it has accorded greater importance to
monitoring the environmental impacts of its projects only since 1988. But, independent or
publically available research on the implementation of environmental screening in specific
sectors has not yet been earned out. One of the Bank’s earliest, and only publically
accessible, reviews of the environmental impacts of 1 19 of its energy projects approved
over a twelve year period, 1978- 1989, was prepared jointly by the Environment
Department and the Energy Development Division in March 1 990. 434
The most obvious link between the Bank s energy projects and environmental
issues has been the decision to subject energy projects to Environmental Assessments (
EAs ) from 1 989 onwards. Under this policy, full EAs and detailed mitigation plans are
required for all investment projects that are expected to have significant adverse
environmental effects- the so-called Category A projects, while less extensive
environmental analysis, are required for projects having less-severe impacts- Category B
projects. The Bank argues that there has been a broadening ofEA experience because
Category A projects comprised six sectors in fiscal 1 994 as compared to four sectors in
1991 . The sectors currently included in Category A are: energy and power, agriculture,
transport, urban, mining, solid waste management, industry, water and tourism, although.
433 World Bank, Recent World Bank Activities in Energy
.
(Washington D.C: World
Bank Energy Series Paper No. 7, 1989), page 1.
434 David Butcher, A Review of the Treatment of Environmental Aspects of Bank
Energy Projects: Power and Coal Mining
.
(Washington D.C. :World Bank Energy Series
Paper No. 24, March 1990).
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energy and power, agriculture and transport continue to remarn the donunan, sectors with
the most amount of project, « UnforUmately, the results of tmplemenring EAs has no,
been the focus of a comprehensive in-house review available for public reference.
The Bank claims that its borrowers have increasingly been making EAs a more
effective project planning tool. According to the Bank, a review of its EA experience has.
..found that most EAs have successfully identified and assessed impacts and that
tru igation, management and monitoring plans are now generally of higher qualitythan they were just two or three years ago.” 436
M
But no citation of an actual review is provided and independent confirmation of the
success of EAs is impossible. Interestingly, the Bank only briefly describes two examples
of so-called high-quality work in EAs- a road project in Yemen and an energy
development project m Ethiopia. 437 More importantly, although the Bank claims that its
experience in the use ofEA to improve project designs is growing, it still admits that.
Most EAs are still not an integral part of the project identification process but
relatively independent assessments that feed into the final stages of the project
design.” 438
are
What this means is that EAs have not really been used to improve project designs from
the very start, but instead are applied as pastiche to a nearly or already finalized project
design.
435 World Bank, Making Development Sustainable : The World Bank Group and the
Environment
.
(Washington D.C: World Bank, 1994), page 73.
436 World Bank, 1994, page 75.
437 World Bank, 1994, page 75.
438 World Bank, Making Development Sustainable . 1 994, page 76.
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Conducting EAs on energy projects is not the only area where energy and
envtronment are linked. The Bank asserts that it aettvely supports its member countries in
meeting their UNFCCC commitments by ensuring that Bank activities are consistent with
the UNFCCC’s objective. Table 5. 1 below outlines the Bank’s key operational policies
which are relevant to the UNFCCC.
Table 5.1: World Bank Policies related to the UNFCCC 439
OMS 2.36 on Environmental Aspects ofBank Work - The Bank will not finance activities
that contravene an international environmental agreement.
OP 10.04 on Economic Evaluation ofInvestment Operations - Global Externalities are
identified in sector analysis or environmental assessment work and enter into project
economic analysis and selection when payments are made to the project under an
international agreement, or the project involves GEF financing; otherwise global
externalities are fully assessed (to the extent tools are available) and are taken into account in
project design and selection.
OD 4.01 on Environmental Assessment and Environmental Sourcebook - Global
environmental externalities are to be identified and evaluated as part of the environmental
assessment (EA) process.
Procedurefor Environmental Review ofIFC Projects - IFC encourages project sponsors to
consider global environmental issues in project environmental analyzes where relevant and
feasible.
BP 2.11 on Country Assistance Strategies - Global environmental issues and the role of the
GEF are discussed when appropriate, in World Bank Country Assistance Strategy
documents.
In addition, existing Bank policies on, the electric power sector
,
energy, forestry and GEF
investment operations promote actions consistent with the Climate Change Convention.
434 World Bank, The World Bank and the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change
.
(Washington D.C: Environment Department: Discussion Paper No. 008, March
1995), page 3.
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Despite this official commttment towards ensuring that Bank activ.ties do not negatively
impact on the UNFCCC's objectives, the Bank is quick to recognize the difficulty of
defining policies and investments consistent with the Convention. A Bank publication
focusing on the Bank and the UNFCCC argues that “the Convention is clear that the
continued growth of energy and use of fossil fuels in developing countries is quite
consistent with the Convention”. « According to the logic of the Bank, support for
conventional fossil fuel energy projects in developing countries does not intrinsically
contravene the objectives of the Convention because the Convention explicitly recognizes
the need for these countries to fuel their economic development using conventional energy
(GHG emitting) sources.
Cuban points out that the Bank financed large superthermal stations in India until
the nationalization of coal mines in 1973. 441 The Bank has recently been active in funding
coal sector projects in India, despite the growing IPCC driven scientific agreement that
burning coal is a major contributor to global warming. In an article on the Bank’s lending
for the expansion of 25 Indian coal mines, Pratap Chatteijee cites a Bank official who
organized an 1996 industry
-government roundtable on “clean coaP’as saying,
“It’s true that there is no such thing as clean coal. But coal is not going to go
away, so we want to make it less damaging by doing the right thing.” 442
440 World Bank, The World Bank and the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change . March 1995, page 4.
441
S. Guhan. The World Bank’s Lending in S. Asia
.
(Washington D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1991), page 25-27.
442
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Chatterjee notes that the Bank's financing of the coal sector in India has been criticized by
the District Action Group ( a group of 21 NGOs in Orissa) and the Institute for Policy
Studies (Washington D.C.) on the basis that the Bank's plan to make a $500 million loan
to India in January 1997 to increase production at 25 coal mines would push production
levels in the country from 78.6 million to 104.6 million tons a year and would have senous
negative environmental impacts. 443 Here, the Bank's push towards funding energy
efficiency in coal mines and coal-fired plants fits in well with the stated Indian policy
preference for increasing reliance on domestic coal while ensuring energy efficiency.
Similarly, as discussed in Chapter 4, Munasinghe’s (the former head of the Bank’s
Environment Department) point that technology and capital transfers from the industrial
countries are essential for enabling developing countries to contribute towards the
protection of the global commons, is identical to the argument made by Indian policy
makers at international climate change negotiations. 444
The World Bank’s funding of coal fired electricity plants is supportive of the
Indian’s state desire to reduce the gap between power supplies and power demand while
reducing oil dependence on oil imports. Investing in energy projects in developing
countries is a very important for the Bank. As Dennis Anderson, a Senior Bank Adviser
notes, developing countries will soon be the world’s largest markets for energy, but given
442
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the threat of global warming, developing countries will need to reduce pollution while
increasing then energy use. « The World Bank estimates that the demand for electric,ty
in developing countries will grow at an average annual rate of 6.7 percent in the 1990s
with the As,a region's requirements composing “almost two-thirds of the total, with coal
and hydro being the two primary sources”, both of which have specific environmental
problems associated with their use. 446
Although one-third of the world’s population is deprived access to electricity and
developing countries use only 500 kWh of electricity per capita annually compared to
more than 10,000 KWh in the USA, Munasinghe, argues that electricity is a particularly
important form of energy in the context of the developing world. 447 He points out that
the rapid growth in energy demand in developing countries has surpassed the growth in
energy production thereby creating shortages in primary fuels and electricity. Munasinghe
states that the generation of electricity is one of the world’s major environmentally
activities since electricity generation alone produces more than 25 percent of
energy related carbon dioxide emissions and since half of all increases in energy related
carbon dioxide emissions for the past twenty years are from electricity. He points out that
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despite the emergence of alternative energy sources, the largest segment of new electricity
in the world is projected to come from coal-fired plants for the next several decades. 448
The global warming implications of generating additional electricity in countries
like India and China where coal usage predominates are serious, and recognized as such,
by the Environment Department of the World Bank. Yet, the Bank’s promotion of coal
based energy lending in India puts it at odds with the sustainable energy stances advocated
by its Environment Department. Perhaps one of the best examples of the Bank’s split
personality with regard to fossil fuel energy development and concern over global climate
change, is evidenced by its approval of funding for coal fired plants in India, while also
seeking for billions of dollars of funding for the GEF to combat global warming, loss of
biodiversity, and the pollution of international waters.
In June 1993, the Bank’s board of directors approved the first of a series of new
loans to India to finance a doubling of India’s coal fired electricity generating capacity
which the US based NGO-EDF, argued would be the single largest new source ofGHG
emissions on the planet-adding 23 percent to India’s carbon emissions (1989 figures) and
4 percent to the global carbon emission total. 449 In September 1993, government
representatives met at a meeting convened by the Bank in Washington D.C. to agree on
the funding of the GEF beyond its pilot phase. The Bank contends that financing coal-fired
power plants does not contradict its stated policy position of not financing projects that
448
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449
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contravene UNFCCC, gtven the Convent,on’s recognition that developing countries GHG
emissions will eontinue to grow. Local NGO groups such as the District Act,on Group (a
group ofNGOs in the heavily industrialized Talcher-Angul region of Orissa) opposed to
the expansion of coal-tired plants argue that the results of pushing for coal-fired electricity
plants is antithetical to the UNFCCC’s ultimate objective-the reduction of anthropogenic
GHG emissions.
The Bank’s stated priority in support of the Convention, is to assist developing
countries to meet their energy demands by emphasizing the three following focal areas:
energy efficiency gains, application of renewable energy technologies, and mainstreaming
ot global environmental concerns. In order to facilitate energy efficiency in developing
countries, the Bank reports that,
“Macroeconomic and structural reforms are a centerpiece of Bank advice to many
of its client countries and will contribute to a large fraction of future carbon
savings.”. 450
Some of the macroeconomic reforms suggested by the Bank include the elimination of
energy subsidies which are seen to add to the potential for global warming and absorb a
significant portion of GDP. 451 A World Bank study estimating that a removal of fossil
fuel subsidies would reduce global carbon emissions by almost 7%, and in some countries
by more than 20%, assuming no change in world fuel prices is cited as evidence by the
450 World Bank, The World Bank and the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change . 1995, page 7.
451
Bjorn Larsen and Anwar Shah, World fossil fuel subsidies and global carbon
emissions
.
(Washington D.C.: World Bank Report No. WPS 1315, June 1992).
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Bank for its policy preference towards the phasing out of energy subsidies. 4S! Citing a
joint UNDP and World Bank study of the Chinese Environmental Protection Agency
enti,led
’ China: Issues and Options in GHC. Fmissions Controf inoa wWch discusses ,he
impacts of economic structural reform on future GHG emissions, the Bank argues in favor
of reforming macroeconomic policies on the grounds that macroeconomic reform can
“have a larger impact on GHG emissions than any explicit mitigation option at the project
level”. 453
In addition to focusing on energy efficiency, the Bank has recently begun to devote
some attention to renewable energy technologies such as windfarms, solar thermal
conversion, photovoltaic cells and biomass-based applications in developing countries.
Bank studies done by Anderson and Ahmed discuss the need to shift towards renewable
energy and improve energy efficiency measures in order to fulfil the obligations of the
Convention. 454 The World Bank’s Solar Initiative is an example of the Bank’s effort in
working with a new troika of partners - developing countries, the energy industry and
NGOs - towards the commercialization of renewable energy applications using direct
solar, wind and biomass energy resources. The Initiative which is actively being sponsored
452 Bjorn Larsen, World fossil fuel subsidies and global carbon emissions in a model
with interfuel substitution
.
(Washington D.C: World Bank Report No WPS 1315, June
1994).
453 World Bank, The World Bank and the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change . 1995, page 8.
454 Denis Anderson and Kulsum Ahmed, “Where We Stand with Renewable Energy,”
Finance and Development
. June 1993, and Denis Anderson and Kulsum Ahmed, The Case
for Solar Energy Investment
.
(Washington D.C: World Bank Technical Paper No. 279,
February 1995).
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Ui India has two main objectives: the preparation and financing of commercial and near
commercial applications, and the facilitation of international research, development and
demonstration. 455
According to the Bank, evidence of its focus on renewable energy are its GEF
related projects in support of renewable energy. 456 The Bank states that these GEF
renewable energy projects may be classified according to three different objectives: 1)
technology development, demonstration and transfer; 2) market development; and, 3)
institutional reform. To this end. World Bank/GEF projects are viewed not only as a
testing ground for technologies but also the first demonstration of their market
applications on a commercial basis. The idea that World Bank/GEF projects would serve
as a vehicle for technology transfer and function as pilot demonstrations of appropriate
market-oriented renewable technologies also ties in neatly with the Indian MNES’
commitment to shifting from Research and Development programmes to market-oriented
renewable energy technologies and programmes. As discussed in Chapter 3, official
MNES reports cite the World Bank and TERI as the sources advocating renewable energy
sector reform. Highlighting the importance of new and renewable energy sources at the
1995 India Power Congress, Minister Krishna Kumar of the MNES stated that,
“The thrust of the our Government during the last two years has been on market
orientation and commercialization of viable renewable energy technologies, and we
455 World Bank, The World Bank and the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change . 1995, page 11.
456
For the evolution of the Bank’s involvement in the GEF see the discussion on GEF
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The conflation of World Bank and Indian priorities with regard to renewable
energy technologies is also reflected in the fact that two key World Bank/GEF projects in
India are in the market development and institutional reform sectors. These are: the Wind
Energy project which supports the Government's efforts to provide financing for private
renewable energy ventures, and the Regulatory Framework project which provides
concessional financing for photovoltaics to offset kerosene subsidies and also support the
sale of power from renewable sources to the power grid. 458
The third focal area of Bank support for the UNFCCC’s objectives is the main
streaming of global environmental concerns. Since 1994, the Bank has provided support
to countries seeking to incorporate global environmental factors into the regular economic
and sector work program of the Bank and for the strategic planning of environmental
management through the development of National Environmental Action Plans. 459 In this
regard, the Bank notes that,
‘‘Renewable energy technologies are featured prominently in the environment
action plan and industrialization strategy of India, to name an important client.” 460
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for India
India borrows a little over a billion dollars a year from the Bank. Unlike other
developing countries borrowers, India is not among the list of the most heavily indebted
nations because it has to date paid back its loans. - At a recent press conference in New
Delhi, the President of the Bank, Mr. James D. Wolfensohn assured Indian policy makers
that India’s share of assistance from the IDA would be maintained at the present level
despite the halving of donor contributions for the current year, but he cautioned that it was
“crucial that the developing world recognizes that the IDA is not a charity.” 462 During
his week long visit to India, in October 1996, Mr Wolfensohn is cited as saying.
The objective is not to run the country. The objective is to put things in a
framework to put us in a condition to finance...” 463
The Bank s role in advocating a liberalized policy regime or framework, on the grounds
that the adoption ol a liberalized economic framework would enable India to access Bank
financing, is an indication of the Bank s attempt to influence the direction of the economic
reforms undertaken by India since 1991.
The Bank’s advocacy of energy sector reform had fallen on deaf ears during the
1980s. But with energy sector liberalization, the Bank’s policy advice has found a more
461
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244
receptive audience. As Chapter 3 potnted out, only about 20, 000 MW out of the
proposed 30,000 MW is expected to be added at the end ofthe Eight Plan period (1997).
Desperate to secure utvestment for its power sector and tncrease electricity generation, the
Indian Government has pushed for the privattzation and reform of its energy sector. Ami
Malhotra, a prominent World Bank Energy Advisor for South Asia, states that the
increased role of Bank in energy sector lending is the result ofthe Bank’s shift in focus
from a funding individual projects to a more sector oriented approach since 1987.
Describing the new focus of energy lending, he points out that,
“Sectoral projects are ftrnded in the context of dialogue and each project allows
the government to further the process of change. A succession of projects allow
lor a senes of policy changes. Lending is a process of policy reform. Simply giving
a loan is not enough, the loan is effective only if there is a change in policy.... Bank
analysis led to a clear anticipation of a problem that there was a lack of domestic
funds for additional power projects. This contributed to the whole issue of bringing
the private sector in.” 464
Manoranjana Gupta notes that the Bank’s new sectoral approach in three of its major
recipient sectors in India-power, coal and water- “is being seen in official circles as a move
towards establishing a complete stranglehold in these areas.” 465
The Bank’s response to the Indian experiment in power sector reform is one
indication of its overall influence in pushing the Indian state towards broadening and
strengthening its sectoral reforms. On August 28, 1996, the Bank’s Country Director for
India, Heinz Vergin delivered a scathing attack on the lack of progress in power sector
464
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World Bank, Washington D.C, July 19, 1995.
465
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reforms warmng that private investors might pull or stay out as a consequence. Choosing
the term "state of disease” instead of “state of health” to characterize the Indian power
sector, Vergin said.
7-T1 °.
f U
l “V
he Bank have a very bleak view
-we are becoming very impatientwith the lack of progress in the area of power sector reforms.” 466
Smce 1993-1994, the Bank has assisted developing countries like India in
cultivating and developing the requisite investment environment and mechanisms for
the development of private power generation projects, through the preparation of
guidelines entitled, “Submission and Evaluation of Proposals for Private Power
Generation Projects m Developing Countries” These guidelines assist developing countries
in preparing mechanisms and procedures for the solicitation and evaluation of
internationally competitive proposals for private power development, including how to
prepare bidding documents and how to undertake effective technical and commercial
evaluation of bids. 467
Two key cases of Bank assistance in the Indian power sector highlight the Bank’s
influential role in India energy sector. The first involves the Bank’s financing of Orissa’s
reforms in power sector policy and institutional framework. These reforms are being
undertaken with the assistance of the World Bank and have been highlighted by the Bank
as an example tor future power prospects. The Bank cites power sector reforms in Orissa
466 Chidanand Rajghatta, “World Bank’s brief for investors in power sector,” The
Indian Express . August 29, 1996.
467 World Bank, Submission and Evaluation of Proposals for Private Power Generation
Projects in Developing Countries
.
(Washington D.C.: World Bank Industry and Energy
Department Paper No. 2, April 1994).
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as laudable, especially since the performance of the Orissa State Electricity Board’s has
been the poorest among SEBs, with current power shortages estimated at about 40
percent of peak demand. 461 In November 1993, with World Bank support, the Orissa SEB
and the Government of Orissa agreed to comprehensive power sector reforms including
the introduction of private sector participation in power distribution, generation and
transmission, the establishment of a power regulatory agency, competitive bidding for new
power generation and electricity tariff reforms at bulk power, transmission and retail
levels. The Programme envisages the elimination of power cuts and supply restrictions in
1998 through the utilization of Orissa’s vast coal and hydro resources and is heralded by
the Bank as a relevant model for other states interested in the power sector reform such as
Uttar Pradesh and Haryana. 469
The second case where the Indian Government has sought World Bank
involvement is in the provision of guarantees for private power investors who are reluctant
to provide mvestment without the security of a fail-back option. Responding to a request
by the Government, the Bank is developing a program for the use of its guarantees in
support of private power investments and the proposed Bank scheme is the only
alternative to the Government’s offer of counter-guarantees against potential losses due to
sectoral inefficiencies. According to the criteria being developed, states could be declared
eligible for Bank guarantees if: (1) both the SEB and the state government are considered
4<lX World Bank, Economic Devel pments in India: Achievements and Challenges .
(Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1995), page 64.
464 World Bank, Economic Developments in India. 1995, page 63-64.
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credu worthy; (2) the SEB and the State Government are in poor financia. standmg, then
the State needs to have started to implement meamngfiil power sector reforms; and, (3)
the project which a Bank guarantee could support is contracted with a creditworthy
distribution company in a state with a history of sound sectoral and regulatory policies. ™
In addition, the Finance Ministry is finalizing a policy to allow World Bank financing
(loans with a 20-25 year maturity ) of private sector, infrastructure related projects.
Explaining the motive behind the policy the Union Finance Minister said
,
“ World Bank g>ving 25-year money. That is an advantage to the country
and to the corporates (sic).” 471
J
The Indian Government has also sought World Bank assistance in the institutional
reform of the coal sector. Despite the Bank’s policy emphasis on the importance of
energy sector reform, institutional reform in the highly protected Indian coal sector was
not earned out in the 1980s. The Indian government was not receptive to the Bank’s
suggestions that the national coal holding company
-Coal India Limited (CIL)- be
abolished and that coal pricing be market driven. Only after the 1991 macroeconomic
reform did the Indian Government’s decide to allow limited privatization (captive mines
for private sector power plants) and undertake some sectoral reform. These reforms
included the tightening of the financial management and a restructuring of CIL.
The Indian move towards liberalization has greatly increased the leverage exerted
by the Bank in the coal sector. In 1992, CIL. requested Bank assistance in its restructuring
470 World Bank, Economic Developments in India. 1995, page 90.
471
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efforts and it was agreed that the most effect,ve way for the Bank to “assist" the company
would be to contribute to the draftmg of a reform program for the eommerctaliza.ion of
coal industry through the Coal Sector Rehabrlitation Project. Aeeordtng to a Bank news
release the Rehabilitation Project was designed in response to CIL’s request for an IBRD
loan of US $ 530 million which would support.
the government’s on-gomg market-oriented coal sector reforms and to provide
financial and technical support to Coal India Ltd., one of the world's largest coal
companies and suppber of 90 percent of Indian’s coal. Improving the health of
India s coal sector is vital to Indian industry and to continued economic
growth.” 472
A separate but linked Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project was
approved in May 1996 and financed by an IDA credit ofUS 63 million. According to the
Bank, this project is a package of high-priority environmental and social mitigation
programs designed to help CIL strengthen its capacity to alleviate negative environmental
and social problems that arise from mining. 473
As stated previously, the Bank’s funding of coal fired power plants reinforces
India s policy preference for using domestic coal reserves to fuel economic development.
But these Bank funded thermal energy projects also have the serious climate change policy
implications for India because their carbon dioxide emissions. In May 1996, the Bank’s
board of directors approved of a 350 million dollar loan to restructure the Orissa’s power
472 World Bank, “World Bank satisfied with progress on India’s Coal Sector
Environmental and Social Mitigation Project”, Washington D.C, World Bank, News
Release No. 97/ 1389/SAS. Available on the Internet at
<htttp://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/ 1 389 .html>.
473 World Bank, News Release NO. 97/1389/SAS, page 1. Available on the Internet at
<http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/extme/1389.html>.
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sector and also voted in favor offending to the CIL to expand 25 coal mines in India
despite major opposition by local groups and international activists. Pratap Chatterjee
cites a spokesman for the Bank's South Asia Department as saying,
“In general there is no getting away from coal being mined in India and used for
p wer generation, given that coal, with reserves of about 250 years, is the least
cost source ot energy for most uses in the country... So the question is to use theresource most efficiently and with the least negative impacts.” 474
Chatterjee reports however that one of CIL’s own consultants pointed out that World
Bank mining activities had wreaked havoc in the lives of communities which had
previously survived on subsistence economy but had now been pushed to a life of
perpetual hunger and misery. 475
An international group sharply critical of the Bank’s investment in Orissa is the
Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies, claims that the Bank’s approval of loans to
Orissa s coal mining and power sectors will help transform the state into one of the
world’s most polluted regions. The Institute notes that although the Bank is financing only
power restructuring and distribution, it plans to replicate this model of unsustainable
development in at least four other Indian states and,
...it is indirectly facilitating the continued poisoning and impoverishment of
Orissa’s poorest people.” 476
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In its report entitled. “The World Bank Juggernaut: The Coal Fired Industnal
Colonization of India's State of Orissa”, the Institute notes that expanse of power from
2. 400 to 1 9, 000 MW over the next ten years will produce at least four percent of the
world's increase in man-made, global wamung carbon emtssions from this stngle Indian
state. It also potnts out that the displacement of over 7, 500 Onssans to make way for coal
mine expansion projeets and the displacement of an additional 35, 000 Orissans to make
way for new coal-power consuming steel nulls will result in the largest coal-nune related
displacement in India. 477
In spite of these arguments, the Indian Government appears eager to embrace the
coal sector reform program advocated by the Bank. In a desperate bid to augment
conventional power supplies and improve energy efficiency gains, the Indian government
has moved fast in implementing the privatization of its conventional power and renewable
energy sectors-policies that the Bank has long been pushing for. Some features of the
politics of power sector reform were discussed in Chapter 3. National environmental
sector policies such as environmental impacts assessments and clearances for thermal and
hydro projects have been reduced in an attempt to further the Indian power and coal
sector reforms. In addition, the highest ranking MOEF bureaucrat has pointed out the
increased burden of providing environmental clearances for projects within 120 days,
given the large numbers of industrial projects coming up for clearances under
477
Institute for Policy Studies, 1996, page 2.
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liberalization. « With the except.cn of the Enron case, which arose primarily within the
context of Centre-State pohtica, wranghng over the financing of the project, the current
United Front Government has pushed through the other private power projects such as the
Cogentrix project with haste.
An examination of specific coal and power projects funded by the Bank, shows the
dovetailing of the objectives of the Indian state and the World Bank in the power, coal
sectors. The World Bank cannot simply be understood as forcing the issues of energy
sector privatization and institutional reform particularly since Indian energy policy makers
can hardly be characterized as unwilling to engage in energy sector reform and
privatization. What is important to note is that policies such as energy sector privatization
and institutional reform which have long been associated with the Bank, as well as the
Bank’s funding of coal and power sector reform projects, have found a receptive policy
environment in India. International environmental and policy groups such as the Institute
for Policy Studies have targeted the World Bank for financing unsustainable energy
projects but have not expanded their analysis to include the role of the Indian state in its
ardent quest for additional energy supplies. While the Bank' s influence in energy sector
reform is undeniable, the Indian Government can hardly claim to have been the victim of
the Bank’s arm twisting.
478
Personal Interview with Dr. N. Krishnan, Environment Secretary, MOEF, New
Delhi, April 28, 1995. See also Chapter 3.
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The Creation of th<> f.FF 479
The genesis of the GEF may be traced to a recommendation made by the
Brundtland Report that, “serious cons,derat,on should be given to the development of a
special international banking program or facihty linked to the World Bank.” « Financing
of the GEF was the result of a .989 suggestion by France that the World Bank seriously
consider the issue of environmental Omdmg and “enhance the normal resources of the
International Development Association ” «' In a statement to the Bank’s Board of
Directors in 1989, the French Finance Minister stated that France was ready to provide
900 million francs over three years for environmental financing. 482 Peter Sand notes that
the French and German proposals at a 1989 World Bank meeting “triggered the first
serious diplomatic negotiations” and resulted in a series of intergovernmental and
interagency meetings culminating in the Paris meeting (November 27-28, 1990) which
established the mandate and structure of the proposed GEF for a three year pilot phase. 483
The author worked intermittently on climate change related projects in Latin
America, the Caribbean, Africa and Asia for GEF/UNDP at New York from July 1994-
February 1 997. For additional information see Helen Sjoberg, From Idea to Reality: The
Creation of the Global Environmental Facility (Washington D.C.: Global Environment
Facility, 1994).
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In October 1991, tripartite procedural agreements among UNDP, UNEP and the
Bank formally established the GEF and specified the responsib,Ut,es of the three
implementing agenc.es. The responsibihty for the chairmanship of the GEF was entrusted
to the World Bank. Funded at one bilhon SDR. the GEF pUot phase ran from 199]
-1994.
The GEF’s mandate was to focus on the global commons problems in four focal areas:
protection of biodiversity, reduction of global warmmg, protect.on of international waters,
and reduction of the depletion of the ozone layer. The funds aUocated were additional to
regular development assistance, and prov.ded as unt.ed grants or on highly concess.onal
terms to countries with a per capita GNP under US $ 4.000 in 1989, on the condition that
they have a UNDP program. 41,4 Thfrty participating governments pledged contributions
amounting to S 820 milhon for the pilot phase with additional co-financing amounting to
over $ 380 milhon. The GEF phot phase portfolio on global warmmg consisted of 42
projects totaling $ 281.3 million and represented 40 percent of total funding. 486
5.5 Developing Coun tries and the GEF Pilot Phase: An Overview of Indian
Responses
In the pre-UNCED phase, India had been actively promoting the issue of “new and
additional funding” which would be provided on a grant or concessional basis for global
4X4
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4X5 Global Environment Facility, Semi-Annual Report on the Pilot Phase
.
(Washington
D.C.: GEF. 1995), page 1 1 and 33.
4X6 Global Environment Facility, Independent Evaluation of the Pilot Phase . 1994, page
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environmental problems. As early as 1987, Ind,an diplomats including Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandh,. were calltng for the provision of additional tunds. and the transfer of
technology, to ensure env.ronmental protect,on in developing countries. « In October
1989, the Indian representative to the Second Committee of the UNGA highlighted the
proposal made by Prime Minister Gandhi, at the Belgrade Summ,t ofNon-Aligned
Nations in September 1989, regarding the establishment of a UN Planet Protection Fund,
to be used to develop or purchase environmentally sound technologies for the benefit of
both developing and developed countries. With an average contribution of one-thousandth
ofone per cent of annual GDP, the Fund envisaged the mobilization ofUS $ 1 8 billion a
year. Noting that developed countries had the major responsibility for taking corrective
action on global environmental problems, the representative said that the imposition of,
...regulatory mechanisms on developing countries without due regard for their
needs must be replaced by equitable and supportive measures, enabling them to
protect the environment without compromising their development objectives and
priorities. The transfer of financial resources and environmentally sound
technologies on preferential and concessional terms is therefore essential”. 488
At UNCED, developed countries pushed for the adoption of the GEF as a possible
mechanism for the funding of the Climate Change and Biodiversity Conventions, arguing
against the creation of any new institutional funding mechanisms. Even though the GEF in
its pilot phase included a reference to additionality, as discussed in Chapter 5, India, like
The source for this information is a review ofUNGA records cross-referenced for
India’s statements on the environment, conducted by the author at the UN Library in New
York.
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many developing countries was critical of the GEF’s mandate and structure and was
reluctant to constder the GEF as a permanent fimdtng mechanism. India had many
reservations on the implementation of the GEF viewing the absence of widespread
participation in its operat.ons with considerable suspicion. « Fairman argues that at
UNCED. both developing and developed country blocs threatened to abandon the GEF if
certain conditions were not met. For developmg countnes, the essential conditton was a
restructured GEF which would give them greater decision-making power, and the funding
of sustainable development activities through the GEF. Developed countries meanwhile
insisted that they retain authority over the GEF pohcy making, that the GEF’s mandate
focus only on four global commons problems. According to Fairman. it was the lack of
movement on the part of the blocs that forced a compromise at UNCED. 490 The final
agreement at UNCED was to include the GEF as an interim financial mechanism on the
condition that it be restructured so as to ensure “new and additional financing” ensure the
disbursement of funds “without introducing new forms of conditionality” and,
Ensure a governance that is transparent and democratic in nature, including in
terms ot decision-making and operations, by guaranteeing a balanced and equitable
representation of the interests of developing countries and giving due weight to the
funding efforts of donor countries.” 491
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The GEF pilot phase was also subjected to an independent evaluation which
uncovered numerous problems. In December 1992, GEF participants requested an
independent evaluation of the pUot phase to be completed in time for then meeting a year
later. « The independent evaluation was part of the restructuring process which had been
initiated prior to the 1992 Rio Conference, ™ in response to the criticisms of the GEF
pilot phase issued by environmental NCOS and developtng countries. The independent
evaluation raises several issues relevant to the discussion on developing country
perspectives on the GEF. Analyzing replies to its questionnaires, the evaluation notes,
“On the whole, developing countries appear less concerned than developed
countries about the global environment, defined as deteriorating by the GEF,
because they view this deterioration as largely the result of the richer countries’
exploitation of the global commons.” 494
Noting that the rationale for the selection of the four focal areas is “obscure in origin” and
may be traced back to the Bank and a few developed countries’ interests in
internationalizing certain environmental problems, the evaluation echoes the point made
m Chapter 4, that developing countries have “resisted the notion that resources lying
within their boundaries should be viewed as global”. 495
492
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Analyzing the relat.onship between the GEF pilot phase and developtng countnes.
m particular the mterfaee between national prionties and global environmental concerns,
the independent evaluation found that governmental agenctes responsible for
environmental issues were tnadequately informed about the GEF, reflecting the fact that
governments were betng represented at GEF negotiations by their ministries of Fmance
and Treasury rather than Environment. « Although this sort of representation is true also
of the developed countries for more obvious reasons, it has not inhibited Indian
participation in securing GEF funding.
Interviews with Indian environmental policy makers reveal an early awareness of
the ramifications ofGEF funding. 497 As the GEF’s climate change portfolio in India
indicates both the MOEF and the MNES were fully informed of GEF’s funding
capabilities. In addition, climate change experts from TERI and IGIDR have been directly
responsible in designing and implementing GEF’s climate change projects in India.
Moreover, rather than pushing for pilot phase contributions solely from donor countries,
certain large developing countries, like China, India and Zimbabwe supported the principle
that developing countries should make a contribution to the GEF’s core funds, arguing
that a contribution from all participants would encourage partnership and remove old
Global Environment Facility, 1994, page 87. Donors such as the US and France are
represented on the GEF Council by their Finance and Treasury Department officials for
more obvious reasons.
497
Personal Interviews with MOEF and MNES officials conducted in 1995. For list of
official interviewed see Table 1.1 in Chapter 1.
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distinctions between donors and reciptem, « Mukul Sanwal has argued that this reflects
the Indian state’s destre to hnk global Chnate change concerns with seeuring energy
efficiency and conservatton measures and renewable energy technolog.es available through
the GEF. 499
Indian participation in the GEF restructuring was spearheaded by the Finance and
not the Environment Ministry. Mr. N.K. Singh currently the Secretary of the Finance
Ministry led the Indian delegation during GEF pilot phase negotiations, while in the
restructured GEF, India is represented by its Executive Director at the World Bank. Bimal
Jalan. India’s Executive Director at the Bank until 1996, is currently, the Member
Secretary of the Planning Commission and is the highest ranking bureaucrat associated
with linking economic liberalization and planning for the Ninth Five Year Plan. The fact
that India s Executive Director of the World Bank also represents India at the GEF
negotiations creates a neat conflation between the projects and policies solicited by India
in the Bank and in the GEF. This dual representation translates into India taking a much
less critical view of the Bank’s dominance within the overall GEF, than some other
developing countries and environmental NGOs.
One distinctive feature of the GEF pilot phase was the intent to make the GEF
serve global environmental objectives rather than national ones, by limiting its financing to
activities that could demonstrate global benefits. This GEF emphasis gave rise to the
498
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concept of “incremental costs." The concept ofdefending the tncrementa, costs of
projects is umque to the GEF. but provtng parficularly difficult to resolve. wha, ts the
constdered to be the most authoritative exphcation of the concept of incremental costs.
Ken King of the World Bank, states that not only is the concept a “difficult one” but
analysis of such costs are difficult and “numerical results are often unreliable”. »
Although the concepts of incremental costs and incremental benefits are relatively well-
defined in cost-benefit analysts, the problem starts when such concepts are linked to global
environmental problems. At a very basic level, the concept relies on a distinction between
a baseline cost (calculated for each project) against which increments (benefits and risks)
are to be defined and an alternative cost calculated. But in its application to global
environmental problems, the very concept of “the incremental cost remains an estimate
which cannot be verified”. *» Unfortunately King provides vety brief examples of
environmental protection incurring net incremental costs in each of the four focal areas.
With regard to climate change, the example cited is as follows,
“Countries that use more expensive substitutes for fossil fuels, practice energy
conservation to a greater extent than economically justified, forego some economic
development, or sequester carbon in otherwise unwanted reforestation, are
incurring incremental costs for actions that slow global warming or reduce the
damage that it is likely to cause. The GEF, as the interim operating entity of the
financial mechanism for the FCCC, finances this type of incremental cost in
developing countries”. 502
00 Ken King, The Incremental Co sts of Global Environmental Benefits; (Washington
D.C.: Global Environment Facility Paper No. 5, 1993), page 1.
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The trouble is that given a very limned pool of resourees and the stated difficulty
in calculating the incremental costs associated with particular projects, the exercise of
selecting projects based on so-called incremental costs nms tnto the very real danger of
becoming a subjeettve one pitting one project against another. As the Evaluate of the
Ptlot phase notes that the application of mcrementa. costs in the four focal areas was no,
only complicated to estimate bu, varied across each of the focal areas. The Evaluation
found the GEF's emphasts on financmg mcremental costs to be a "serious weakness” in its
policy framework. 503
Interestingly, both developed and developing countries found the concept
satisfactory. The donors liked the concept because it focused on global rather than
national dimens,ons and the reciptents liked it because they felt that wha, was being
financed was additional to their domestic interests. 504 One example of India’s, and in
particular TERI’s
, involvement in GEF policy issues was the initiation of the Program for
Measuring Incremental Costs for the Environment (PRJNCE) in February 1993 at a
workshop held at TERI. New Delhi. A series of papers applymg the concept of
mcremental costs was published under the aegis of PRINCE. 505 In a seminal piece
Global Environment Facility, Independent Evaluation of the Pilot Phase 1994
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analyzing the workmg of the GEF as an institution for envtronnrenta, aid, Fatnnan notes
that the wide variety of projeet types and the pressure to speed up projeet proposals led to
great variation in the use of incremental cost criterion. He writes.
In the vast majority of project proposals, the agencies used the criterion as aheuristic justification, not as a rigorous tool for decision analysis.” 506
5 6
Portfolio in Inrtia
The restructuring conditions formulated at Rio served as the mandate for a series
of seven intergovernmental meetings amongst countries participating in the GEF, and
culminated in the establishment of a new “instrument” for the restructured GEF. 507
According to Fairman, “political interests” and “a process of institutional learning”,
combined in the GEF restructuring process to produce changes in the GEF’s governance
and administrative structure. 508 The GEF restructuring process had two specific
objectives: 1 ) to correct some of the problems experienced in the pilot phase and 2) to
define an appropriate relationship between the GEF and the UNFCCC and the CBD. In
addition to the problems of a lack of transparency in the GEF project cycle, and limited
developing country participation in the GEF pilot phase, the implementing agencies were
also criticized for emphasizing speed over project quality, and for instituting a complicated
505
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project cycle. 5W Influent,al US environmental NGOs such as the Environment Defense
Fund, also criticized the linkage ofGEF projects to environmentally questionable World
Bank loans and argued for a restructuring process that would ensure that GEF projects
not serve as a cover-up or “green window dressing" for business
-as-usual
environmentally destructive projects. 510
By instituting a defined project cycle and formulating operattonal strategies in the
four focal areas ofGEF fiinding, notable progress was made in achieving the first
objective. However, the second objective remains unfulfilled as the GEF remains the
interim rather than the permanent financial mechanism for the UNFCCC. Developing
countries, including India have resisted attempts made by developed countries to ensure
that the GEF become the permanent financial mechanism for the UNFCCC preferring to
stipulate after two climate change COPs that the GEF only serve as an interim financial
mechanism.
In March 1994, representatives of 73 states accepted the Instrument for the
Establishment of a Restructured Global Environment Facility
,
and shortly thereafter all
three implementing agencies formally adopted the same. 5 1
1
The process of restructuring
Darnel Esty and Jamison Koehler, “Restructuring the Global Environment Facility,”
(Washington D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1993), page 3. Postion paper
collected by author.
510 Environment Defense Fund, “G-7 Nations need to pursue restructuring ofGEF
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the GEF, along with a US $ 2 billion replenishment of the GEF binding base-now known
as the GEF Trust Fund, brought to the pilot phase to an end. The present opera,tona,
Phase, GEF 1 is scheduled to continue through 1997 with the firs, replenishment tncetmg
for the second phase of the GEF held on May 2, 1997 in Waslungton D.C.
Twenty six countnes, including eight developing countries have contributed to the
GEF Trust Fund tncludmg Braztl (SDR 4 million), Ctuna (SDR 4 million), Egypt (SDR 4
million) and India (SDR 6 million). 512 In US dollar terms, India has contributed $ 8.4
mtllion, compared to Brazil, China, Korea, Mextco. Portugal, and New Zealand, each of
whom have contributed $ 5.6 million. Based on statements made in favor ofGEF
financing by MNES officials, the significant Indian contribution to the GEF can be
interpreted as an indicator of the Indian State’s interest in leveraging additional GEF (finds
for energy efficiency, energy conservation and renewable energy related climate change
projects. 513
Discussing India’s role in the GEF in an interview with an Indian news magazine,
^-Qntline
-
Mohammed El Ashry, the Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the GEF
stated that India had “taken a loud role in the restructuring the GEF”. 514 In a
513 Global Environment Facility, 1994, Annex C-Attachment 1, page 26.
513
Personal Interviews with MNES officials, Mr. Prabhakara, Secretary, MNES, (New
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personal interview. El-Ashry elaborated on the nature of.ndian participation in the GEF
negotiations,
•dndia realized that it could help shape the negotiations, see benefits for its enemysector which has the potential for tremendous growth and also help fuel Indian
T
fr
heyr Indlan de,egation) tod th- *"* “
ffieffimre^-
opportuntfies for alternative energy development for
When questioned about the programmes pushed for by India in the GEF, El Ashry notes
that India, like China, has demonstrated a keen interest in seeking gains from energy
efficiency and other programmes which are of'“ immediate benefit to the national
population and have immediate political returns”. 5,6 El-Ashry's point that India has been
interested in securing GEF funding for climate change projects that fit in with national
objectives and have energy efficiency and energy conservation gains supports the claim
that Indian participation in the GEF is directly influenced or framed by national energy-
related development needs. Highlighting, India's ability to secure GEF funding, El-Ashry
states that out of the GEF’ present budget of $ 2 billion, $ 300 million has been allotted
to India, which “has the potential of getting another $40 -60 million.” 517
From the perspective of developing countries, the restructured GEF is a great
improvement. The restructured GEF consists of both an Assembly consisting of
representatives of all GEF participants and the GEF Council. Unlike the participant’s
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assembly which oversaw the GEF operations in the pilot phase, the restructured GEF is
governed by a Council composed of 32 members (and an equal number of alternate
members), half ofwhom are from developing countries. The Council represents
constituency groupings made up of countries from a particular regton or sharing particular
concerns. Unless a constituency decides otherwise, each Council member and each
alternate semes for a penod of three years. The stated intention of having multi-country
constituency groups was to ensure “balanced and equitable representation” on the
Council, but the G-7 countries still have individual representatives.
Since the onset of the restructured GEF, India has retained its position as principal
council member representing Bangladesh (alternate), Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka. The
Council meets semi-annually or as frequently as necessary and two-thirds of the members
of the Council constitute a quorum. The Council has also been allocated a great deal of
responsibility over GEF policy and project selection. It reviews the GEF’s operations;
momtors and evaluates GEF policies, programs, strategies and projects; reviews the
GEF’s work program; directs the utilization ofGEF funds; approves and periodically
reviews the operational modalities of the Facility including strategies and directives for
project selection, preparation and execution; acts as a focal point in the GEF’s relations
with the COPs of the UNFCCC and CBD; appoints the CEO, oversees the work of the
Secretariat; and, approves the GEF’s administrative budget. 518
518
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The broad responsibilities allocated to the GEF Council, in conjunction with its
"principles of decision-making" distinguish governance and participation in the
restructured GEF from the informal governance structure and limited developing
participation in the GEF pilot phase. According to the Instrument,
“Decisions of the Assembly and the Council shall be taken by consensus. In the
case of the Council if, in the consideration of any matter of substance, all
practicable efforts by the Council and its Chairperson have been made and no
consensus appears attainable, any member of the Council may require a formal
vote.
The GEF s consensus-based governance arrangements do not set it apart from the
UNGA’s extensive use of consensus but do set it apart from both the standard Bretton
Woods voting procedures-contribution weighted votes- and the UN General Assembly
voting procedure-one nation, one vote. However, decisions requiring a formal vote by the
Council are to be taken by a double weighted majority, that is
,
an affirmative vote
“representing both a 60 percent majority of the total number of participants and a 60
percent majority of the total contributions. 520 Essentially this amounts to a marriage
between the Bretton Woods and the UN voting procedures, as contributors votes get
counted in two ways but developing countries get one-country one vote representation.
However, voting power is weighted according to contributions and hence not all
s|l>
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contributors are equal with large contributors as i to i„ ^c mriou US, Japan, Germany and France wielding
greater power than other contributors. 521
The operations of the restructured GEF are elucidated in the GEF Operational
Strategy published m February 1996 which notes that GEF operations will be programmed
in three interrelated categories: operational programs, enabling activities (national
communications from developing countries to the UNFCCC), and short-term response
measures.
522 The three initial operational programs for climate change which have been
proposed by the GEF are: removmg barriers to energy conservation and efficiency for
example, the application and implementation of least-economic cost, commercially
established energy efficient technologies; promoting the adoption of commercial or near
commercial renewable energy and reducing implementation costs of such technologies;
and reducing the long-term costs of low GHG emitting energy technologies. Within the
GEF, the submission of requests for project financing and the development of project
proposals is nationally driven. The first two operational programs are consistent with
India’s post- 1991 national energy policies such as, an increased policy commitment to
secure additional energy supplies through alternative energy sources, a marked policy shift
towards the application of commercially established renewable energy technologies rather
than decentralized, rural applications based on national research and development efforts,
and a policy shift towards reducing energy losses and ensuring energy efficiency. Table 5.2
provides information on current GEF climate change projects in India.
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1 able 5.2 GEF Climate Change Projects in India ™
Project Name &
Implementing
Agency
GEF
Phase
Executing
Agency
Entry
into
Work
Prog.
GEF
allo-
cation
($ mill.)
Project Description & Status
Alternate Energy
Project
(WORLD BANK)
Pilot
Phase
Indian
Renewable
Energy
Development
Agency
(IREDA)
12/91 $ 26.00 ( ommercialized investment in wind
forms and solar photovoltaic power
systems through below-market loans
mainly to private investors.
Windfarm capacity totaling 3 1 MW
has been financed.
Optimizing
Development of
Small Hydel
Resources in Hilly
Regions
(UNDP)
Pilot
Phase
Ministry of
Environment
and Forests
12/91 7.50 Project to assist in the optimal
utilization of small hydroelectric
resources in the Himalayan region
through the establishment of 20
commercially viable demo, projects.
Project has leveraged an additional
in cash contribution of $ 7 million
from the Government.
Cost-Effective
Options for
Limiting GHG
Emissions
(UNDP)
Pilot
Phase
Indira Gandhi
Institute for
Development
Research.
5/93 1.50 Project to assist in assessing
investment projects and related
policy options for limiting GHG
emissions.
Project still not implemented. 524
Development of
High Rate
Biomethanation
Processes as Means
of Reducing GHG
emissions
Pilot
Phase
Ministry of
Non-
Conventional
Energy Sources
5/92 5.50 Project develops master plan for
generation and utilization of
biocnergy, creates commercially
viable packages for replication, and
disseminates technology for high-
rate biomethanation.
Solar Thermal
Electric
GEF 1 Rajasthan State
Electricity
Board
4/96 49.00 Project to finance incremental costs
of construction and operation of a
grid connected 140 MW solar
thermal fossil fuel hybrid power
plant in Rajasthan. Project to
demonstrate the viability of solar
trough technology and to stimulate
expansion of solar-thermal
technology worldwide. World Bank
Board approval expected 4/97.
s
' Global Environment Facility, Quarterly Operation Report
.
(Washington D.C: Global
Environment Facility, November 1996), page 51, 103-104. The Report identifies the Small
Hydel Resources in Hilly Regions project as a particularly successful one.
4
According to UNDP/GEF the project document has still not been finalized by
IGIDR as of March 1997.
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As Table 5.2 reveals, onlv one oflndiaV rcr • * •y 01 I a s GEF projects is not directly connected to
national energy sector poltcie, Thts is the UNDP/GEF pilot phase project approprta.ely
entitled “Cos,
-Effective Opttons for Linnting GHG Emtssions”. It was scheduled to be
executed by IG1DR ,992 bu, still remains on the drawtng board. Given the close
institutional linkages between the IGIDR, (designated as project's lead executmg agency
by MOEF), and the MOEF. the
.action on the project is not jus, a testanten, to the lack
of national political interest in the issue. I, also indicates that- if only by default- that
energy related development objectives and not environmentally related ones influence the
selection and implementation ofGEF climate change projects in India.
It is important to point out India has not so far sought any GEF funding for the
preparation of national communications required of all Parties to the UNFCCC. Under
Article 1 2. 1 of the UNFCCC, India is committed to reporting national climate change
related information, including a national inventory ofGHG emissions by sources and
removals by sinks, a general description of steps taken to implement the Convention, and
any other information it considers relevant to the implementation of the Convention’s
objective. Indian diplomatic activity at the international climate negotiations
notwithstanding, and in marked contrast to China and Brazil, the Indian state has not
sought for funding for the submission ot its national communications either from the GEF
or from the US Country Studies Program ( a US initiative funding the preparation of
national communications in over 50 developing countries). One obvious reason for the
lack of Indian interest in securing external funding for its national communications is that
it has preferred to maintain control over the reporting of its national GHG emissions
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required in the national communications, perhaps because of the
emissions data.
controversy over methane
Interestingly, the climate change projects proposed by the Indian government in
the GEF pipeline indicate a slight shm in orientation of Indian climate change policies.
Nandita Mongia, an Indian climate change expert, and the Deputy Director of
UNDP/GEF’s Regional Bureau for Asia, says that there has been a slight change in the
MNES's and MOEF's outlook towards the GEF. Mongia notes that at earlier GEF
presentations to Inter-Ministerial meetings organized by the Planning Commission, policy
makers argued that India did not need a mitigation strategy or mitigation related projects
because developing countries were not responsible for the global climate change problem.
In contrast, she notes that at the same Inter-Ministerial group’s April 1996 GEF
workshop, the list of viable climate change project proposals selected for submission to
the GEF included the capture and utilization of coal-bed methane, 526 energy efficiency
improvement, improved performance of agriculture feeder level pumps, and off-grid
power distribution. 527 It is however, useful to note that all the projects in the GEF pipeline
contmue to conform with the previously stated Indian energy related development policy
objectives.
- 5
Personal Interview with Nandita Mongia, Deputy Director, Regional Bureau for
Asia, UNDP/GEF, New York, April 2, 1997.
526 The project proposal was approved by the GEF in June 1997 and now requires the
GEF Council endorsement before i' can be translated into a project document specifying
the project’s activities and work plan.
527
Interview with Nandita Mongia, New York, April 2, 1997.
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5. 7 Conclusion
The World Bank has since 1988 added environmental cons.derat.ons to its
traditional energy lendmg programs. The Bank has consistently advocated domestic
energy sector liberalization, and pushed for institutional and price sector reforms in the
coal industry. Yet prior to the 1991 move towards econonnc liberalization, the Indian
state resisted all attempts at price and institutional reform in its coal and power sectors.
The Indian state's move towards a liberalized policy regime and the shift towards seeing
private fmancng as an integral part of reducing the country’s endemic and growing power
shortages, has led to its increased willingness to embrace both coal and power sector
privatization and to its offer incentives to the private sector to secure investment in
marketable sources of renewable energy and in commercially viable renewable energy
technologies. The Bank’s advocacy of institutional and pricing reforms in the energy
sector did not have a significant impact on the Indian energy sector under centralized
planning, but with the onset ot liberalization, the Bank’s influence in promoting Indian
energy sector reform has increased. An examination of the Bank’s coal and power sector
projects indicates that so far these projects have not had any demonstrable impact on
national environment policies with regard to global climate change.
The World Bank s funding of coal, power and renewable energy projects have
been welcomed by the Indian state because the energy sector policies advocated by the
Bank are identical to, and supportive of the Indian state’s policy objectives in the coal,
power and renewable energy sector. The Bank’s argument that financing coal fired
electricity plants in developing countries in no way contravenes the objective of the
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UNFCCC because the Convention accepts that GHG emissions from these countries will
need to rise as they develop reinforces the Indtan state's claim of the right to fuel its
economic development using domestic coal reserves. The Bank's emphasis on funding
coal-fired electnci.y plants and its wtllingness to fund energy efficiency and conservation
project in these coal-fired power plants means that the Bank's funding policies tie in well
with the stated Indian interest in securing additional electricity capacity from coal-fired
power plants. Neither the Indian state nor the World Bank bemoans the increase in carbon
dioxide emissions that result from an increased reliance on coal-fired electricity as a
principal source of commercial energy, because both Indian policy makers and Bank
documents have argued that such increases are sanctioned under the UNFCCC.
Meanwhile, the CIL's solicitation of Bank funding for sectoral reforms which would make
the coal industry commercially viable and financially self-sustaining indicates that the
Bank’s energy sector reform policies are being heeded by the Indian coal industry under a
newly liberalized policy regime.
Unlike the Bank, the GEF is focused on four global environmental concerns. But
in implementing its agenda the GEF has encountered numerous political and policy related
obstacles, not the least of which has been developing countries’ reluctance to accept the
GEF as the permanent financial mechanism for the UNFCCC and the CBD. India was
active in the GEF restructuring negotiations and sought to include greater transparency,
greater institutional accountability, and wider participation in the GEF. Indian
representation at the restructured GEF has been more tempered and less critical of the
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Bank’s dom,nance the GEF. primarily because, it is represented on the GEF Council by
Us Executive Dtrector to the World Bank and no, MOEF cl,mate change poUey makers.
Both TERI and IG1DR have played a role in preparing climate change related
projects for India. TERI has played an active role in the evolution and policy application
of concept of incremental costs and several TERI experts have been instrumental in
preparing energy-related climate change projects for the GEF. IGIDR was designated as
the lead executing agency for a project on outlining cost-effective options to limit GHG
emissions which was to be implemented in the GEF pilot phase. Almost five years later,
the project document remains undone, indicating a lack of interest in investigating options
that are not beneficial from an energy-related perspective.
Although the GEF has not proved to be a funding mechanism compatible with
Indian insistence on the need for new and additional sources of funding, and the transfer
and dissemination of economically viable and environmentally sound energy technologies,
the GEF has been a source of binding for Indian energy related (efficiency, conservation
and alternative) climate change projects. The GEF has given Indian policy makers an
opportunity to secure funding for certain national energy related development policies
such as the increased commitment towards energy efficiency and conservation measures,
the marked policy shifr towards application of commercially viable renewable energy
technologies and the increased desire to secure additional energy supplies from alternative
sources of energy. As the GEF climate change portfolio in India demonstrates, Indian
policy makers have been selective in submitting climate change project proposals to the
GEF. So far, the bulk of GEF climate change related funding in India goes to those
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projects that tie in with national energy related development policies rather than those with
stnctly environmental objectives and the objectives of two GEF operational programs for
climate change, namely, the removal of barriers to energy efficiency and conservation,
and the adoption of leas,
-cost, economteally v,able renewable energy technolog.es are
reflected in the previously stated national energy policy frame.
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CHAPTER 6
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
6
-' A_Brief Overview of the Study’- Princinal Finrfi-p,
In the policy arena of many develops countries, particularly large, populous and
poor ones like India, energy-related economic development objectives and needs do not
compete with national concerns over global climate change. Instead, these development
.
change. It can be argued that energy related development needs also frame national
climate change policy stances in many developed countries as well. For example, the
Australian Prime Minister recently stated that Australia would withdraw from the
UNFCCC, rather than accept GHG reduction targets that could damage Australia’s
economy. The basis for Australia’s reluctance to adopt any GHG emissions limits, he
argued, was that reducing GHG emissions by 10% below 1990 levels by 2020 would cost
each Australian about $ 7,000. 528
Why is Australia so reluctant to accept GHG reduction targets under the
UNFCCC? Australia is the world’s largest exporter of hard coal, and as the most recent
UN energy statistics indicate, Australia exports as much as 128,405 thousand metric tons
out of a world total of 428,900 thousand metric tons in 1993 529
,
that is approximately
30% of the world’s total coal exports. While electricity generated from coal-fired plants is
528 Lunn Greenlees, “Australia may withdraw from pact,” Svdnev Australian. May 6
1997.
529 United Nations Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy
Analysis, Energy Statistics Yearbook: 1993
.
(New York: United Nations, 1995), page 124
and page 132.
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b,g business, but carbon dioxide emissions from coal-fired plants arc also the leading cause
of the global cltmate change. Clearly, the Australian response to ongotng international
climate change negotiations is predicated on its role as the world’s principal exporters of
hard coal, and Australian response to the internal,onal negotiations on a possible protocol
limiting GHG emissions is much less influenced by national concern over preserving the
global commons.
The central claim advanced in the study was that national energy related
development policies directly influence and provide the contextual impetus for Indian
environmental policy making. The 1991 shift in Indian development strategy towards
phased economic liberalization had a more definite policy impact in the national energy
sector than in the national environment sector. These policy changes in coal, power,
renewable energy sectors combined with growing shortages of overall energy supply and
an increasing gap between anticipated and actual capacity additions in the power sector
constitute the dominant policy frame driving Indian climate change policy stances. The
principal finding of this study is that Indian energy related development objectives and
needs have framed not only the formulation of Indian policy stances at international
climate negotiations but also India’ role in international environmental financing
institutions and the kinds of climate-change related projects, proposed for international
institutional funding.
Indian policy actors, both policy makers and policy experts see an inextricable
linkage between international negotiations limiting GHG emissions, and a range of
critically important activities such as patterns and modes of energy use, securing the
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transfer oftechnolog.es that promote energy efficiency, consecution. and the
commercialization of renewable energy. Indian policy actors respond to the global climate
change problem because they see it as directly linked to national energy related
development objectives and needs, and not out of a concern for preserving the global
commons.
The result of interviews with both policy makers and policy experts reveal that
both groups share a particular frame- an energy related one- which is used to bind the
terms of policy discourse (issue identification and responses) on climate change.
Consequently, both policy experts and policy makers respond to the global climate change
issue from the perspective of this energy “frame”. The sharing of this energy related frame
rather than a strictly environmental one influences the construction of Indian policy
responses at international climate fora. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, Indian policy makers
do not conceive of the global climate change problem as a global commons problems,
even though the bulk of the literature on international climate change negotiations tends to
equate the lack of international agreement on global climate change with a collective
action failure characteristic of global commons problems. Indian negotiators have sought
to ensure that no limits be imposed on India’s right to fuel economic development, and to
call for new and additional funding and appropriate energy-related technologies which
would assist in climate mitigation activities.
An in-depth examination of the national policy framework in the energy and
environment sectors under centralized planning from 1 970s onwards, undertaken in
Chapter 2, revealed that the Indian energy sector was plagued with public sector
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mefficiency and big gaps between antie.pated and actual add.tions to generating capacity,
and that India was among the earliest develops countries to mstitut.onalize and legislate
environmental concerns. Desp.te the creation of envtronmental legislate and the
trapptng of an envtronmental bureaucracy however, the actual implementa.ton and
monitoring of environmental problems at the state and local level left much to be desired.
An analysis of consecutive plans also revealed several constant characteristics of the
Indian energy sector including a strong desire to reduce dependence on oil unports. an
emphasis on the use of domestic coal reserves, endemic power shortages, power sector
inefficiencies due to losses in transmission and distribution and mismanagement, and an
early interest in decentralized and rural applications of alternative energy technologies.
With the onset of liberalization in 1991, India has been hungry for additional
energy production capacity to fiirther industrial development and economic growth, and
has been desperate to attract private investments in the national power sector. Energy
sector liberalization has resulted in the creation of many new policies such as, the speedy
implementation ofpower sector privatization, the need for the rapid establishment of
thermal power plants, the streamlining and reduction of environmental clearances and
environmental impact assessments, the inception of policies to wash and reduce the fly-ash
content of Indian coal India, and an increased commitment towards commercially viable
renewable energy technologies. All of these policies have implications for the global
climate change issue because they contribute to either increasing overall carbon emissions
or to off setting or limiting carbon emissions.
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The 1991 shift towards energy sector liberalization rested on a policy recognition
that the Public sector would not be able to raise sufficient resources to meet the national
demand for power. Consequently, Indtan policy makers have looked towards increased
privatization of the power sector and renewable energy sector. Energy sector liberalization
has had a dramatte impact on the sector as whole, and particularly on the coal-fired power
and renewable energy sectors. Certatn policy changes instituted as a consequence of
liberalization have implications for increasing aggregate Indian GHG emissions while other
have implications for reducing aggregate national GHG emissions. Some characteristic
features of the Indian energy sector under a liberalized policy regime are an endemic and
growing gap between power supply and demand, desperate bids to attract private
investment in the power sector, and an active interest in the application of marketable
renewable energy technologies. It is these energy sector policies and needs and not
national environmental policies which directly influence the formulation of Indian policy
stances at international climate change negotiations.
One feature of Indian energy policy that has serious implications for increasing
aggregate national carbon dioxide emissions is the renewed desire to use coal-fired
electricity as a principal source of commercial energy. The growing gap between energy
supplies and energy demand has provided an added impetus to expand production of
domestic coal and to increase national power supplies through capacity additions to coal-
fired plants. Since liberalization, India has searched more actively for ways to reduce oil
imports, while the national policy preference of relying on domestic coal reserves and
thermal energy has only become more marked. But the Indian state’s desperation to
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secure capacity additions in the power sector has no, been restricted to coal-fired
electricity and the state as a direct consequence of energy sector liberalization, has moved
rapidly to promote commereial applications of alternative energy technologies. Energy
sector liberalization has been charactenzed by rapid privattzatton, and the active
solicitation of foreign dtrect investment tn both the power and renewable energy sectors.
One of the most interesting findings of the study was the importance allocated to
market applications of renewable energy under liberalization. This is particularly relevant
given that alternative energy technologies allow for a reduction of fossil fuel related GHG
emissions. In this regard, it is important to note that India's wind energy program which
had a target of installing 500 MW has installed 730 MW of which 517 MW are in the
private sector and expects to reach a final capacity of 1 ,200 MW by the end of the Eighth
Plan. 5,0 As noted in Chapter 3, India is currently the second largest wind producer in the
world after the US and will soon have one of the world’s largest solar photovoltaic
programmes. Given the achievements in the renewable energy sector, the MNES has
decided to introduce a renewable energy legislation in the Parliament and is currently
working on formulating a national renewable energy policy. Clearly, additional
opportunities for energy efficiency, energy conservation and for market applications of
renewable energy technologies exist in India and in many other developing countries.
However, the shift away from decentralized, rural applications of renewable energy to the
commercialization of renewable energy sponsored under the new liberalized policy regime
530 Government of India Press Information Bureau Releases, “ 000 MW of Grid Quality
Power from Renewables”, August 16, 1996. The information is available on the Internet at
<http://www.nic.in/India-Image/PIB/PIBR 1 60896.html>.
281
does bode well for efforts to ensure that rural poor have equitable
services and systems. But here, the unfortunate and
that for the Indian state, the
access to energy
unacceptable truth may very well be
provision of equitable access to energy services to the rural
poor is simply not as much of a priority as is the
industrial areas.
provision of power for urban and
International negotiations on global chma.e change reveal new sources of North-
South political and economic tensions. As the international debate on globtd climate
change "heats up", one view posited is that "future global climate change has been a low
priority for most developing countries." »' But, the active participation of large
developing countries like Bra.il, China and India in international chmate change
negotiations is testimony to the fact that many developing countries know that they have a
considerable stake in the future outcomes of these negotiations. India has been active in
ensuring that the UNFCCC include principles and norms allocating responsibility for the
global climate change problem to those who have the largest share of historical and
current global emissions ofGHGs- the developed countries. Indian negotiators have also
pushed for the UNFCCC to acknowledge that per capita emissions from developing
countries is still low and that the share of global GHG emissions originating from
developing countrres will need to grow to meet their economic and social development
needs.
Ann Hawkins, Contested Ground: International Environmentalism and Global
Climate Change," in Lipschutz and Conca, eds., The State and Social Power in r.Lk,i
Environmental Politics . 1993, page 233.
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The specific climate change policy stances promoted by India, a, international
negotiating fora reflect Indian policy actors' intentions to ensure that no international
commitments be imposed on large developing countries which might curtail India's effort
to fuel increased economic development. Indian policy actors have also used the
international cltma,e change negotiating fora to seek access to additional energy sector
investments and economtcally viable energy technologies. The desire to augment energy
supplies, bring in energy efficiency and conservation measures and commercialize
renewable energy frames Indian policy stances a, international climate change negotiations
and influences the kinds of projects proposed by India for international institutions
binding in the energy-environment sector. Indian policy makers have insisted on
developing countries' right to fuel their economic development using domestic energy
sources and have pushed for the transfer of economically viable and environmentally
sound energy technologies on a cost free basis. They have also been strong proponents of
the need for new and additional fimding from developed countries to fund climate change
related mitigation activities in developing countries.
Looking at the Indian policy process, this study found that national policy experts
from CSE, TERI and IGIDR have fixed the range of national climate change policy
options by effectively capturing the climate change policy domain and the ear of relevant
policy makers. Expert advice from these organizations has been, and continues to be,
solicited by MOEF and MNES officials in the area of policy and project analysis. MOEF
officials have convened periodic meetings with these policy experts prior to the INCs and
the COPs to formulate relevant and appropriate policy stances to be adopted at upcoming
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international meettngs.
,n addition, policy experts from TER, and 1G1DR have been acfive
in preparing project proposals for GEF funding.
ter. Continues to play an aettve role in setting the parameters for national donate
change policy stances. Drawtng on the Indian initiative at COP-
1 , where Indian
nego.ta.ors secured developtng country support for the A0S1S protocol, climate change
experts a. TERI have been ae.tve in prepartng text to be included in the ongoing
international climate change negotiations on a protocol. In January 1997, TERI supported
by the MOEF, convened a workshop in New Delhi and invited relevant international
climate change experts and policy makers to dtscuss the issue of a climate change
protocol. Meanwhile, Dr. Parikh of 1GIDR, (after completing her work as an IPCC lead
convening author in 1 995), has been nomtnated by the Indtan government to serve on the
Scientific and Technical Assessment Panel of the GEF which evaluate criteria and projects
to be funded under the GEF.
Examining the relationship between energy and climate change-related policies
and projects advocated by the World Bank and the GEF, and Indian climate change policy
apparatus, the study finds that the Bank has had a greater influence in shaping Indian
energy policy under the new liberalized policy regime. With the advent of liberalization,
the Indian energy sector has undergone a considerable transformation, characterized by a
higher degree of private sector investment in both the power and the renewable energy
sectors, and by institutional reform, both of which are policies long advocated by the
Bank. Although the Bank had recommended privatization, and pricing and institutional
reform, the policy advice had fallen on deaf ears under centralized planning. In addition.
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the study found that Indtan policy actors have sough, to ensure that national climate
change-related projects proposed for GEF fitndmg have pnmarily an energy (with
attendant envtronmental benefits), rather than , strictly environmental focus. India has
sought to use the GEF as an appropnate fitndmg mechantsm for the submission and
application of marketable renewable energy technology and energy efficiency and
conservation projects which are economically viable and envtronmentally beneficial. As
discussed in Chapter 5, MNES and MOEF projects submitted for GEF funding have
primarily been renewable energy projects, although currently energy conservation and
energy efficiency projects are also being submitted.
The study found that the influence of the World Bank and the GEF is not
unidirectional (that is, from the institutions to the domestic policy arena), but that Indian
policy experts and policy makers have used the programmes and projects of these
institutions for fulfilling national energy related needs and objectives. The World Bank’s
energy sector policies and lendmg, particularly in the Indian coal and power sectors have
serious climate change implications for India. The Bank’s role as a principal energy lender
gives it more leverage to influence Indian energy policies, which in turn impact on the
formulation of Indian climate change policy stances. Given the global environmental focus
of the GEF, and the fact that India is represented on the GEF by its Executive Director to
the Bank, the GEF’s influence on Indian climate change policy making has been such that
Indian climate change policy makers have concentrated on using the GEF as funding
mechanism for its energy related objectives. Although the GHG emissions from the large
developing countries are much less significant than those from developed countries, the
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study supports Durham’s point that "the Great Polluters", such as Brazil, China, India and
Indonesia are in position to try and balance demands made upon them by developed
countries with counter-proposals for their reduction ofC02 emissions. 532 More
importantly as the case of India demonstrates, the growth trajectories and increasing
energy demands of large developing countries, and the potential impacts of the same on
global climate change, give these countries more leverage than other developing countries
in seekmg financial and technical assistance through international environment financing
institutions such as the World Bank and the GEF.
Although the study has focused only on the relevant domestic policies influencing
Indian climate change stances at international negotiations, it is important to briefly
highlight a few characteristics of developing countries’ responses to the international
climate change negotiations. The assessment of responses to global climate change has not
only revealed North-South divisions but has also highlighted divisions between developing
countries. The different concerns and interests amongst developing countries regarding
global climate change, challenge the notion of the G-77 and China being considered a
homogenous negotiating entity. For example, the AOSIS, whose members are very low
GHG emitters but are unfortunately the most vulnerable to the threat of sea-level rise due
to global climate change, have emerged as a visible bargaining block in international
climate change negotiations. The AOSIS’s call for a climate change protocol was initially
viewed with suspicion by China and India who feared that they might face new
532 Eunice Durham, “Climate Change Policies in Developing Countries and the Role of
Multilateral Institutions,” in Hanish ed.. Climate Change and the Agenda for Research .
1994, page 69.
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commitments to reduce their GHG emtsstons, bu, by COP-1, these eountnes endorsed the
need for a protocol which would not tmpose any GHG emisstons reductions on developing
countries but which would set targets for limiting emissions from developed countries. In
direct contras, to AOS.S, OPEC countries have argued tha, any cuts in GHG emtsstons
directly impinge on their economic development as oil exporters. OPEC members have
attempted to stagnate progress on a possible protocol by calling into question lPCC’s
scientific assessment reports. The allocation of a Bureau sea, to AOSIS has led to a move
by OPEC countries to broaden representation, and seek for a seat for themselves on the
Bureau of the COP.
In addition, to the ongoing discussions on a future protocol to be finalized at COP-
3 in Kyoto, Japan, AI J remains one of the most important issues for both developing and
developed eountnes. As the study demonstrates, developing countries have differed in
their policy response to J1 or AIJ, as it is now called. Although many developing countries,
including India, China and Brazil, initially viewed JI with a great deal of caution, countries
like Costa Rica and Chile have advocated the benefits of JI at international climate change
fora. In marked contrast to Brazil, both China and India have endorsed the initiation of a
pilot phase of JI at INC-1 1, and worked actively towards the current formulation of a
pilot phase of AIJ without any credits accruing to developed countries. As the study
demonstrates, Indian policy experts from TERI and IGIDR, and key Indian policy makers
favor AIJ in the areas of energy efficiency, energy conservation, substitution of fossil fuel
sources, application of marketable renewable energy technologies. This view cannot be
restricted to the functionaries of the Indian state but may be extended to the Indian private
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energy sector which is after all the most essential element in future AIJ ventures with the
private energy sector in developed countries. Although this study did not focus on the role
of the private sector in formulating national climate change policy stances, future work on
the developing countries’ responses to the UNFCCC negotiations will need to take into
account the role of the private sector, particularly the energy sector. There is recent
evidence that Indian private sector is considering the economic costs and benefits of
addressing the global climate change problem. As Mr Nyati, the Environmental Focal
Point for the Confederation of Indian Industries (an apex organization for Indian industry
whose objectives are to provide advice, information and representative services to industry
and government) puts it.
If we have to reduce GHG emissions then we can do through energy conservation
measures and substitution of non-renewables for renewables but we are opposed to
putting a cap on GHG emissions- given the current level of Indian per capita
emissions, a cap is not acceptable.” 533
6.2 Some Recommendations for Future Work
Several brief suggestions are provided below, and they vary in scope from a
general recommendation for detailed investigations into the dynamics of the energy-
environment policy nexus in developing countries, to more specific suggestions that
emanate from the study’s findings. Moving from the general to the particular, it is clear
that although, global climate change has emerged as a completely new environmental
factor affecting the provision of, and access to, sustainable energy services in developing
countries, the scarcity of energy services in these countries has grave socio-economic and
533
Personal Interview with Mr Nyati, Environmental Focal Point, Confederation of
Indian Industries, New Delhi, September 13, 1995.
288
environmental implications. Lackrng the necessary infrastructure and financtng, developing
countries are faced with the task of prov.dtng leased, equitable access to energy
services whtle ensuring tha, additions to energy capacity do no, occur a, the cos, of
economic and environmental well being.
Approximately 2.5 billion people in developing countries have little access to
commercial energy supplies. Ye, the global energy demand for energy conrinues to grow,
with the developing country share increasing from 34 percent in 1990 to 49 percent in
2020 and 60 percent in 2050. - If these energy increases are satisfied using convenfional
energy sources and technologies there is every likelihood that already grave national (air
pollution), regional (acid rain and land degradation) and global (climate change)
environmental problems wiU be seriously exacerbated. Moreover, the growing lack of
adequate capital (both conventional and concessionary aid) for needed investments in
conventional energy will result in severe energy shortages. 535 While developing countries
are eager and almost desperate to attract private investment for their energy sectors, and
have focused their efforts at securing investments for large power plants, attention needs
to be paid to the provision of, and access to, sustainable energy services for the rural and
urban poor in these countries.
N. Nakicenovic and J. M. Jefferson, Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and
Beyond
,
(London: World Energy Council and International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis, 1995)
535
United Nations Development Programme Energy and Atmosphere Division, UNDP
Initiative for Sustainable Energy
.
(New York: UNDP, 1996), page 1.
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The connection between energy sector liberahzatton and the provision of equitable,
sustainable energy services in developing countries needs to be examined. A recent World
Bank report entitled World Development Report I <** : From Plan m discusses
several lessons of experience with regard to liberalization; one with particular relevance
for India is the impacts of the transition from plan to market on the poor. Here the Report
offers the grim conclusion that initial conditions of economic reform make increased
income inequality inescapable. It notes that.
Until this impact is offset by renewed growth-the indispensable element in any
antipoverty policy-an increase in poverty is inevitable.” 536
Using consumption data for the latter half of 1991 and 1992, collected by the National
Sample Survey Organization, Tendulkar and Jain offer support for linkage between
economic reforms and a worsening of poverty and argue that there has been a fairly
substantial worsening of rural poverty, and more marginal increase in urban poverty in the
early stages of economic reforms. 537 One specific aspect that urgently needs to be
addressed is the impacts of energy sector liberalization on the rural poor and on the
provision of non-commercial energy services.
In order to ensure that energy shortages and inefficiencies in energy production,
transmission and distribution systems do not become an obstacle to sustainable
development, developing countries need to focus on the two following areas: efficiency of
536 World Bank. World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market (Washington
D.C.: World Bank, 1996), page 144.
537 Suresh 1 endulkar and L.R. Jain. “Economic Reforms and Poverty,” Economic and
Political Weekly. June 10, 1995.
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energy production, transmission, distribution and end-use, and increased emphasis on
environmentally sound energy systems including a greater reliance on new and renewable
sources of energy and on marketable renewable energy technologies. There is clearly an
urgent need to highlight relevant policy issues in the energy-environment relationship in
developing countries and to facilitate these countries’ transition to environmentally sound
and economically viable energy systems.
One recommendation for future work, directly related to the present study, is to
examine the extent to which national energy related development needs, and patterns of
energy consumption and production frame or directly influence the construction of
national climate change policy responses in other countries. Such studies might be
particularly relevant for the current international negotiations on a climate change
protocol, as they will reveal the national policy impetus for action on climate change
,
and
the range of climate change related options preferred by, and open to different countries.
In addition, it might be useful to revisit the Indian case study in few years from now to see
if any policy frame shifts have occurred with regard to the formulation of national climate
change policy stances.
Related to the recommendation for additional empirical work on the role of policy
frames in driving national climate change policies, is a general recommendation for added
rigor and focus on the relationship between conceptual definitions of frames and framing
and the empirical applications of the role of frames in policy specific situations. Currently,
there are very few applications which link a theoretical definition of policy frames with an
empirical study of the role of frames in shaping actual policy outcomes. In large part, this
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may be due to the general methodological difficulties associated with the analytic
construction of frames which were identified in the introduction. Consequently,
researchers have proposed theoretical definitions of frames which they have been unable to
demonstrate or verily as existing in policy specific situations. In addition, work on the role
of pohcy frames needs to account for the theoretical and methodological relationship
between framing and learning. As discussed in the introduction, pohcy frame shifts cannot
simply be equated with (complex) learning unless these frame shifts are the result of the
provision of new, consensual knowledge. Consequently, additional theoretical and
empirical work on policy frame shifts which may be traced to the provision of consensual
knowledge needs to be undertaken.
One rather obvious suggestion for future work which emerges from the study is
the need to focus on the role of knowledge-based policy experts in the construction of
macroeconomic, energy and environmental policy in developing countries. In particular, it
would be useful to examine the role of transnational policy experts in the formulation of
national climate change policies. Additional suggestions are examinations of the role of
epistemic communities or knowledge-based policy experts as the case may be, in the
adoption of economic reform and liberalized pohcy regimes in developing countries and
the role of epistemic communities or policy experts in the formulation of energy policy in
developing countries. It might also be interesting to investigate the extent to which two
different kinds of epistemic communities exists around the global climate change issue -
one centered on climate change skeptics and the other centered around climate change
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advocates-and to study their influences in the development, progress, or lack thereof, of a
climate change protocol.
Another recommendation which emerges as a consequence of the findings of the
present study is the need to pay greater attention to the chmate change related implications
of private sector, bilateral and multilateral lending in energy sector in developing
countries. More specifically, given the World Bank’s role as a principal energy lender in
developing countries, national and regional evaluations of World Bank energy sector
lending and the climate change related implications of the same are essential. In addition,
given recent agreement on, and current interest in engaging in an AIJ pilot phase, bilateral
lending in energy sector which satisfies the criteria laid out by COP-1 will have to be
carefully studied. Finally, attention should also be paid to the GEF’s overall effectiveness
in implementing developing countries’ requests in the area of climate change. In addition,
national assessments of the usefulness of the GEF’s emphasis on incremental cost
financing predicated on distinguishing between national and global environmental benefits,
and favoring only those projects with demonstrable global benefits needs to be conducted.
The GEF is currently engaged in preparing a study of its overall performance to assess the
extent to which it has achieved the main objectives for its work during the pilot phase and
under the restructured GEF. One component of this study is to assess the GEF’s
effectiveness in providing additional funds for developing countries’ efforts to address
global environmental problems. Unfortunately, the results of study will be available only in
time for the GEF Assembly to be held in early 1998.
293
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Books and Reports
Agarwal. Anil and Narain. Sunita. Global Warmino in an I Im-md
New Delhi: Centre for Science and Environment. 1991.
AhUj3
' Dil'P_Ihe incremental Cost of Himate Change Mi,ieation PrniecK
Washington D.C.: Global Environment Facility Report No. 9. 1993.
Amsden. Alice. Asia's Next Giant: South Korea „nd Fate lnd„..ri a ii„,:„n
New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
Anderson. Dennis and Ahmed, Kulsum. The Case for Solar Energy Inve^m
Washington D.C: World Bank Technical Report No. 279, February 1995.
Asian Development Bank. Environmental Considerations in Energy Development
Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1991.
Asian Energy Institute. Collaborative Study on Strategies to limitm
:
emissions in
and Brazil. New Delhi: Asian Energy Institute, 1992.
Axelrod. Robert ed. Structure ot Decision: The cognitive maps of political elites .
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
Banuri. Tariq ed. Economic Liberalization: No Panacea
. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
Benedick, Richard. Ozone Diplomacy . Cambridge: ITarvard University Press, 1991
Bhagwati. Jagdish. India in Transition . Delhi: Oxford University Press. 1993.
Bhagwati. Jagdish. and Desai, Padma. India-Planning for Industrialization
London: Oxford University Press, 1970.
Asia
1991.
294
Boden. Thomas Kanciruk. Paul and Farrell, Michael. Trends '90: A Compendium nfn„.
on Global Change. Oak Ridge: Oakridge National Laboratory. 1990,
Bradnock. Robert. India's Foreign Policy since 1971 New York: Council on Foreign
Relations Press, 1990. K
Breslauer, George and Tetlock, Philip eds. Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy
Boulder: Westview Press, 1991.
Butcher, David. A Review of the Treatment of Environmental Aspects of Rank Energy
Projects: Power and Coal Mining
. Washington D.C.:World Bank Energy Series
Report No. 24, March 1990.
Byrne, John and Rich, Daniel eds. Energy and Environment: The Policy Challenge
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1992.
Cassen, Robert and Joshi, Vijay eds. India: The Future of Economic Reforms .
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995.
Chakravarty, Sukhamoy. Development Planning: The Indian Experience .
Oxford: Claredon Press, 1987.
Dery, David. Problem Definition in Policy Analysis . Lawrence: University Press of Kansas,
1984.
Dreze, Jean and Sen, Amartya. India, Economic Development and Social Opportunity .
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995.
Druckman, D., Stem, P., & Young, O. eds. Global Environmental Change: Understanding
the Human Dimensions . Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1992.
Dunlap, Riley, Gallup, George, and Gallup, Alec. Health of The Planet .
New Jersey: George Gallup International Institute, 1992.
295
Eder. Klaus Ihe Social Construction ofNihasi A Sociology
Enlightenment
. London: Sage Publications, 1996.
Fischer, Frank. Technocracy and the Politics of F.Yjwtio
Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990.
Gamson, W.A. Talking Politics
. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Gelbspan, Ross. Ihe Heat is On . New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1997.
Ghosh, Pradip ed. Economic Policy and Planning in Third World Development
Westport: Greenwood Press, 1984.
Global Environment Facility. Independent Evaluation of the Pilot PWpWashington D.C.: World Bank, 1994.
Global Environment Facility, Instrument for the Establishment of the Restructured Global
Environment Facility
. Washington D.C.: Global Environment Facility, 1994.
Global Environment Facility. GEF Council: A Proposed Statement of Work
Washington D.C.: Global Environment Facility, 1994.
Global Environment Facility. Semi-Annual Report on the Pilot Phase
Washington D.C.: Global Environmental Facility, 1995.
Global Environment Facility. Operational Strategy .
Washington D.C.: Global Environment Facility, 1996.
Global Environment Facility. Quarterly Operation Report .
Washington D.C: Global Environment Facility, 1996.
296
Goffman. Erying. Erame Analysis; An Essay on Ihe Organiza.ion n f
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974.
Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert ed. Ideas, Beliefs and Foreign PnlirY
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993.
Gordon, L., and Oldenberg, P. eds. India Briefing 1997 Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.
Grubb, M„ Brackley, P„ Ledic, M., Mathur, A., Rayner, S„ Russell, J„ and Tanabe, A.
Energy Policies and the Greenhouse Effect-Volume II- Country Studies anH
Technical Options
. Dartmouth: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991.
Grubb, Michael and Anderson, Dean. The Emerging International Regime for Climate
Change. London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1995.
Guha, Ashok ed. Economic Liberalization. Industrial Structure and Growth in India
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Guhan, S. The World Bank's Lening in South Asia .
Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1991.
Gupta, Joyeeta, Junne, Gerd and van der Wurff, Richard. International Policies to Address
the Greenhouse Effect . Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam, 1995.
Haas, Ernst. When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International
Organizations . Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
Haas, Peter. Saving the Mediterranean: The Politics of International Environmental
Cooperation . New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
Haas, Peter, Keohane, Robert and Levy, Marc eds. Institutions for the Earth: Sources of
Effective International Environmental Protection . Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.
297
Hamsh, Tedl ed. Ornate Change and the AgsndaiaL&easatdl
Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
Hanson. A.H. Ihe Process of Planning. London: Oxford University Press. 1956.
Hardgrave, Robert. India under pressure Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.
Hirschman. Albert. ABjasfora^^
and , atin A^„„New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.
" —
'
Burrell Andrew and Kingsbury, Benedict. The International
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992.
Politics of the Environment
Innes, Jnditli Knowledge and Public Policy: The Search far Meaningful Indi,.,,,^
New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1990.
Institute for Policy Studies. New IPS Study: World Bank Set to ,„m Indian State inm
OJobal Sacrifice Zone, Washington D.C.: IPS, May 13, 1996.
International Energy Agency. Bjofuels
. Paris: International Energy Agency, 1994.
International Energy Agency. Climate Change Policy Initiatives: Vol TT-Selected Nnn-TFA
Countries. Paris: OECD/Intemational Energy Agency, 1996.
Ishiguro, Masayasu and Akiyama,Takamasa. Energy Demand in Five Major Asian
Developing Countries. Washington D.C.: World Bank Discussion Papers, 1995.
Jachtenfuchs, Markus. International Policy-Making as a Learning Process? The European
Union and the Greenhouse Effect . London: Ashgate Publishing, 1996.
Jalan, Bimal. India’s Economic Crisis . New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1 992.
298
Jasanoff. Sheila. The Fifth Branch: Science Advisers a S PolicyM^rc
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990.
Jasanoff, Sheila ed. Learning from Di^stpr
Philadelphia: University of Pennslyvania Press, 1994.
Joshi, Vijay and Little, Ian. India: Macroeconomics and Political Economy 1 964. 1 QQi
Washington D.C: World Bank, 1994.
^ y
Joshi, Vijay and Little, Ian. India’s Economic Reforms: 1991-2001
New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Keohane, Robert. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Politic!
Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Keohane, Robert. Neorealism and its Critics .
New York: Columbia University Press. 1986.
Keohane, Robert. International Institutions and State Power
Boulder: Westview Press, 1989.
Keohane, Robert and Levy, Marc. Institutions for Environmental Aid
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996.
Khator, Renu. Environment. Development and Politics in India .
Lanham: University Press of America. 1991.
King, Ken. The Incremental Costs of Global Environmental Benefits . Washington D.C.:
Global Environment Facility Report No. 5, 1993
King, Ken. The Incremental Costs of Global Environmental Benefits . Washington D.C.
Global Environment Facility Report No. 5, 1993.
299
Kmg
’
K
,|"'^
ues ‘0 116 Addressed by the ProgramJaLMeasurinp Internal r„* f„.
Kingdom, John. Agendas, Alternatives, and PnhUp Policies
Boston: Little & Brown, 1984.
KoWi
’
AtuL Psniocr^cv and Discontent
. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Krasner, Stephen ed. International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983
Larsen. Bjom and Shah, Anwar. World fossil fi.nl subsidies and ,i»tvt
Washington D.C.: World Bank, June 1992.
carbon emissions
Larsen. Bjorn. World fossil fuel subsidies and global carbon emissions in a model ,„t,n
interfile! substitution. Washington D.C: World Bank, June 1994.
Levy, Marc, Keohane, Robert, and Haas, Peter eds. Institutions for the Earth: Sources of
Effective International Environmental Protection
. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.
Levy, Marc, Young, Oran, and Zum, Michael. The Study of International Regimes
Laxenburg: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1994.
Lipschutz, Ronnie and Conca, Ken eds. The State and Social Power in Global
Environmental Politics . New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
Little, Ian. Economic Development: Theory, Policy and International Relations .
New York: Basic Books, 1982.
Lunde, Leiv. Science or Politics in the Global Greenhouse?: The Development Towards
Scientific Consensus on Climate Change . Oslo: FridtjofNansen Institute, 1991.
300
Lundqv
if
• L- lbs HW an4 thf Tortoise- riem
_
A[r Policies in I IniLH s„». -h
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980.
Manmohan, Singh. Indira Export Trends. London: Oxford University Press, 1964.
Mehta, F.A. Second India Studies : Economy
. New Delhi: MacMillan, 1 976.
Minzter, Irving ed. Confronting Climate Changp
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Minzter, Irving. Implementing the Framework Convention on Climate Change-
Incremental Costs and the Role of the GEF . Washington D.C.: Global
Environment Facility Report No. 4, 1993.
Mintzer, Irving and Leonard, J.A. eds. Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Storv of
the Rio Convention
. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993.
Mitra, A.P. ed. Greenhouse Gas Emissions in India . New Delhi: Council of Scientific and
Industrial Research and the Ministry of Environment and Forests, 1992.
Mohan Munasinghe ed. Global Climate Change: Economic and Policy Issues .
Washington D.C.: World Bank Environment Report No. 12, 1995.
Nakicenovic, N. and Jefferson, J.M. Global Energy Perspectives to 2050 and Beyond .
London: World Energy Council and International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis, 1995.
Nath, Kama! India’s Environmental Concerns . New Delhi: Ministry of Environment and
Forests, Environment Information System, 1995.
Nayar, B.R. Modernization and Indian Planning . Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1972.
301
Nijkamp, Peter. Environmental Pnliry Analy
-h. New York: John Wiley & Sons. 1980
Parikh, Jyoti and Pai. Madhuri. Superconductors in Power Systems- A Terhn,u„,„.
Assessment tor India Bombay: Allied Publishers. 1990.
Parikh. Jyoti and Hariharan, V. eds. Power Systems for the Year 7000 and tW'-.t
New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill Publishing, 1990.
Parikh. Jyoti and Gokam, Subir. Consumption Patterns: The Driving Fmvp r>f
Environmental Stress . Bombay: Indira Gandhi Institute for
Development Research. 1991.
Parikh. Jyoti and Painuly, J.P
. Compressed Natural Gas in Transport Sector: Techno-
economic Assessment fpr India
. Bombay: Indira Gandhi Institute for Development
Research Report No. DP-9 1-49, 1991.
Parikh. Jyoti and Gokam. S. Climate Change and India’s Energy Policy Options Bombay:
Indira Gandhi Institute for Development Research Report No. DP-92-76. 1992.
Parikh. Jyoti and Chattopadhyay, D. CCE Emissions Reductions from Power Systems in
India. Bombay: Indira Gandhi Institute for Development Research
Report No. DP-92-79, 1992.
Parikh. Jyoti. North-South Cooperation in Climate Change through Joint Implementation
.
Bombay: Indira Gandhi Institute for Development Research Report No. 142, 1994.
Parikh. Kirit. Second India Studies: Energy . New Delhi: MacMillan. 1976.
Oye, Kenneth ed. Cooperation under Anarchy .
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.
Oye, Kenneth. Economic Discrimination and Political Exchange .
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
302
Repetto, Robert ed. The "Second India" Rpykl.-H
Washington D.C.: World Resources Institute, 1994.
Rosenau, James and Czempeil, Emst-Otto eds. Governance withom fiovemnyn,. rs,
n|Tand Order in World Politics
. New York: Cambridge University Press. 1992 ,
Roy, K Tisdell C. and Sen. R.K. eds. Economic Development and Environment- A P-,,,.
Study of India. Calcutta: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Schon, Donald. Ihe Reflective Pragtioner : How Professionals Think
New York: Basic Books, 1983.
Schon, Donald and Rein, Martin. Frame Reflection: Toward the Resolution of Intractahle
Policy Controversies New York: Basic Books, 1994.
Sjoberg, Flelen. From Idea to Reality: The Creation of the Global Environment Facility
Washington D.C: Global Environment Facility, 1994.
Sjostedt, Gunnar, ed. International Environmental Negotiation
London: Sage Publications, 1993.
Tata Energy Research Institute. Energy Data: Directory and Yearbook. 1990-91
New Delhi: Tata Energy Research Institute, 1992.
Tata Energy Research Institute. Climate Change: An India Country Study
New Delhi: Tata Energy Research Institute, 1993.
Tata Energy Research Institute. Environmental Considerations and Options in Managing
India's Long-term Energy Strategy . New Delhi: United Nations Environment
Programme and Tata Energy Research Institute, 1995.
303
Tata Energy Research Institute. Environmental rnnckWj.,,,
and r)n,,OTO into s Long-term Fnergy Strategy: SertoraLDetails New Delhi: United Nationsnvtronment rogramme and Tata Energy Research Institute. 1995.
Third World Network. The Social and Rmlngleai t^,
~f "^Irl Bank/IMF
Adjustment Policies in India
. New Delhi: Third World Network, 1992.
United Nations. 1993 Yearbook of the United Nations
. New York: United Nations. 1993.
United Nations Department for Economic and Social Information and Policy Analysis
Energy Statistics Yearbook: 1993
. New York: United Nations. 1995.
United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations. Foreign Direct Investment and
Technology Transfer in India . New York: United Nations, 1992.
United Nations Development Programme. Workshop Report on Designing Joint Project
.
Mechanisms to Promote Benefits for Developing Countries- 13- 15 December
1924. New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1994
United Nations Development Programme Energy and Atmosphere Division, UNDP
Initiative for Sustainable Energy
,
New York: United Nations Development
Programme. 1996.
Warford, J., Schwab. A., Cruz, W., and Hansen, S. The Evolution of Environmental
Concerns in Adiustment [.ending: A Review .
Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1993.
Weiss, Carol ed. Using Social Research in Public Policy Making .
Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1 977.
Westing, Arthur ed. Global Resources and International Politics .
New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.
304
Wildavsky. Aaron. Speaking Truth to Power: Tho An „na r„» of Policv Analv^k
Boston: Little. Brown & Co., 1979.
Wolfrum. Rudiger ed. Enforcing Environmental Standards: Economic Mechanisms .is
Viable Means ? . New York: Springer. 1996.
Woods Hole Research Center. Report of a Workshop nn Criteria for Joint
Implementation
. Woods Hole: Woods Hole Research Center, 1994.
World Bank. The Energy Transition in Developing Countries
Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1983.
World Bank. The Evolution of Environmental Concerns in Adjustment Lending
Washington D.C.: World Bank. 1993.
World Bank. Making Development Sustainable : The World Bank Group and the
Environment
. Washington D.C.: World Bank. 1994
World Bank. Submission and Evaluation of Proposals for Private Power Generation
Projects in Developing Countries . Washington D.C.: World Bank Industry and
Energy Department Paper No. 2, April 1994.
World Bank. Trends in Developing Countries:Emergintz Capital Markets-Vol.2 .
Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1995.
World Bank. The World Bank and the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change .
Washington D.C: Environment Department: Discussion Paper No. 008,
March 1995.
World Bank. Economic Developments in India: Achievements and Challenges .
Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1995.
305
World Bank. .World Development Report 1996: From Plan to Market
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
World Commission on Environment and Development. Our Common Future
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987.
World Meteorological Organization. World Climate Conference- Pvtended Suimmks qL
Papers Presented at the Conference
. Geneva: World Meteorological Organization.
World Resources Institute. World Resources: 1990-1991
New York: Oxford University Press, 1990.
World Resources Institute. World Resources: 1994-199S
New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
World Resources Institute. World Resources: 1 996- 1 997
New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Young, Oran. International governance: Protecting the environment in a stateless society
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
Zartman, William ed. Positive Sum: Improving North-South Negotiations .
New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1987.
Periodicals and Newspapers
Adler, Emanuel and Haas, Peter. “Conclusion: epistemic communities, world order and
the creation of a reflective research program.” International Organization .
Vol.46: No.l. Winter 1992.
Agarwal, Anil. “Western rhetoric swamps cold facts of global warming.”
Economic Times . January 26, 1992.
306
Anderson, Dennis and Ahmed, Kulsum. “Where We Stand
Finance and Development June 1993.
with Renewable Energy.”
Anderson, Dennis. “Energy and Environment: Technical and Economic Policies ”
Finance and Development June 1 996.
Banerjee, Soma. “A reluctant CIL agrees to supply washed coal.” The Economic TWc
August 6, 1996.
'
Bemauer, Thomas. “The Effect of International Environmental Institutions: How we
might learn more.” International Organization
. No. 49: Vol.2, Spring 1995.
Bhagwati, Jagdish and Chakravarty, S. “Contributions to Indian Economic Analysis: A
Survey.” American Economic Review Supplement
. September 1969.
Bodansky, Daniel. “Draft Convention on Climate Change.”
Environmental Policy and Law . Vol. 22: No.l, 1992.
Bombay Bureau. “Maharashtra government clears Enron power project.”
The Economic Times . January 9, 1 996.
Business Correspondent. “Intoxicated by power.” The Economist . June 14, 1997.
Business Correspondent. “ Fuel Industry tops in wooing investment.”
The Hindu . June 27, 1995.
Carpenter, C., Chasek, P., Cherian, A., and Wise, S. “INC-1 1 Highlights, Thursday, 9
February 1995.” Earth Negotiations Bulletin.Vol. 12: No. 5, February 10, 1995.
Carpenter, C., Chasek, P., Cherian, A., and Wise, S. “Summary of the Eleventh Session of
the INC for the FCCC: 6-17 February 1995.” Earth Negotiations Bulletin .
Vol. 12: No.l 1, February 20, 1995.
307
Vol. 12: No.21, April 10, 1995.
Chakraborty, Madhumita. “Ministry move to end CIL
The Financial Express
. August 9. 1996.
row with power project.
Chatteijee, Pratap. “World Bank to pay for global warming disaster.” InterPress Serv^
September 10, 1993.
Chatteijee, Pratap. “World Bank makes new plans for global coal industry.” InterPress
Service
. August 2. 1996.
Chatteijee, Pratap. “Environment-India: Coal Mine Loans Opposed on Social
Environmental Grounds.” InterPress Service May 19, 1996.
Chattopadhyay, D., and Parikh, Jyoti. “C02 Emissions Reductions from the Power System
in India.” Natural Resources Forum . November 1993.
Crocker, C. “The elephant awakes: Freemg India’s economy.”
The Economist . May 23, 1992.
de Neufville, Judith and Barton, Stephen. “Myths and the definition of policy problems.”
Policy Sciences . Vol. 22. 1989.
Delhi Bureau. “CBI Executes Warrants on Rao.” The Hindu . October 10, 1996.
Downs. Antony. “Up and Down with Ecology.” Public Interest . No 28. 1972.
Eco Reporters. “G-77 Moves on Protocol." ECO .Vol. 89: No. 4. March 31, 1995.
308
Eco Reporters. “Mandate Movement?” ECO
. Vol.89: No 2. March 29 1995.
Economic Bureau. “India to pursue a restrictive monetary policy: Manmohan ”
The Indian Express
. December 17, 1991.
Enron Special Report. ‘Arbitration: Who will pick up the tab.”
India Today
. August 31, 1995.
Express News Service. “Enron Phase II likely to change : Salve.”
Indian Express
. January 14, 1996.
Financial Express News Service. “Cogentrix raises many an eyebrows.”
The Financial Express
. October 13, 1996.
Financial Express News Service. “Centre sets up committee on infrastructure.”
The Financial Express
. October 13, 1996.
Fotheringham, A. “Reformer Rao.” The Economist
. July 13, 1991.
Gamson, W.A., and Modigliani, A. “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on nuclear
power: A constructionist approach.” American Journal of Sociology .
Vol. 95, 1989.
Girma, Messaye. “Macropolicy and the Environment: A Framework for Analysis.”
World Development . Vol.20: No. 4. 1992.
Greenlees, Lunn. “Australia may withdraw from pact.” Svdnev Australian . May 6, 1997.
Gupta, Manoranjana. “World Bank seeks stranglehold over coal, power and water
sectors.” Financial Express . January 13, 1992.
309
Haas, Peter. “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination." International Organization Vni 46 ; No. 1 . Winter 1992.
Haas, Peter. “Knowledge, Power and International Policy Coordination.”
International Organization Vol. 46: No. 1. Winter 1992
Haas, Peter. “Banning Chlorofluorocarbons: Epistemic Community Efforts to Protect
Stratospheric Ozone. International Organization
. Vol 46: No. 1. Winter 1992.
Hardin, Garret. The Tragedy of the Common.” Science
. Vol. 162, December 13, 1968.
Jacob, Rahul. “The Surprise Reformer: Can a Harvard-educated rebel find success as
India's new deficit busting Finance Minister.” Time
. Vol. 148: No. 3,
July 15, 1996.
Jain, Sunil. “A Long Winding Road.” India Today September 30, 1994.
Jasanoff, Sheila. “Managing India’s Environment.” Environment
. Vol. 28: No. 8.
October 1986.
Jasanoff, Sheila. “India at the crossroads in global environmental policy.”
Global Environmental Change . Vol.3: No.l. March 1993.
Knshnakumar, Asha. “Growing Concerns: On the ecology of development.”
Frontline . March 22, 1 996.
Kuklinksi, James, Luskin, Robert and Bolland, John. "Where is the Schema: Going beyond
the S’ word in Political Psychology. American Political Science Review .
No. 85. 1991.
Kurien, P. J. “Renewable Energy for Sustainable Development.” The Economic Times .
December 14, 1995.
310
Levy, Jack. “Learning and foreign policy: sweeping a conceptual minefield.”
Internationa l Organization
. No. 48. Spring 1994
Linden, Eugene. “A Sunny Forecast.” lime. Vol. 144: No. 19. November 7, 1994.
Mohan, R. “Cogentrix project clears last hurdle.” Business I ine July 16, 1996.
Mongia, N., Bhatia, R„ Sathaye, J., and Mongia, P. “Cost of reducing CO, emissions from
India.” Energy Policy . Vol 19: No. 10. December 1991.
Mongia, N, Sathaye, J, and Mongia, P. “Energy use and carbon implications in India ”
Energy Policy . Vol 22: No. 11, 1994.
Mukheijee, Shubham. “Government slashes red tape on foreign owned coal, hydro power
projects.” The Economic Times . August 22, 1996.
Munasinghe, Mohan, Cruz, Wilfredo, and Warford, Jeremy. “Are economywide policies
good for the environment?” Finance & Development
. September 1993.
Nehru, Arun. “The Politics of Uncertainty.” The Flindu . May 13, 1996.
New Delhi Bureau. “Guarantees for fast-track power units by September 30.”
The Economic Times . August 17, 1996.
New Delhi Bureau. “No more CEA nod for power projects upto 250 MW.”
The Economic Times . August 21, 1996.
Nye, Joseph. “Nuclear Learning and U.S.- Soviet Security Regimes.”
International Organization . Vol. 41, 1987.
Parikh, Jyoti and Pai, M.G. “Applications of High Temperature Superconductors to Power
Sector in Developing Countries.” Journal of Superconductivity . Vol.l. 1989.
311
Parikh, Jyoti and Gokarn, Subir. “Climate Change and India'sGlobal Environmental Change
. September 1993
.
energy policy options.”
Parikh, Jyoti. “Energy Conservation in Indian Manufacturing Industries
Productivity
. Vol.30: No.4, 1990.
Journal of
Parikh, Kint. “Renegotiated Enron Deal: Letter to the Editor.”
Times of India. January 22, 1996.
Paterson. Matthew and Grubb, Michael. “The International Politics of Climate Chance
International Affairs Vnl i iqqo 6
Rajghatta, Chidanand. “World Bank’s brief for investors in power sector.”
The Indian Express August 29, 1996.
Sanotra, H.S., and Jain, S. “The Power Fallout.” India Today
. August 31. 1995.
Sebenius, James. “Designing Negotiations Towards a New Regime: The Case of Global
Warming.” International Security . Vnl 15: No.4. 1991.
Shiva, V. “Global Environment Facility, Perpetuating Non-Democratic Decision-Making.”
Third World Economics
. 31 March 1993.
Siddayo, Corazon. “Energy investments and environmental implications.”
Energy Policy . Vol. 20: No. 3. March 1992.
Simoman, Haig. “Springing a U-Turn on climate: Developing countries have shifted
attitude.” Financial Times . April 6, 1995.
Singh. Rahul. “The World Bank and the Subcontinent.” EarthTimes. December 8, 1996.
312
Singh, Vir. “World Bank President faces ire ofNGO activists ”
Earth Times
. October 28, 1996.
Skolnikoff, Eugene. “The PoUcy Gridlock on Global Warming.”
Foreign Policy
. No. 79. 1990.
Special Correspondent. “Rao Unveils Audacious Strategy.”
Indian Express
. January 25, 1996.
Special Correspondent. “World Bank to review all projects in India.”
The Hindu . October 21, 1996.
Special Report. “Arbitration: Who will pick up the tab.” India Today
. August 31, 1995
Staff Reporter. “Climate change outcome appears bleak: Developing Nations reluctant on
commitment to carbon reduction goals.” The Observer of Business and Politics
March 5, 1992.
Staff Reporter. “India may opt out of climate convention: Retaliation against US decision
to boycott bio-diversity convention.” The Observer of Business and Politics
June 3, 1992.
Staff Reporter. “Emphasis on Reforms Continues in Budget.” The Hindu . July 23, 1996.
Staff Reporter. “Deadlock over greenhouse gas cuts.” Daily Telegraph . April 5, 1995.
Sudarshan, R. “Liberalization and the Environment.” The Hindu . April 19, 1996.
Sullivan, James. “Private Power in Developing Countries: Early Experience and a
Framework for Development.” Annual Review of Energy . Vol. 15. 1990.
313
Tendulkar, Suresh and Jain, L.R. “Economic Reforms and Poverty.”
Economic and Political Weekly
. June 10. 1995
Tnpathi, S. “The Politics of Power, the Power of Politics.” Asia Inc October
,
1995.
Underdal, Arild. “The Concept of Regime 'Effectiveness.” Cooperation and Conflict
No. 27, September 1992.
'
Varam, Dev. 'Power Sector Investment in the Dark.” News India September 15, 1995.
Vikraman, Shaji. “Infrastructure Project Finance: Policy on 20-Year IBRD Loans for
Private Sector on Anvil.” Business Line August 13. 1996.
Warner, S.G. “High Cost of ‘Green’ Signal for Power Projects.’
Business Line . August 28, 1996.
Young, Oran. The Politics of International Regime Formation: Managing Natural
Resources and the Environment.” International OrpanUation
No. 43, Summer 1989.
Government of India and United Nations Documents
Government of India. Press Information Bhavan. "Statement at the Press Conference on
Three Years Achievements of Shri. P.V. Narsimha Rao Government by Minister of
State for Non-Conventional Energy Sources and Agriculture. New Delhi: Press
Information Bhavan, July 7, 1994.
Information Unit on Climate Change. “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change”. Geneva: World Meteorological Organization and United Nations
Environment Programme, 1992.
314
Information Unit on Climate Change. “Fact Sheets Nos. 201, 209, and 215-222 ”
Geneva: World Meteorological Organization and United Nations Environment
Programme, 1993.
Ministry ofNon-Conventional Energy Sources. “Background Note: Third Conference of
Chief Ministers and Ministers of Non-Conventional Energy Sources of State
Governments and Umon Territories.” New Delhi: Government of India, September
Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources. Annual Report: 1993-1994
New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1994.
Ministry ofNon-Conventional Energy Sources. Annual Report: 1994-1995
New Delhi: Government of Indian Press, 1995.
Planning Commission. Third Five Year Plan. 1961-1966
.
New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1961.
Planning Commission. Fourth Five Year Plan: A Draft Outline
New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1966.
Planning Commission. Fourth Five Year Plan. 1969-74 .
New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1969.
Planning Commission. Fifth Five Year Plan, 1974-1979
.
New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1976.
Planning Commission. Sixth Five Year Plan, 1980-85 .
New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1981.
Planning Commission. Seventh Five Year Plan. 1985-90- Vol. I .
New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1985.
315
Planning Commission. Seventh Five Year Plan. 1985-90-Vo i n
New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1985.
Planning Commission. Eighth Five Year Plan 1 992-97- Vnl T
New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1992.
Planning Commission. Eighth Five Year Plan. 1992-1 997-Vol II
New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1992.
United Nations General Assembly. “Protection of the global climate for present and future
generations of mankind.” Resolution 43/53. December 6, 1988.
United Nations, “Forty Fourth Session-Second Committee : 6th Meeting-Summarv
Records.” A/C.2.44/SR.6, October 5, 1989
United Nations General Assembly. “Possible adverse effects of sea-level rise on islands and
coastal areas, particularly low-lying coastal states.” Resolution 44/206 December
22, 1989.
United Nations General Assembly. Protection of the global climate for present and future
generations of mankind.” Resolution 44/207. December 22, 1989.
United Nations General Assembly. Protection of global climate change for present and
future generations of mankind.” Resolution 45/212. December 21, 1990.
United Nations. “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Climate Change -Non-
paper submissions.” A/AC.237/Misc. 1/Add. 1-9. June-July 1990.
United Nations. “Report of Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework
Convention on Climate Change on the work of its the First Session.”
A/AC.237/6, March 8, 1991.
316
United Nations. “Set of Informal Papers provided by delegations,”
A/AC.237/Misc.l/Add. 1-9, May-June 1991.
United Nations. “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
4/^7 oCrVemi^ °n C1Unate Change °n the work of its Second Session ”A/AC.237/9, August 19, 1991.
United Nations. “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Third Session ”
A/AC.237/12, October 25, 1991.
United Nations. “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Fourth Session.”
A/AC.237/15, January 29, 1992
United Nations. “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention
on Climate Change (Fourth Session)-Commitments.” A/AC.237/WG.1/L.7
December 18, 1991
United Nations. “Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development: Vol. 1 1 1.” A/Conf.151/26, August 14, 1992,
Chapter 33, paragraph 14.
United Nations. “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of the second part of its
Fifth Session.” A/AC.237/18 (Part II), October 18, 1992.
United Nations. “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Sixth Session.”
A/AC.237/24, January 6, 1992.
United Nations. “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Eighth Session.”
A/AC.237/27/Rev.l, June 16 1993.
317
Uni,ed
crte™ for jomt
United Nations. “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for aramework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Tenth c
A/AC.237/76, October 1 0, 1 994
.
0t “S Sesslon
-
United Nations. “Matters Relating to Commitments: Letter dated September 20 1994 tfom
°f Trinidad^ ™ •» •»*Secretary of the mtenm secretariat, transmitting a draft protocol to the UNFramework Convention on Climate Change on Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Reductions. A/AC.237/L.23, September 27, 1994.
United Nations. Matters Relating to Commitments: Letter dated September 22, 1994 fromthe Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safetyof Germany to the Executive Secretary of the interim secretariat, transmitting
proposals for farther elements of a protocol to the Convention.”
A/AC.237/L.23/Add.l, September 27, 1994 .
United Nations. “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention
on Climate Change: Criteria for Joint Implementation.” A/AC.237/MISC 44/Add 1
December 7, 1994.
*
*
’
United Nations. “Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention
on Climate Change: Criteria for Joint Implementation: Addendum.”
A/AC.237/MISC .44/Add. 1
,
February 6, 1995.
United Nations. “Report of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for a
Framework Convention on Climate Change on the work of its Eleventh Session:
Part II-Recommendations to the Conference of the Parties.” A/AC.237/91/Add.l
March 8, 1995.
United Nations. “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its First Session: Action taken
the COP-Part II.” FCCC/CP/1995/Add.l, June 6, 1995
318
Unpublished Mimeographs/Papers
Dasgupta, C. Statement by Leader ofthe Indian Delegation at INC-2.” July 19, 1991
De Sa, Antony.
“Presentation to UNFCCC’s Technical Panel on AD.” Geneva
fonhlViL
“
J°mt S-eg.es
Esty, Daniel and Koehler, Jamison. “Restructuring the Global Environment
Washington D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1993.
Facility,”
Group of 77 and China Informal Paper. “Draft decision ofthe Committee
Joint Implementation.” February 15, 1995.
on Criteria for
Indian Delegation. “Proposed Elements of a Mandate for Consultations
Informal Paper.” March 28-April 7, 1995.
on Commitments:
Indian delegation. “Intervention by India with regard to criteria for joint implementation ”
August 1994.
Kamal Nath, “Official Government of India Letter sent by Minister Kamal Nath.”
March 24, 1995.
Kumar, Kumar. “1995 India Power Congress: Special Address on New & Renewable
Sources of Energy in India.” New Delhi, September 13, 1995.
Mathur, Ajay. Technological Options for reducing GHG emissions from coal-based power
generation.” Tata Energy Research Institute Paper, June 1991.
Noronha, L.“Principle and Commitments to Limit Climate Change: A Commentary.”
Tata Energy Research Institute Paper, January 1992.
Pachauri, R.K. and Ghosh, P. “International Energy Policy Issues from an oil importing,
developing country perspective.” Tata Energy Research Institute Paper. June 1991.
319
Sreenivasan. T.P “Speaking Notes of Ambassador T.P. Sreenivasan. Deputy Permanent
Representative of India tn the Second Committee on the protection of global
climate change tor present and future generations of mankind.” October 21, 1994.
Tata Energy Research Insitute “Global Warming Centre: Perspective Plan-2010.” 1992.
van der Wurfif, Richard. InLematiorad Climate Change Pol itics: Interests and Perception.
Manuscript, University of Amsterdam. March 31, 1997.
Personal Interviews
Interview with K R. Achary, Technical Assistant to Minister of Non-Conventional Energy
Sources, New Delhi, September 12, 1995.
Interview with K.K. Bakshi, Additional Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests,
New Delhi, September 11, 1995.
Interview with Dr. S.K. Chopra, Senior Advisor, Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy
Sources, New Delhi, September 14, 1995.
Interview with Antony De Sa, Personal Secretary to the Minister of Environment and
Forests, Geneva, August 23, 1995.
Interview with Dr. N. Knshnan, Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests, Geneva,
April 28, 1995.
Interview with S. Krishna Kumar, Minister of State for Non-Conventional Energy Sources,
New Delhi, November 21, 1994.
Interview with Dr. Anil Malhotra, Energy Advisor-South Asia Department, World Bank,
Washington D.C., July 19, 1995.
320
Interview with Dr. Ajay Mathur, Research Fellow-Climate Change Expert
Research Institute, New Delhi, November 14
, 1994 .
,
Tata Energy
Interview with Dr. Irving Minzter, Stockholm Environment Institute, Geneva
August 31, 1995.
Interview with Kamal Nath, Minister of State for Environment and Forests
New Delhi, September 11, 1995.
Interview with Dr. R.K. Pachauri, Director, Tata Energy Research Institute,
New York, October 27, 1994, and New Delhi, September 13, 1995.
Interview with Dr. Jyoti Parikh, Senior Professor, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development
Research, Bombay, September 29, 1995.
Interview with B.R. Prabhakhara, Secretary, Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy
Sources, New Delhi, September 14, 1995.
Interview with Mukul Sanwal, Senior Advisor-United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change Secretariat, Geneva, August 23, 1995.
Interview with Ravi Sharma, Climate Change Expert, Centre for Science and Environment,
New Delhi, September 13, 1995.
Interview with Dr. S. Sharma, Director-Climate Change, Ministry of Environment and
Forests, New Delhi, September 12, 1995.
Interview with Dr. C.S. Sinha, Climate Change Focal Point, Tata Energy Research
Institute, New York, October 26, 1994, and New Delhi, September 13, 1995.
Interview with Ambassador. T.P. Sreenivasan, Deputy Permanent Representative, United
Nations Mission of India, New York, October 21, 1994.
321
Interview with Dr. R. Sundararaman, Secretary, Intergovemment Panel on ClimateChange, Berlin, April 1, 1995.
Interview with R. Vasudevan, (Former) Secretary, Ministry of Power, New Delhi
September 14, 1995.
Internet Sources
Chittal, Nitin. “An overview of the Indian Power Industry.”
Indian Express Investment Week
. April 1, 1996. Available on the Internet at
<http://www. power.indiaworld.com/open/bgnd/537 1 -OOO.html>.
Embassy of India-Economic Wing, “Foreign Direct Investment in India-Useful Statistics.”
April 11, 1996. Available on the Internet at
<http://www.indiaserver.com/biz/emdc/fdi/fdi2/fdi.html>.
Government of India Press Information Bureau. “Power Highlights.” August 14, 1996.
Available on the Internet at <http://www.nic.in/India-Image/PIB/power.html>.
Government of India Press Information Bureau. “2,000 MW of Grid Quality Power from
Renewables.” August 16, 1996. Available on the Internet at http://www.nic.in/
India-Image/PIB/PIBR 1 60896.html>.
Government of India Press Information Bureau, “Power Booklet.” August 1996.
Available on the Internet at <http://www.nic.in/India-Image/PIB/bpower.html>.
Government of India Press Information Bureau. “Interim Budget, 1996- 1997-Speech of
Shri Manmohan Singh.” February 28, 1996. Available on the Internet at\
<http://www.nic.in/India-Image/PIB/Archive/PIBR/Feb96/PIBR280296.html>.
International Trade Administration (IJS Department of Commerce), “India-Big Emerging
Markets.” 1996. Available on the Internet at
<http://www.stat-usa.gov/bems/bemsind/inbes.html>.
322
Staff Reporter. ''Centre to introduce pollution norms for power plants.” India Power
July 22, 1996. Available on the Internet at
<http ://www.power, indiaworld.com/open/news/jul22.html>.
World Bank. “India.” Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications, 1996.
Available on the Internet at
Daily .
<http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/sas/in.html>.
World Bank. “India: A Social Profile.” Washington D.C.: World Bank Publications, 1997.
Available on the Internet at
<http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offfep/sas/in.html>.
World Bank. “The World Bank: A Global Partnership for Development.”
Washington D.C.: World Bank, 1996. Available on the Internet at
<http ://www.worldbank
.org/html/extdr/glance/html>.
World Bank. “World Bank satisfied with progress on India’s Coal Sector Environmental
and Social Mitigation Project.” Washington D.C.: World Bank Press
Release No. 97/ 1389/SAS. Available on the Internet at
<http ://www .worldbank
.org/html/extdr/extme/ 1 389 .html>.
323


